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S Y N O P S I S 
The main t h ru s t of t h i s t h e s i s e n t i t l e d Social Ph i lo -
sophy of Mutahhari i n Modern Perspect ive i s to cont ras t the 
Mutahharl 's soc ia l philosophy with philosophers of the West 
l i k e Herbert Marcuse, J , P, S a r t r e , Karl Popper, Bertrand 
Russell and J , S, Mill i n the l i g h t of t h e i r approaches t o -
wards i ssues such as soc i a l change, indiv idual and soc ie ty , 
freedom, soc ia l Jus t i ce and a l i ena t ion e t c . 
Although S a r t r e , Popper, Marcuse and Russell represent 
d i f f e r e n t views of s o c i a l change, t h e i r concern with Marxism 
can be taken as a meeting point with Mutahhari 's view. As a 
matter of f a c t , Mutahhari developed h i s soc i a l philosophy 
through a c r i t i q u e of Marxism and o ther western ideologies 
such as Ex i s ten t i a l i sm. For ins tance , Sar t re developed h is 
soc i a l philosophy on Marxist l i n e s on the bas is of ex i s t en-
t i a l ontology, which marks a significeint point of departure 
i n western philosophy. However, Mutahharl 's opposi t ion to 
Marxism and Exis ten t ia l i sm was confined to those elements in 
them which threa ten to Jeopardise the fundamentals of Islam, 
Most of the western approaches, p a r t i c u l a r l y those 
labeled as the New Left , s t r i v e to c r i t i c i s e Marxism in 
general and Soviet Marxism in p a r t i c u l a r with a view to 
recons t ruc t Marxism and bring about an authent ic Marxism 
which could be a source of c r i t i c a l theory based upon d i a l e c -
t i c a l method. So t h e i r c lash with Marxism i s e s s e n t i a l l y a 
family quarrel. But Mutahhari felt that Marxism is a 
challenge to Islam at a fundamental level. There were 
some Muslim scholars in Egypt, Iran and other Muslim 
countries, including India and Pakistan, who strove to 
reconcile Marxism with Islam in order to develop a revo-
lutionary theory as a remedy for their social maladies. 
But Mutahhari considers such an attempt at reconciliation 
not only misguided but also dangerous. The present work 
attempts to examine the basis of Mutahhari's misgivings 
regarding such efforts. 
Chapter I is devoted to a general discussion of the 
development of Marxism in the course of history, and various 
revisions and deviations in Marxism are examined. The second 
section of the same chapter deals with capitalism and social-
ism. In the third section the relationship between Islam and 
socialism is examined. 
In Chapter II, the issue of democracy and liberty is 
discussed with reference to the various responses to it among 
the eastern and the western thinkers. In the second section 
of this chapter, Popper's position in The Open Society and its 
Enemies is elucidated. As Edward Boyle points out. Popper 
belongs to a great tradition that includes not only Mill but 
also Bertrand Russell. In the third section the New Left 
approach towards social philosophy is discussed, with parti-
cular emphasis on Marcuse who is considered to be the ideoloqu 
of the New Left. In the fourth section the dialogue between 
' ) 
Exis t en t i a l i sm and Marxism i s dea l t with, Sar t re made an 
attempt in h i s Cr i t ique of D ia l ec t i ca l Reason to find room 
within Marxism for c r e a t i v i t y , Sar t re resolved to use exis-> 
t e n t i a l i s m as a means to ascend fxxjm Marxism of today towards 
an authent ic Marxism which i s f ree from the t r aces of idealism. 
In Chapter I I I , Mutahhari 's soc ia l philosophy in the 
l i g h t of h i s views regarding the concept of soc ie ty , ind iv idua l , 
cap i t a l i sm, soc ia l j u s t i c e , e t h i c a l values and freedom are 
discussed. As for Mutahhari 's wr i t i ngs , there i s a unifying 
p r i n c i p l e which runs through the whole of h i s works, tha t i s 
h i s general account of nature ( F i t r a t ) , Mutahhari developed 
the app l ica t ion of h i s general views of nature ( F i t r a t ) to 
analyse soc ia l ques t ions . 
Chapter IV i s devoted e n t i r e l y to a comparative study 
of Mutahhari 's soc i a l philosophy and tha t of h is western counter-
p a r t s . This comparison i s aimed at e labora t ing the basic features 
of Mutahhari 's philosophy. In the conclusion, the relevance of 
Mutahhari 's view of socie ty to over age i s discussed and h i s 
s t a tu s as a seminal contemporary th inke r i s assessed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
After the second world war, almost all Islamic 
countries gained their political freedom and there was 
a crisis in western democracy with the emergence of 
Nazism and Fasism which coincided with the growing world-
wide prestige of the Soviet Union, China and other social-
ist states, particularly because of their anti-imperialist 
posture and appeal for equality, social Justice and equi-
table distribution of wealth. In these post-second world 
war conditions the. communist block and its ideology appeared 
to be the only refuge and safeguard for the qjpressed people 
of the exploited countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. 
The prestige of Marxism was also enhanced by its anti-war 
posture that came in the wake of the peace-movement. People 
disillusioned with the colonial and imperialist system 
blamed the old ideologies, particularly religion, for their 
backwardness, slavery and exploitation. It was due to 
these reasons that the situation came to be such that the 
ideological atmosphere was receptive to the winds of Marxism. 
As a consequence of the political freedom and a response 
to the attendent responsibility of tackling socio-political 
issues, there appeared many philosophical works which were 
historically i*elevent to political, economic and social 
themes rather than with theoritical or speculative philosophy. 
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And these were often Influenced overtly or covertly by 
Marxism. According to Marcuse, Marxist philosophy is 
superordlnate to social theory and all the philosophical 
categories of Marxian theory are social and economic 
categories^ whereas Hegel's social and economic categories 
are all philosophical concepts* Marcuse himself sees 
philosophy as a part of social theory. So emphasis in 
social philosophy resulted in the development of new 
ideas regarding man, societyt freedom, social Justice and 
moral values etc. 
In the Muslim World also thinkers and intellectuals 
were Influenced by the growing popularity of Marxist social 
philosophy. Those who did not totally surrender to Marxism, 
made attempts to reconcile this ideology with Islam. They 
sought to interpret Islam in Marxian terminology. Others 
accomodated Marxism in the Islamic framework of ideas by 
expounding the socio-historical-economic realities in 
Islamic terms. Such attempts resulted in the reinterpre-
tation of Islam and its various aspects. 
Parallel with the development and spread of such form 
of thinking was a reviveuL of interest in all the aspects 
of the Islamic tradition, comprising the philosophy, sufism, 
theology and Sharl^ah law. 
»1 
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Mutahharl as one of the leading figures of contemo-
rary Islamic thought and an exponent of the traditional 
Islamic philosophy in Iran, whose principle philosophical 
theme and technique is based on sublime philosophy (Hikmat-e 
Muta'Sllvvah) set out to meet these challenges. Regarding 
Marxism, he went to the philosophical roots of historical 
materialism and demonstrated with rigorous logic the contra-
dictory character of the key principles of Marxism. On the 
basis of this refutation and critique he developed his own 
social philosophy. 
In the west, a few decades after Hegel's death, two 
main currents of social thought developed, one was positive 
philosophy which provided the foundation of modem positivism. 
This trend was rooted in the French positivist philosophy of 
Comte saint Simon and the Utop an socialists, viz.oven, 
Fourier etc, accoMing to which all truths come from observa-
tion and should be formulated in the form of scientific 
laws. The second cuirent in social thought originated in 
Feuerbach's raw materialism and developed in the form of 
Marxian philosophy which is said to contain a critical method 
and a radical iaqpulse. Marcuse advocates the latter view 
and argues that a critical theory defends certain values 
which transcend the given order and fact, but positivism is 
a kind of accommodation within the status quo and displays 
an u n c r i t i c a l conformist a t t i t u d e towards the ' f a c t of 
exper ience ' . 
To be more precise the ' pos i t i ve philosophy' i s a 
pe r ju ra t ive term for a thinker l i k e Marcuse, denoting a 
conformist a t t i t u d e , whereas the 'negat ive philosophy' i s 
favourably evaluated by him for being c r i t i c a l and subver-
s i v e . 
This work attempts to cont ras t Mutahharl 's soc ia l 
philosophy, whose wri t ings re f lec ted the influence of the 
Qur'an, Hadith, and Muslim philosophers l i k e Ibn-Sini and 
Mulla §adra with philosophers of the West l i k e Herbert 
Marcuse ( the author of One Dimensional Man), J , F. S a r t r e , 
who set out to reconci le Marxism with e x i s t e n t i a l i s m , Karl 
Popper, the advocate of piecemeal change e t c . in the l i g h t 
of t h e i r approaches towards soc ia l change, man, soc ie ty , 
freedom, soc ia l j u s t i c e , a l i ena t ion e t c , 
Mutahharl 's s t r a tegy in his wri t ing i s to review 
Islamic sc iences . Having a phi losophica l background and 
being well-versed in Islamic s t u d i e s , he bel ieves in Islam 
as an a l t e rna t i ve bas is for modern cu l tu re and c i v i l i z a t i o n 
and has sought to go back to the o r i g i n a l message of Islam, 
to discover i t s relevance to our own time, to s t r i v e to 
change the s t a tus quo, to rebui ld the socie ty and i t s 
institutions in the light of the Islamic tenets. Although 
Sartre, Popper, Marcuse, Russell and Mill represent a 
different view of social change, their concern with Marxism 
can be taken as a meeting point with Mutahhari's views. As 
a matter of fact Mutahharl developed his social philosophy 
through criticising Marxism and other western ideologies 
such as Existentialism, However, his opposition to exist-
entialism was confined to those elements in it which threaten 
to Jeopardize the fundamentals of Islam. 
But most western thinkers strive to criticise Marxism 
in general and soviet Marxism in particular with the view to 
reconstruct Marxism and bring about an authentic Marxism 
which oould be a source of critical theory and dialectical 
method* So their clash with Marxism is essentially a family 
quarrel. But Mutahharl felt that Marxism is a challenge to 
Islam at a fundamental level. There were some muslim scholars 
in Egypt, Iran and other Muslim countries, including India 
and Pakistan, vrtio strove to reconcile Marxism with Islam in 
order to develop a revolutionary theory as a remedy for their 
maladiesw But Mutahharl considers such a reconciliation not 
only misguided but also dangerous. Though, as yamld'Enayat 
puts it of all the ideological challenges to Islam in the 
twentieth century, socialism has been the most congenial 
n 
to Its overriding temper* It comes closer than nationalism 
and democracy to Islam's central summons for brotherhood 
social harmony and equalitarianism. Tension no doubt 
arises between the two, when socialism is intervined with 
the Hegelian promotion of European ethnocentricity and 
Marxian atheism."^ ^ 
Mutahharl*s knowledge of Marxism and western philosophy, 
particularly existentialism, cannot be said to be very inten-
sive and authentic because firstly, his training was parimarily 
in lalamlc philosophy, secondly he touched upon western philo-
sophy only to the extent it was relevant to the fundamentals 
of Islam, and thirdly he had to mainly depend on Arabic and 
Persian translations of western philosophical texts Marxism 
underwent many changes but Mu'^ ahharl examined certain specific 
principles of Marxism only ignoring the significance of such 
changes. As he declares in his book Society and History* that 
his intention was to "criticise neither all the theories that 
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have appeared in Marxism nor Marxism as a whole.** His 
writings in defence of the metaphysical foundations of Islam 
are not polemical. He employs philosophical and logical 
methods in his argument and denounces the old scholasticism 
of the Asharite and the Mutazalite schools of thought for 
their polemical attitude towards their opponents and the 
issues under discussion. On account of this Mutahharl Is 
considered to be one of the founders of new Kalam In con-
temporary Iran. 
By new Ifalam Is meant a kind of reconstruction of 
Islam In the light of the needs of the modem times. That 
Is, to meet the challenges from within and outside. He 
did this along the lines of *Allamah Iqbal attempted In 
the Indian sub-continent who Inspired both Mutahharl and 
*A11 Sharl'atl. However, Mu"fahharl was critical of Sharfatl 
and 'Allamah Iqbld on certain basic Issues. 
Iqtaal*s deep concern for the crisis of Islam In 
contemporary society was Indebted to two principal sources, 
his knowledge of Islamic heritage and his training In 
western philosophy. "Disillusionment with the west, tempered 
by a recognition of Its scientific and technological accomp-
lishments; awareness of the pressing need for the renewal 
of Musllot society through a process of relnterpretatlon and 
reforms affirmation of the integral relationship of Islam 
to politiCfl and society; espousal of an Islamic alternative; 
and reaffirmation of the transitional character of the Islamic 
conmunity". Ihls was the background of Iqbiil'a contribution 
to the contemporary revival of Islam. The title of one of 
8 
h i s l a s t works^ The Reconstruction of Religious Thought 
in Islam, sununerises his purpose quite c lear ly . I t i s 
important to remember that Iqbal was not wellversed in 
Maiocist theory. His socia l i s t tendencies are best under-
stood within his own rel igious t rad i t ion . His incl inat ion 
towards socialism was rooted in Islamic social teaching 
based on the Islamic principles of the socio-economic equality 
and brotherhood of the believers and the social obligation 
of a l l muslims toward the i r brothers in fa i th , exemplified 
by Zakat. 
In Iran, *A11 Shari'iati, a Sorbonne educated scholar, 
contemporary of Mu-fahharl and a specia l i s t in sociology fe l t 
concerned that the sociological dimension of Islam has been 
forgotten. He adopted a new scient i f ic approach to the 
understanding of the sociological dimension of Islam and 
explained the interact ion of the Islamic message with the 
laws of social organization. Shari 'atl 's cr i t ic ism of Marxism 
was also on the basis of his sociological understanding. He 
looked at Islam from the same angle. But Mu^ahharl went 
to the very philosophical roots of Marxism with a strong 
Islamic b ias . Sharlati uses the term ' d i a l ec t i c ' freely. 
He does not deem i t necessary to find an Islamic equivalent 
for the term. For him the two crucial applications of the 
principle of dia lect ic are the philosophy of history and 
[] 
sociology. Using the story of Abel and Cain as a metapho-
rical framevfork he depicted history as a conflict between 
two opposing forces represented by these two characters. 
But Mu-fahharl was opposed to this kind of interpretation 
of history. In Egypt, Mustafa as-Sibal sought to reconcile 
Islam with socialism in order to find out an alternative 
to meet the contemporary social problems. His book entitled 
IshtlrSklyyat al-Islam (The Socialism of Islam) was consi-
dered to be the exposition of Egyptian socialism within 
Islam. This trend was followed in Iran by Sazman-i Mu.ia-
hidln-i Khalq (The organization of the Fighters of the 
people) a gueirilla organization created in the early 
seventies in Iran. Their perception of Islam was affected 
to some extent by ^All Sharlatl's teachings. 
Exercises in reconciling Islam with Marxism have never 
been explicit; one could say that the outcome of this recon-
ciliation is# if anything, potentially a serious challenge 
to orthodox Marxist-Leninist parties in the Muslim countries, 
since it can act as an alternative carrier of their ideals 
of social and economic Justice without incurring the blemish 
of Irrellgloslty or atheism. The blossoming of an assortment 
of Marxist or Marxian schools of thought-revisionism, the 
new left, existentiallstic marxism and the ecletic stream 
U) 
arising from the critique of Marxism-Leninism by Sartre, 
Marcuse, Lefebvre, and others meant that in the post-
stalin thaw such a synthesis belonged no longer to the 
realm of intellectual day-dreaming. Korsh and Marcuse 
and Kojeve put forward new interpretations of Marxism. 
In France Sartr« felt that Marxism had turned towards 
idealism, so he developed a revolutionary Marxism which 
combined existentialism with Marxism, Philosophers of the 
Frankfort School (Jurgeo, Habermos, Horkheimier and Adorn) 
renewed Marxism and reinterprated the dialectic which has 
been debased in the soviet theory of dialectical materialism. 
In his One Dimentional Man, and Soviet Marxism. Marcuse 
articulates the crisis of Marxism and challenges some of 
the basic postulates of Marx's theory. The result is a 
reconstruction of Marocian theory which questions such central 
features of Marxism as the theory of capitalist crisis. So 
Marcuse produced a theory of society that uses the Marxian 
method Of analysis to provide a radical critique of contempo-
rary capitalist and communist societies, culture and ideology. 
Accoz^ ling to Douglas Kellner, Marcuse reconstructed Freudian 
and Marxian theories in order to develop a critical theory 
of contemporary society, combined with a sketch of a non-
repressivt society which draws on Marx, Frued, Utopian 
u 
soclalisDi, German Idealism and the Ideas of various poets 
and philosophers. In France Sartre proposed to reconcile 
Marxism and existentialism. He sought to make use of 
existentialism as a means to ascend from the Marxism of 
today towards an authentic Marxism reconcilable with exist-
entialist realism. He is of the view that the communists 
themselves would not be able to do any thing so long as 
they remained entrenched in a Marxism which had lost its 
vocation of universal humanism. Only existentialism could 
restore Marxism to that vocation and meanwhile existentialism 
found a reason for its continuing presence in the wake of 
the decline of Marxism. 
Sartre in Being and Nothingness denies the existence 
of a perticular human nature and is of the view that man is 
free and the bej.ng of man is in possibility-of-being that 
is, to be able to be in one or another mode and determined 
by the dictates of a theory of absolute freedom. But 
Mutahhari challenges this idea and is of the view that man 
possesses nature (fitrat). By and large, Sartre failed to 
open a new avenue in contemporary social philosophy by 
reconciling existentialism with Marxism, for he set out 
to save Marxism from the idealism of Hegel but he himself 
fell in the same trap. Marcuse unlike Sartre exercised 
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worldwide impact and was acclaimed "father of the new 
l e f t " , and was the co-founder of the Frankfurt school. 
He believed that oppression in industrial s o c i e t i e s 
e x i s t s no longer in an economic way but ex i s t s in a s p i r i -
tual and in te l l ec tua l form. His cr i t ic i sm of advanced 
industrial s o c i e t i e s , both western and eastern, as well as 
the Soviet Society in his One Dimentional Man. Soviet 
Marxism. Error and Civ i l i za t ion was very severe. 
He found shortcomings in Marxian philosophy and 
seriously questioned Marxian orthodoxy but could not work 
out any alternative model of socialism. He l o s t recourse 
to Fruldianism which was the extreme opposite of Marxian 
reductionism ( in order to reconstruct Marxism) Alsadair 
Macintyre, who was a severe c r i t i c of Marcuse, attributed 
to him a kind of neo-Hegelianism, because in his Reason 
i^ tnd RyvolutJoi:^ Marcuse elaborated Hegelian soc ia l philosophy 
and advocated Hegelian-Marxian philosophy. Despite the ir 
differences both Sarti»e and Marcuse are considered to be the 
exponents of New-left. Hegel's role was s ignif icant espe-
c i a l l y at the ear l i e s t and l a s t phases of the in te l l ec tua l 
development of Marcuse. Sartre, on the other hand, set out 
to bring a revolution inside Marxism and to save Marxism 
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from the dogmatism of Stalinism but was not successful* 
Whereas Marcuse made an attempt to modify Marxism and 
create a critical theory by reconciling Marxism with 
Freudlanlsm. 
Marcuse and Popper hold that there are no fixed 
laws of society. However, Marcuse was a severe critic 
of western capitalism and believed in dialectical method 
and qualitative change in those societies, but on the 
contrary Popper was a defender of western democracy and 
believed in piecemeal change as opposed to revolution. 
Like Marcuse, Mutahhari was a severe critic of capitalism 
and according to him Marxian theory of surplus value is 
Insufficient to show the depth of exploitation in capitalism. 
Mu"5ahharl*s social philosophy reflects Quranic views 
and regarding the nature of Man he believes that man is 
social by nature (fitrat) but his approach is different 
from the two contrasted approaches to social science which 
are called methodological individualism and methodological 
collectivism. Mutahhari opposed both the Marxist and exist-
entialist approaches to man, according to which a particular 
human nature does not exist. According to Mu-^ ahharl man is 
an entity vAlch is self-conscious and is also conscious 
In respect to the world and nature around him. In his 
view the very emergence of "I" is an indication of the 
M 
emergence of consciousness. Thus he brings about the 
unity of subject and object in human consciousness, 
Mutahharl holds that the Islamic doctrine of nature 
(fitrat). contrary to the cartesian or Kantian doctrines, 
does not claim that man from the beginning of his creation 
possess certain apriori knowledge. Now does it agree with 
existentialism and Marxism that man from the beginning is 
passive as against society which is active and determines 
the personality of man. According to the doctrine of natui^ 
(fitrat), man in the beginning of his creation inclined 
towards apprehending things potentially. It will be actual-
ised with the help of external factors. Sometimes due to 
the negative effects of society man is detached from his 
actual position and fails to regain his identity, Man in 
such a state, according to Mutahharl, is called 'alienated'. 
So Mutahhstrl's concept of alienation is different from that 
of Marxism «oA existentialism. While articulating the 
importance of the notion of Justice Mutahharl holds that 
denial or approval of the principle of Justice played an 
important role in the development of social philosophy in 
the Muslim world. 
Regarding the notion of moral values, Mutahharl not 
only disagrees with analytical philosophers like G.E,Moore 
\-
and Russell but also opposes even A^Ll'amah Tabatabal's 
view that human ends determine the concepts of "good" and 
"evil". In this dissertation an attempt: is made to 
give an elaborate analysis of Mutahhari's views on social 
philosophy in contemporary perspective dealing at some 
length with the main points of difference between his 
social philosophy and the philosophy of some contemporary 
western thinkers. 
MUTAHHARi*3 LIFEl-
Murta^& Mutahharl was born in 1920 at Fariman located 
about sixty kilometers away from Maahhad. He was reared 
in religious surroundings. He received his early education 
under his father's guidance and supervision who was a 
spiritual and pious man. At the exceptionally early age 
of twelve, Mu'^ ahharl began his formal religious studies at 
the teaching institution in Mashhad, which was then in a 
state of decline, partly because of internal reasons and 
partly because of the repressive measures directed by Rida 
Khan the first Pahlavl autocrat, against all Islamc Insti-
tutions* But in Mashhad, Mutahharl discovered his great 
love for philosophy, Theology and mysticism, a love that 
remained with him throughout hislife and came to shape his 
entire out look on religion. 
The figure In Maahhad who aroused the greatest 
devotion in Mutahharl was Mlrza Mahdi Shahidi Radavl, a 
teacher of philosophy. But Ra^avi died in 1936 before 
Mutahharl was old enough to participate in his classes, 
and partly for thJ|s reason he left Mashhad the following 
year to Join the growing numbers of students congregating 
at the teaching inlstitution in Qum. Mutahharl was able to 
benefit there from the instruction of a wide range of 
scholars. He studied Piqh and Usui — The core subjects 
of the traditional curriculum with Ayatullah HuJJat Kuhkamarl, 
Ayatullah Sayyid Muhammad DImSd, Seyyid Muhammad Riz§ Gul-
payagSnl, and HaJ Sayyid Sadr al-Dln sadr. But more important 
than all was Ayatullah Burujirdi* Mu-^ ahharl attended his 
lecttires from his arrival in Qum in 19A4 until his departure 
for Tehran in 1952, and he nourished a deep respect for him. 
Fervent devotion and close affinity characterized Mutahharl's 
relationship with his prime mentor in Qum, Imam Ruhullah 
KhomeirO.* >/hen Mutahharl arrived in Qum. The Imam was a 
young lecturer (mudarris)• 
In about 1946, Imam Khomeini began lecturing to a small 
group of students that included both Mu-^ ahharl and his roomate 
at the Payzlya Madrasa, AyatullSh Muntazirl, on two key 
philosophical texts, the Asf5r al»Arba'a of Mulla Sadra and 
the Sharh»i Manzuma of Mulla Hadl Sabaavarl. 
{ 
Finally, among the teachers to whose iiifluence 
Mutahhari was exposed in Qum, mention must be made of the 
great exegete of the Quran and philosopher, *Allamah Sayyid 
Muhammad Husayn Tabataba*!, Mutahhari participated in both 
Taba|abiii*8 classes on the Shifa' of Avi-Cinna from 1950 
to 1953 and the thursday evening meetings that took place 
under his direction* The subject of these meetings was 
materialist philosophy^—a remarkable choice for a group 
of traditional scholars. Mu-Jahharl himself had first 
conceived a critical interest in materialist philosophy, 
especially Marxism, soon after embarking on the formal 
study of the rational sciences. According to his own 
recollections, he began, in about 1946, to study the persian 
translations of Marxist literature published by the Tudeh 
party, the major marxist organization in Iran and at that 
time an inqportant force on the political scene. In addition 
he read the writings of Taqi Aranl, the main theoretician 
of the Tudeh party as well as marxist publications in Arabic 
emanting from Egypt. Mutahhari himself describes this 
situation: 
"I was willing to learn materialist 
thought and its logic through original 
sources. In 19A6 I became familiar 
with their books translated into persian 
and Arabic languages published by Tudeh 
:8 
party, and also other marxist 
works. I devoted meticulously to 
study the books written by Taql 
Aranl whose major work was Mater-
ialistic Dlalectlc.o 
He came to master the whole subject of materialist 
philosophy* This mastery made him an Important contributor 
» 
to Tabatabal*s circle and later, after his move to Tehran, 
an effective combatant in the Ideological war against 
marxism and marxist Influenced Interpretation of Islam* 
Numerous refutations of marxism have been essayed 
in Iran, but almost all of them fall to go beyond the 
obvious incompatibilities of Marxism with religious belief 
and the political failures and inconsistencies of marxist 
political parties. Mu-fahharl, by contrast, went to the 
philosophical roots of the mather and demonstrated with 
regorous logic the contradictory and arbitrarily hypothetic 
nature of the key principles of marxism* His polemical 
writings are characterized more by Intellectual than rheto-
rical or emotional force* 
In 1952, Mutahhari left Qum for Tehran and began 
teaching philosophy at the madrasa yi Marvi in Tehran* 
Mutahhari found a broader and more satisfying field of 
religious, educational and ultimately political activity* 
; G 
In 1954, he was Invited to teach philosophy at the Tehran 
University, where he taught for twenty two years. After 
the Islamic Revolution in Iran he was appointed Chairman of 
theCk)uncil of Cultural Revolution, Mu-^ahhari's services 
to the Islamic Revolution were brutally cut short by his 
assassination on may 1, 1979. Ttie murder was carried out 
by a group known as Furg&n, which claimed to be the prota-
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gonist of a "progressive Islam". 
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PRESENT WORK IS AS FOLLOWS; 
In the first chapter the development of Marxism in 
the course of history is discussed and various revisions 
and deviations in Marxism are examined in a succinet 
manner with particular reference to the changes and revisions 
brought about by Marxist thinkers in Marxism ranging from 
Lenin, Plekhanov, Stalin, Luclo Coletti, Karl Korch and 
Marcuse. 
The second section of the same chapter deals with 
capitalism and socialism as analysed by Marx, according to 
whom their conceptual foundations lie in the dispute 
between Christian schoolmen regarding the natural law theory 
and free competition as the natural state of affairs put 
forwarded by Hobbes and Locke. The issue of socialism is 
::o 
also treated as essentially an ethical issue as it involves 
in the first place the fundamental question of Justice. 
In the third section the relationship between Islam 
and socialism is examined. As a matter of fact socialism 
came closer than nationalism and democracy to Islam's 
central summons for brotherhood, social harmony and egali-
tarianism and the high regard for collectivism. It is due 
to this reason that some Muslim thinkers made an attempt 
to reconcile Islam with western socialism. 
In the second chapter the issue of democracy and 
liberty is discussed with reference to the various responses 
to it among the eastern and the western thinkers. Among 
> 
the Muslim thinkers, Tabatabal and Mawdudl have questioned 
the soundness of the very principle democracy, that is, 
the majority role. J.S.Mill was also very anxious to 
safeguard minorities against the tyranny of the Majority, 
Russell advocates democracy and is of the view that socialism 
and democracy are reconciable. According to Russell it is 
the individual in whom all that is good must be realized 
and the free growth of the individual must be held as the 
supreme end of a political system. But social system is 
based on power and power is the fundamental concept in social 
2 JL 
science 3ust as 'energy' is the fundamental concept in 
physics. Power is the embodiment of the possessive 
Impulse of human nature, but this impulse came gradually 
under the control of reason. According to Iqbid and 
Mu-^ahhari, intellect alone is Incapable of saving mankind. 
It Is to be assisted and inspired by true faith (iman). 
In the second section Popper's position in The Open 
Society and its Enemies is elucidated. As Edward Boyle 
points out, Popper Indeed belongs to a 'great tradition' 
that Includes not only Mill but also Bertrand Russell, 
because Popper In his book seeks to set free "the critical 
powers of man"* It is a major contribution to the theory 
as to how we can apply "the critical and rational methods 
of science" to the problems of society, and how we can 
establish sound principles of democratic social advance. 
In the third section the new left approach towards 
social philosophy is discussed. Marcuse is considered to 
be the theorltlclan of the new left. 'New Left' is generally 
used In Europe and North America as a collective label for 
student ideologies, which, while sharing the basic tenets 
of socialism do not identify with soviet communism alongwith 
^ Its repressive state machinary. In the fourth section the 
dialogue between Existentialism and Marxism is dealt with, 
Sartre made an attemptln his Critique of Dialectical Reason 
to find room within Marxism for creativity. So there was 
a crying need to make a revolution within current Marxlsiii. 
Sartre resolved to use existentialism as a means to ascend 
from the Marxism of today towards an authentic Marxism which 
Is free from the traces of idealism. 
In the third chapter Mu-fahhari's social philosophy 
in the light of his view points regarding the concept of 
societyt individual* capitalism, social Justice, ethical 
values and freedom are discussed. So far as Mutahharl's 
writing is concerned, there is a unifying principle which 
runs through the whole of Mu-^ahharl's work, that is his 
general account of (Fitrat) human nature. Mutahharl 
developed a method based on his general view of (fitrat) 
human nature to analyse social issues. 
In his book Society and History. Mutahharl says that 
much that is said about nature (fitrat) (in other philoso-
phies) fails to elucidate its depth and to comprehend its 
full dimensions. Even those who often talk about nature 
(fitrat), since they do not pay due attention to the various 
aspects of its vast dimensions ultimately come up with views 
Q 
Which contradict this principle.^ He holds that man has a 
?.1 
single and authentic primordial nature, which could bestow 
a unity on culture. and culture is not a product of 
historical, ethnic and geographical factors or merely 
10 
super structure of a profit-oriented class struggle. 
Undoubtedly, he holds. Islamic ideology is human at its 
core and arises from the Qur'anic principle of the pri-
11 
mordial nature of man. 
Regarding the notion of man he says that according to 
Isl&m in the course of the creation and prior to the 
Influence of historical and social factors, man gained a 
special existential dimension and lofty capacity to shoul-
der the responsibility of changing himself and the world 
that distinguished him from animals and imparted to him his 
identity. According to this view, man at the beginning 
of creation has gained a kind of special intelligence and 
special consciousness (conscience), that exists in all 
members of the human species, and this primordial conscience 
has given him a special individualism, capacity to be called-
upon and addressed by transcendence and to move upward. These 
ideologies begin their summons and engender movement in 
reliance upon the primordial conscience that distinguishes 
the human species. There is an aspiration to sacred truths 
and realities that are innate in every human individual. Man 
is the focus of a range of potential extra material aptitudes 
24 
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and capacities waiting to be nurtured. 
According to Mu"^ ahhari man before acquainting with 
the things aixsund himself or in other words acquiring 
knowledge by experience ('ilm-e husuli) or apostriori 
knowledge is aware of his "self" or has knowledge by 
presence (*ilm-e huduri) or apriori knowledge. He observes 
that when psychologists set out to study consciousness they 
study the conscousness which is acquired through knowledge 
by experience and not through apriori knowledge i.e. knowledge 
by presence. But philosophers mostly deal with apriori 
knowledge or knowledge by presence. This knowledge is 
definite, devoid of uncertainity. Uncertainity arises in 
apostriori knowledge. In the case of apriori knowledge 
knower and known become identical. In this case there is 
no room left for any doubt, 
Mutahharl is of the view that man is social by nature. 
According to this theory man's social life is similar to the 
partnership of a man and woman in married life: each of the 
partners was created as an integral part of a whole, and by 
nature, yearns to be united with the whole. Mutahharl is of 
the view that society is a composite reality like natural 
conqpounds. Here minds and thoughts and wills and wishes are 
2r) 
synthesised. This synthesis is spiritual essentially 
and not physical. Individuals enter into social life 
with their gifts aquired from nature (fitrat) and their 
inborn abilities, and spirituality merge into one another 
to attain a new spiritual identity, which is termed as the 
"Social or collective spirit". Regarding the idea that 
there are the laws which govern the society, as Qnile 
Durkheim believes, Mutahharl observes that in this case 
the3?e will be no room left for the idea of the freedom and 
choice of the individual. So he chooses the middle position 
between individualism and collectivism that saves from the 
extremes of absolute freedom and absolute compulsion. He 
holds that Durkhimian determinism arises due to the failure 
to recognize the essential nature of the human being. 
Regarding the homogeniety or hetrogenity of the 
societies, as to whether all human societies can follow one 
and the same ideology or there must be multiplicity of 
Ideologies based upon various types of societies, Mutahharl 
again appeals to the theory of nature (fitrat) in order to 
Justify his argument. According to which man who consti-
tutes a single species and not be termed as a set of species, 
is social by his primordial and organic nature; that is 
man's aoclallty, emergence of the society, or his coming 
2G 
to have a colleotive s p i r i t ar ises from an essent ia l 
innate quality inherent in his nature, Mu-fahharl i s of 
the view that the specific primordial nature of man aims 
a t at taining ultimate perfection through in tu i t ion . Societies, 
c iv i l iza t ions and cultures move towards unification. Unifor-
mity and fusion i s the future-goal of a l l human soc ie t ies . 
He believes that in the course of time a universal society 
wil l evolve in which a l l human potentials wil l be actualized 
and man will a t ta in his real perfection, happiness, and 
f ina l ly , genuine humanity, Mu-fahharl holds that the origLn 
of e thical values i s also nature ( f i t r a t ) . 
Mu^ahharl c r i t i c ized those Muslim scholars who were 
influenced by the Marxian approach to philosophy of history 
and as a resul t divided the society into two poles. In his 
book i^ciety and History, he says that the claim that the 
Qur'Sn has divided society materially and sp i r i tua l ly into 
two classes and that these two classes are in confl ict with 
each other, is absolutely fa l se . To say that accoixiing to 
the Qur'an there are two classes consisting of the Kafirun 
(unbelievers) and oppressors (mustakbirun) on the one hand 
and on the other mu>mlnun (believers) and the oppressed and 
the exploited class (mustad^ifun), which struggle against 
27 
each otheTf r e f l e c t s the basic c o n f l i c t between the 
oppressed and the oppressors , i s not c o r r e c t . '^ He 
fu r the r says tha t the Qur^an be l ieves in the fundamental 
n a t u r e of the human being (f4. t ra t) t some thing e s s e n t i a l 
which i s found even i n an extremely dehumanized person 
l i k e Pheraohf *rtio i s a na tu ra l human being but whose 
growth i s a r r e s t e d . I t also admits even for the most 
corrupt persons the p o s s i b i l i t y , howsoever weak, of moving 
towards t r u t h and s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n . 
The chapter fourth i s devoted e n t i r e l y to a compara-
t i v e study of Mu^^ahharl's soc i a l philosophy and that of h i s 
western coun te rpa r t s . This comparison i s aimed at e labo-
r a t i n g basic fea tures of Mutahharl*B philosophy. In the 
conclusion the relevance of Mutahharl 's view of soc ie ty to 
our age i s discussed and h i s worth i s assessed. 
» * * 
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CHAPTER - I 
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 
(a)» Marx's Philosophy Versus Marxist Thinkers: 
I t I s according to Z.A.Jordan, the author of The 
Evolution of D ia l ec t i ca l Materialism, t h a t 'Marxism i s 
not a name with proper c r e d e n t i a l . I t i s an ambiguous 
term having severa l c lose ly r e l a t e d and in t e r lock ing 
meanings. I t i s also d i f f i c u l t to r e l ay upon Marx and 
Engels ' wr i t ings on Marxism i n order to examine Marxism, 
fo r Marxism underwent many changes and rev is ions by many 
Marxist th inkers . . Popper argued tha t Marx's own views 
d i f fered from what i s known as Marxism-Leninism in t ha t 
Marx considered t h a t p o l i t i c s and ideas are r e l a t i v e l y 
I n e r t fac tors in soc ia l changes, whereas sovie t Marxists 
and their sympathisers have undertaken to transform 
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society in terms of their own version of Marxist Theory. 
It is said that once in a gathering of ardent 
Marxists where Marx was trying to defend his position 
which contradicted his earlier position, he said: "I am 
not so much of a Marxist as you are". It is also said 
that in his later years Marx said: "I am Marx, not a 
Marxist". Nevertheless, some writers made a distinction 
between Marxism and the Marxism of Marx believing that 
:u 
Marx's Ideas should be considered as a stage In the 
development of Marxism or In other words that the Marxism 
of Marx represents the primary stage or the period of 
infancy of Marxism and not the whole Marxism, for Marxism 
is subject to evolution. But Mutahhari objects to this 
claim and holds that this group of writers does not explain 
what in their view Is the essence of Marxism. The main 
condition for the development of a school Is that Its 
basic principles should remain permanent, changes occurlng 
only in secondary matters without affecting the basic 
principles* Otherwise there would be no difference between 
total rejection and development pf a theory. If we do 
not consider the permanence of fundamental principles as 
a condition for its developmental process, then Saint 
Simon, Proudhon or any other thinker of this type should 
be considered as different stages in the evolution of this 
school. Moreover, why should not Marxism itself be regarded 
as a stage in the development of one of these schools"?^ 
According to Z,A,Jordan •Marxism* can be used to refer 
to practically anything you choose and is thus a confusing 
or meaningless term. But It Is the name customarily given 
to the tradition of orthodox Marxism, allegedly first 
established by Marx and Engels, preserved and protected 
:^ 2 
from distortions by Plekhanov and Kautsky, and held to 
have been codified in its pristine purity by Lenin and 
Stalin,^ 
Western exponents of Marxism hold the view that 
the origin of misconception and distortion of Marxism is 
traceable in the Soviet Union. But according to Russians 
it is the Right (close to bourgeois reformism) and the 
Left (characterised by anarchist and voluntarist concep-
tions) opportunist trends in the revolutionary working-
class movement which in the name of science attempt to 
revise the principal propositions of Marxism-Leninism, 
dose views of the revisionists were subjected to strong 
criticism by Lenin and partdoolarly by Plekhanov. 
Regarding the contribution of Plekhanov in the 
development of Marxism and his role in contesting revlsion-
lsm» there are differences of opinion among the Marxist 
thinkers, Lenin applauds him as a Marxist theorltician. 
He is popularly known as a mcui who contested the revisionism 
of Kantian idea and economlsm in Russian. In the beginning 
he was a Bolshevik, later on he considered the Bolsheviks 
to be Bakuninlsts rather than Marxists. He was against 
Lenin's idea of the party and accused the Bolsheviks of 
;i:^  
ultracentralism and Imposing the absolute party dictator-
ship over the proletariat. In this regard L.Kolakowski, 
the x)ollsh thinker, observes: 
In numerous polemics he (Plekhanov) 
argued that Lenin's conception of 
the party, which made it completely 
independent of the spontaneous 
consciousness of the proletariat, 
meant that the role of the working 
class would be usurped by a party of 
intellectual professional revolution-
aries. This party would become the 
sole source of political initiative, 
which was grossly at variance with g 
Marx's theory of the class struggle? 
Plekhanov was of the view that Bolsheviks have 
departed from Marxism in the philosophical sphere as well, 
for Bolshevicks attempted to introduce empirco-criticism 
into Marxist philosophy, S. H. Baron, the author of a 
basicwork on Plekhanov, observes that his struggle against 
revisionism did much to facilitate the rise of Leninism, 
but that his subsequent opposition to Leninism brought him 
to a position close to the revisionists. The same author 
considers that the root cause of Plekhanov's political 
defeat was his unshakeable faith in the applicability of 
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the West European pattern of development to Russia. 
It is interesting to note that in recent times 
Gorbachev, while criticizing Lenin, holding him responsible 
;M 
for the evils of Stalinism, for the f i r s t time in the 
history of Russian Socialism, re-evaluated the contribution 
of Plekhanov to Socialism. Thus after three quarters of 
a century he was rehabil i ta ted in the soc ia l i s t v«rorld and 
h i s cri t icism of Leninism was accepted ^Justified, t rue and 
val id . 
The character of Lenin as a revis ionis t or as a 
fai thful marxist has long been a subject of dispute. Stal in 
maintained that Lenin added nothing to the inherited doct-
r ine and took nothing away from i t , but applied i t s principles 
uncryingly not only to Russian conditions but, more important 
to the entire world s i tua t ion , Lenin himself in "Two 
Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution" 
wri tes : 
"When and where did I ever claim to have 
created any sort of special t r ea t in 
international social-democracy not iden- Q 
t i c a l with the trend of Bebel and Kautsky"?^ 
The author of Main Currents of Marxism writes that 
nonetheless, on one or two essent ia l points the innovations 
tha t Lenin introduced into the Russian revolutionary movement 
suggested considerable doubt as to his f ide l i ty to Marxist 
t r ad i t ion . In the f i r s t place, Lenin at an early stage 
:ir> 
advocated an alliance between the proletariat and the 
peasantry as the basic strategy for the bourgeois revolu-
tion, while his opponents contended that an alliance with 
the bourgeoisie would be more in accordance with the 
doctrine in this case. Secondly, Lenin was the first 
to see the national question as a valuable reservoir of 
energy that social democrats could and should use to 
further their cause, instead of being regarxied as merely 
an awakward hinderance. Thirdly, he formulated his own 
organizational rules and his own version of the attitude 
the party should adopt towards a spontaneous outbreak by 
the workers. On all of these issues too, his doctrine 
turned out to be exceedingly practical, and it can safely 
be said that on all three points his policy was necessary 
10 for the success of the Bolshevik revolution. 
Lenin's as well as S ta l in ' s conception of h i s tor ica l 
materialism also differs from Marx's and Engels' conception 
of h is tory . According to Marx and Engles there Is no 
log ica l connection between d ia lec t ica l materialism and 
h i s to r i ca l materialism. But Lenin and Stal in posit a 
logical connection between these two. The author of the 
Evolution of Dialectical Materialism writes: 
» c 
In view of their instrumental and 
utilitarian approach to knowledge 
in general and to sociological 
knowledge in particular, Lenin and 
Stalin initiated a short turning 
point in the understanding of the 
materialist conception of history. 
They both believed that the main, 
if not sole, task of the social 
sciences was to acquire a body of 
knowledge on the basis of which 
individual and collective human 
behaviour could be controlled and 
social action directed twoarda pre-
determined goals. Lenin and Stalin 
were as anxious to make use of the 
materialist conception of hisotry 
as a guide to action, as Marx and 
Engels were to consider it only as 
a guide to study.'' 
Regartiing the contribution of Stalin to Marxism, 
as to whether he was a philosopher or not there are differ-
ences of opinion. Some people consider him as a philoso-
pher. M.B.Mittin, Stalin's court philosopher, considered 
him as a philosopher who provided a comprehensive and 
systematic account of the materialist dialectics which 
Marx had planned but never succeeded in writing and which 
Engels and Lenin had failed to bring to completion in 
Dialectics of Nature and Philosophical Note Books respect-
Ively.''^ 
Stalin is called a philosopher on the basis of his 
two publications Dialectical and Historical Materialism 
,-) ^ 
(1938) and Marxism and Problems ot Linguistics (1950). 
But The author of The Evolution of Dialectical Materialism 
holds the view that it is hardly possible to treat Stalin 
as a genuine philosopher according to either of the two 
definitions widely accepted outside the Soviet Union. Try 
as one may, it is impossible to discover in the dialectical 
materialism of Stalin either the originality and profundity 
of thought with which he is credited in the U.S.S.R, or 
Intellectual acuman and professional competence. His doctrine 
LB an ecletlc composition which freely borrows ideas, defi-
nitions, and even whole formulations from Engels and above 
all, from Lenin. The fallacies taken over from his prede-
cessors remain undisclosed and their ideas are further 
simplified in order to serve the requirements of social 
and political conditions, Marxism had, infact, shortened 
the distance between politics, philosophy, and literature, 
wrote Stalin's biography. Stalin crudely oversimplified 
the Marxist view of their interconnexion, until he degraded 
science, history and art to a point where they became 
13 handmaidens of his politics. 
Stalin's autocratic rule caused split in the Commvinist 
block. Even Tito broke relations with him. Later on 
Khursuhchev advocated de-stalinization merely to consolidate 
:)8 
h i s pos i t i on against h i s opponents. Consequently he 
promoted the publ ica t ion of some books which were banned 
i n S t a l i n ' s age. 
Revival of Marxist Thought After the Second World War: 
The aftermath of the F i r s t World War saw a rev iva l 
of i n t e r e s t i n Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Their very-
pe r t i nen t indictment of bourgeois complacency and c u l t u r a l 
shallowness was reaffirmed i n the ex i s t en t i a l i sm of Jaspers 
and Heidegger. Ex i s t en t i a l philosophy emphasized tha t the 
task of philosophy, which for a time had been almost fo r -
g o t t e n , i s ' t o catch s igh t of r e a l i t y a t i t s o r i g i n ' (Jaspers) 
and ' t o recapture , to repeat (wiederholen), the beginning 
of our h i s t o r i c a l s p i r i t u a l ex i s t ence . The beg iming 
must be begun again, more r a d i c a l l y (Heidegger), At the 
same time Luckacs, Korsch, Gramsci and Bloch put forward 
t h e i r new i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of Marx's thought. These received 
unexpected corroborat ion a f t e r the pub l i ca t ion of the 
previous ly unknown Economic and Phi losophical Manuscripts 
i n 1932. Marx's ea r ly notebooks confirmed t h a t h i s social ism 
grew out of the indignat ion at human a l i ena t ion in c a p i t a l i s t 
soc i e ty . Young Marxist i n t e l l e c t u a l s were quick to note 
the s i m i l a r i t i e s between the Marxian concept of a l i ena t i on 
and the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t search for o r i g i n s . The f i r s t to do 
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so were Herbert Marcuse, a student of Heidegger, in a 
review of the Manuscripts, and Alexander Kojeve, a student 
of Jaspers, in his lectures on Hegel's phenomenology. 
After the second world war Marxist intellectuals 
were concerned to stress the humanist element in Marxism, 
thereby countering Soviet despotims and ideology. In this 
way they followed in the footsteps of Lukacs and Korsch, 
and Marcuse and Kojeve. In France Sartre and Camus 
developed a revolutionary Marxist theory which combined 
the humanism of the young Marx with humanism of existen-
tialism. In West Germany the Frankfurt School renewed 
Marxism by means of the 'negative* dialectic. Even in Moscow 
Luckacs attempted to preserve Marxist humanism under the 
dark shadows of Stalinist terror. 
Although during the cold war there was often great 
animosity between intellectuals from different countries, 
all were united in the- eflort to dissociate themselves from 
the vulgar Stalinist version of Marxism and to preserve the 
humanist element in Marxism. Among the 'humanist' Marxists 
one should not count those who were members of the communist 
parties. The committed humanists were those who sooner or 
later resigned from the party or were expelled from it. To 
name a few, the following may be referred to: Henri Lefeboure, 
Maurice Marlan-Ponty and Ftobert Garaudy in France, M.N.Roy 
i n Ind ia , the poet Aime Cesaire in the West Ind ie s , Ernst 
F ischer i n Austr ia , Ignazio s i lone i n I t a l y , Stephen Spender 
i n B r i t a i n ; and above a l l those who never Joined the pa r ty , 
Brecht , Benja^iin, Horkheimer, Ado m o , S a r t r e , and those 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s from Eastern Europe who were ac t ive in the 
shor t period between the p o s t - S t a l i n i s t 'Thaw' and the 
suppression of the Czech experiment of social ism with a 
human f a c e ' . Some of them even t r i e d to s t a r t a dialogue 
with c h r i s t i a n theo log ians . 
Frankfurt School: 
I t i s a trend of Marxism or movement associated with 
t he I n s t i t u t e for School Research founded within the 
Univers i ty of Frankfurt i n 1923 by a group of intel lectudLs . 
The d i r e c t o r of the i n s t i t u t e from 1930 was Max Horkheimer. 
Other members were Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin and 
Herbert Marcuse. They agreed on the necess i ty of providing 
a c r i t i c a l theory of Marxism. When the Nazis came to power 
i n 1933 the i n s t i t u t e n a t u r a l l y could not continue i t s 
functioning i n Germany, Some of the members continued 
t h e i r a c t i v i t y i n Geneva and Pa r i s and some o the r l i ke Adorn 
and Herbert Marcuse migrated to the United S t a t e s . The 
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school is characterized as L.Kolkakowski by the following 
features: 
In the first place, by the fact that this school 
treats Marxism not as a norm to which fidelity must be 
maintained but as a starting point and an aid to the analysis 
and criticism of existing culture; hence it has made free 
use of many non-marxist sources of inspiration such as 
Hegel, Kant, Nietzsche and Freud. Secondly, the school's 
programme was expressly of non-party nature. It did not 
identify with any political movement, in particular commu-
nism or social democracy, towards both of it has often 
expressed a critical attitude. Thirdly, the school was 
clearly influenced by the interpretation of Marxism evolved 
by Luckacs and Korsch in the 1920s, especially by the concept 
of 'reification* as an epitome of the problems of the modern 
world. However, it can in no way be regarded as a school 
of Luckacs's desciples, for its members and this is the 
fourth important point have always emphasized the indepen-
dence and autonomy of theory and have opposed its absorp-
tion by all embracing •Praxis' even though they were also 
engaged in criticising society with a view to transforming 
it. Fifthly, and here again, the Frankfurt School basically 
from Luckacs while accepting Marx's position as to the 
1 'J 
exploitation and 'a l ienat ion ' of the p ro le t a r i a t , i t did 
not identify with the l a t t e r in the sense of regarding 
i t s existing class-consciousness, l e t alone the d ic ta tes 
of the communist party, as an apriori norm. I t emphasized 
the universality of ' r e i f i ca t ion ' as a process affecting 
a l l s t r a t a of society, and became more and more doubtful 
of the p r o l e t a r i a t ' s revolutionary and l ibera t ing ro le , 
as a resul t of which in the end i t jettisoned th is part of 
Marx's doctrine altogether. Sixthly, although profoundly 
•revisonist* vis-a-vis orthodox version of Marxism, the 
school regarded i t se l f as a revolutionary in te l lec tua l 
movement; i t rejected the reformist position and maintained 
the need for a complete transcendence of society while 
admitting that i t had no posit ive Utopia to offer and even 
15 that in present conditions a Utopia could not be created. 
I t i s to be noted that Frankfurt school in the eyes 
of Russian Marxists is the label of a trend in the le f t : 
which attempts to d i s to r t and falsify Marxism. 
* * # 
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(b). Capitalism Versus Socialism;-
Capitalism in the eyes of Marxists denotes a 
historical stage and a socio-economic formation which 
is based on the private ownership of the means of pro-
duction. A contemporary Muslim thinker, Muhaimnad Baqir 
al-Sadr in his book Our Economics (Iqtisaduna) observes 
that capitalist theory unlike Marxism is not based on 
scientific laws (Historical materialism) but is based on 
certain values and ideas. It is composed of three main 
elements: (1) adherence to the principle of private 
ownership in an unlimited form, (2) opening the way for 
every individual to exploit his ownership and all the 
possibilities as he likes and to allow him to multiply 
his wealth with different means and methods he can employ, 
(3) guarantlng freedom of consumption in the same way as 
freedom of exploitation is guaranteed. So these are the 
main signposts of the capitalist doctrine which could be 
suimned up in three freedoms: Freedom of ownership, freedom 
of exploitation and freedom of consumption. Mutahharl in 
his book The Foundations of Islamic Economics has put 
forward his view of capitalism according to which modem 
capitalism is separated from the old capitalism, and that 
modern captlalism is described as sheer exploitation of 
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labour what p r o f i t c a p i t a l i s t s earn ac tua l ly belongs to 
the labour . He r e j e c t s Marx*s theory of surplus values 
2 because i n h i s view t h i s theory i s an an t i - l abour theory . 
J u l i u s i Leoweste in h i s book Marx Against Marxism holds 
t h a t modern capi ta l i sm d i f f e r s from a l l o ther forms of 
cap i ta l i sm, which has exis ted at a l l t imes. In the 
r a t i o n a l form of the economy. In the separa t ion of 
bus iness , r a t i o n a l accounting and the r a t i o n a l a t t i t u d e 
to work. I t owes i t s dynamic development to t h i s r a t i o n a l 
form of organization.-^ 
The theo re t i c i ans of the f ree market economy were 
not economists in the s t r i c t sense but were ph i losophers . 
Ttie Enlightenment philosophers be l ieve in a n a t u r a l order 
of things which could be explained by reason. Leibniz 
presupposed a p re -es tab l i shed harmony in the universe , 
and Kant presupposed a na tu ra l purposiveness i n p o l i t i c a l 
soc i e ty . Analogous to t h i s view Adam Smith, the f i r s t of 
the c l a s s i c a l economists, presupposed the exis tence of a 
hidden hand i n the economy. 
Smith advocate a free market s imi l a r to the free 
play of the forces of na tu re , and condemns the merchanti le 
monopolies of the crown. These are as much p o l i t i c a l - a n d 
4u 
moral arguments as they are economic. 
Jullusi Loewenst holds that the science of economics, 
which originated in the attempt to analyse the new economic 
systems, has its roots In the natural law theory of the 
Middle Ages. The Christian schoolmen accepted the concepts 
of the Just price and the guaranteed livelihood as "natural" 
In the economic sphere. This theory, derived from the truth 
of divine revelation, was seriously shaken during the 
renaissance, when the battle for the affirmation of this 
world against the demand of the other world was fought 
Intellectually, The earliest exponents of the modern 
secular natural law theory, Hobbes and Locke agreed, despite 
many differences between them, in principle on the rejection 
of the christian concept of *fallen nature'. They condemned 
the christian view of the natural order as unnatural and 
Instead posited free competition as the natural state of 
affairs. 
There is still a debate over the essential character-
istics of capitalism. The author of The American Political 
Dictionary holds that: 
"Many social scientists have treated 
capitalism as an early variant of 
industrial society. Such terms as 
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post-capitalism and welf-capitalism 
now abound. The changes that are 
most often cited in arguing that 
contemporary industrial societies 
are no longer capitalism are first 
the divorce of ownership from central 
with the rise of modern corporate 
capital. Second the greatly expounded 
role of the state; Third the political 
influence exercised by the working 
class through trade union and a democratic 
political system capitalism has under-
gone considerable modifications as a 
result of these factors."^ 
Marx had predicted that capitalism will be replaced 
by socialism because conflict between bourgeois (upper 
class) and proletariate (lower class) and competition 
between different capitalists would terminate in socialisn. 
But this idea was contested by Max Weber. Max Weber was 
of the view that capitalism is a universal aspect of all 
social and economic system. In his book The Open Society 
and Its Enemj^ aa Karl Popper says:-
"The arguments underlying Marx's historical 
prophecy are invalid. His ingenious atte-
mpts to draw prophetic conclusions from 
observations of contemporary economic ten-
dencies failed. The reason for this failure 
does not lie in any insufficiency of the 
empirical basis of the argument. Marx's' 
sociological and economic analyses of 
contemporary society may have been some 
what one-sided, but in spite of this bias, 
they were excellent in so far they were 
descriptive. The reason for his failure 
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as a prophet lies entirely in the 
poverty of historicism as such, in 
the simple fact that even if we 
observe today what appears to be a 
historical tendency or trend, we 
cannot know whether it will have the 
same appearance tomorrow," " 
To trace the origin of modern socialism one should 
go back to the French Revolution at the end of the eight-
eenth century as the chief source used by the radical 
thinkers. In the beginning its aim was collective owner-
ship which characterised a kind of Utopian socialism. The 
exponents of this kind of socialism were Saint Simon and 
Fourier in France and Robert Owen in England, Later on 
Engels claimed that Marxist socialism had shifted socialism 
from Utopia to a scientific basis, Williom Graham in his 
book Socialism New and Old says: 
"The new socialism calls itself 
scientific and appeals to political 
economy and to historical science 
including the new doctrine of evolu-
tion as examplified in the history 
of human societies, so that the 
decisive battle must be fought in 
the field of economics,"' 
In other place he says that the "theory of value" in the 
hand of Karl Marx is in fact almost the whole of socialism. 
But Karl Popper contests this idea and holds that it is one 
of the unimportant parts of the Marxist creed and said 
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that in holding the theory of value as a redundant part # 
of Marxism he was defending Marx rather then attacking 
Q 
him. Mutahhari also in his book The Foundations of 
Islamic Economic criticised this theory and proved that 
the theory of value is an anti-labour theory for it 
fails to demonstrate that the capitalist is the exploiter. 
Karl Popper in Open Society and its Enemies says: "Marx's 
value theory does not suffice to explain exploitation," 
The issue of socialism is more essentially an ethical 
issue, for it involves in the first place the whole great 
question of Justice, not Justice in the narrow sense in 
which the word is commonly used but in the most compre-
hensive as well as the deepest sense. William Graham in 
this regard holds that socialism has come into the world 
because of injustice, in the first instance. So say the 
socialists. It has also come because the social evolution 
has prepared the way of it; but still its main aim is to 
realize Justice. The present system, industrial and social, 
the socialists say, is organized injustice, which results 
in injustice in all directions, gross and palpable. He 
says further that the remarkable thing is that they go to 
the economists to defend their view gains in England and 
in Germany. Mill, for example, in his Political Economy 
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constantly declaims against the injustice involved in the 
present distribution of wealth, and he repeats his denun-
12 
ciation in his Autobiography. It is probably because 
of this aspect of socialism that some Muslim thinkers turned 
their faculties to develop a new ideological enterprise-
Islamic socialism, because Islam's chief objective was to 
bring about in society a sense of brotherhood and social 
Justice* Hamld 'Enayat in his book Modern Islamic Political 
Thought elaborated this underlying tendency in the Muslim 
world in the following words: 
If the periods of libralism, mainly in 
the form of parliamentary rule (in 
Egypt from 1923 to 1952, with some 
interruption; in Iran from 1941 to 1953; 
in Turkey from 1950 to 1950; in Pakistan, 
between 1959 and 1976), ended in failure, 
it was not, of course, solely because 
of the flaws in some of the muslim ideas 
of democracy as studied in-this section. 
In fact, with all their protestation of 
loyalty to national cultures, the pro-
tagonists of liberalism in these countries 
(The wafd in Egypt, the national front in 
Iran, the Democrats in Turkey, and so on) 
often espoused a totally western nation 
of democracy. Thus avoiding the problems 
faced by those who wanted to incorporate 
democracy into Islam. But this still 
did not save them from failure. The 
failure has certainly been caused not so 
much by conceptual in coherence as by the 
absence of specific social and economic 
formations, including an autonomous, 
conscious, and articulate middle class. 
Aggravating the effects of all these 
factors have been phenomena of a more 
general character, such as educational 
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backwardness, widespread illiteracy 
and the prevalence of servile habits 
of thinking and blind submission to 
authority. Perhaps no less important 
are the periodic crises of western 
democratic themselves in the thirties 
with the rise of Nazism and Facism, 
and in the sixties, with the reluctance 
of the United States and some West 
European powers to adjust themselves 
to the realities of the post-colonial 
area. The result in each case has been 
the further discreding of liberal trend 
in the muslim countries, and the commen-
surate strengthening of the groups 
seeking radical, violent sweeping and 
elitist solutions to their political 
and economic problems a process which 
gained further impetus with the growing 
world-wide prestige of the Soviet Union. 
The People's Republic of China and other 
socialist states, particularly popularity 
among muslims people because of their 
anti-imperialist posture, as well as with 
the rise of the Third World as the embo-
diment of new hopes and visions in inter-
national politics.''3 
The spokesman of Islamic socialist in Egypt was 
Mustafa as-sabal, the Dean of the Faculty of Islamic 
Jurisprudence and school of law in the University of 
Demaacus. His book entitled ^shtirBcIwat al-Islam (The 
Socialist of Islam) was for a long time the accepted 
exposition of the congeniality of Egyptian Socialism with 
IslSm. Attempts in reconciling Isl"am with Marxism became 
more explicit in the latter stages. In Iran Sazman-i 
Mu.iahidln-i Khalq (The Organization of the Fighters of 
n^ 
the people) was the chief exponant of this idea. They 
set out to interpret the Qur'an and Islam in terras of 
Socialism. Mutahharl as a champion of true Islamic Social 
Philosophy exposed the weakness of this attempt in his book 
History and Society by analysing this trend. He said that 
in his view those who thought in this way either did not 
correctly understand Islam or historical materialism or 
the both.''^ 
Presently Marxists are not willing to Justify social-
ism on the basis of certain moral values. Rather they consider 
it as an inevitable outcome of the law of history. Karl 
Popper in his Poverty of Historicism proved that it was an 
unfounded claim. He observes that we cannot, therefore, 
predict the future course of human history. "^  
Capitalism unlike Marxism does not claim a scientific 
basis for itself, and therefore, it is unable to explain 
the need for entertainment of freedom by way of historical 
need, religion or conscience. 
*** 
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(c). Islamic Socialism: An Ideological Challenge to Islam; 
Islamic socialism Is a term which Is sometimes used 
to designate the Ideology of those people who set out to 
reconcile socialism and Islam. They tinged socialism with 
the Islamic concept of social Justice and made it appear as 
bearing the stamp of Islamic Ideology for enhancing its 
acceptability. Mutahharl was of the view that this approach 
to Islam posed a grave danger to the Ideology and teaching 
of Isl"am. Therefore he contested this stand and was the 
first Iranian thinker who exposed the weakness of this ideo-
logy and refuted the argument advanced in its favour. In 
his last book. Modem Islamic Political Thoughts Hamld 
*Enayat, a Professor of Political thought in Tehran University; 
examined this trend in detail. In the following paragraphs 
we give a summary of his comments made in the book Modern 
Islamic Political Thought. 
According to *Enayat, of all the ideological challenges 
to Islam In the twentieth century, socialism has been the 
most congenial to its overriding temper. It comes closer 
than nationalism and democracy to Islam's central summons 
for brotherhood, social harmony and egalltarlanism. In 
more explicit terms, as two systems of socio-political 
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engineering, Islam and socialism, are unanimous in their 
high regard for collectivism, and bringing about an equili-
brium between corporate and individual interests, state 
control, and an equitable distribution of wealth. While 
Islam is at variance with nationalism with regard to the 
latter'a basic belief in ethnic specificity as the only-
valid criterion of group interests and with democracy with 
regard to permissibility of absolute freedom of opinion, 
it does not find itself in conflict with the broad principles 
of socialism. Tension, no doubt, arises between the two 
either when socialism is intertwined with the Hegelian 
proiaotion of European ethnocentricity and Marxian atheism, 
or when Islam is presented as the guardian of the sanctity 
of private ownership. But neither are Hegelianism and 
Marxism integral constituents of socialism nor is private 
ownership a cardinal tenet of Islam. 
H. 'Ehayat is of the view that there are three varieties 
of Islam in socialism: 1, Official, 2. Fundamentalist,and 
3. Radical. Official socialism found its exponent in 
president Nasir of Egypt who decided to adopt socialism 
as the most effective means of turning Egypt into a modern 
industrial state ensuring Justice and equality for all 
citizens. 
5 c 
The spokesmen of Islamic socialism in Egypt during 
the early sixteies mostly acknowledge their debt to the 
pioneering work of a Syrian thinker, Mustafa al-Sibai, 
sometime the Dean of the Faculty of Islamic Jurisprudence 
and school of law in the University of Damascus. His 
book entitled IshtirakJyyat al»Islam (The Socialism of 
Islam) was for a long time recommended to any inquirer 
both inside and outside al-Azhar as the most acceptable 
exxx>sition of the congeniality of Egyptian socialism with 
Islam. The fact that it had been produced by the official 
publishing house was also an evidence of the government's 
approval of its contents. All this was rather ironical, 
since Sibal was also the leader of the Syrian organisation 
of the Muslim Brothers or Ikhwan al^Muslimun (called the 
Islamic Socialist Front). So while, as we saw before, 
their comrades were being persecuted in Egypt, the ideas 
of their leader were promoted in the same country as an 
2 
authentic Islamic confirmation of the state ideology. 
Sibal unfailingly brings out in his book the antici-
pations, or elements, of socialism in Islam. He sets out 
to adumbrate all the Islamic rules of 'state control over 
the social uses of wealth', realisation of state provision 
for all members of society, and state assurance to them of 
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a life of dignity. Nowhere in his book does he attempt 
a serious discussion of the principles and ideas of social-
ism in any of its known versions. In the introduction to 
his book he admits that socialism has multiple varieties, 
resembling a creature with twenty heads, but he says that 
all these varieties share a common belief in the necessity 
of state control over the use of wealth in the society 
and in the realisation of "mutual social responsibility" 
(to be defined later) for all its members, so that they 
can partake of a life in which human dignity and human 
confidence in the present as well as future are guaranteed. 
Elsewhere he also ennumerates a series of contradictions 
between Islam and communism. These are focused on such 
specific points as freedom of constructive competition 
which does not mean class conflict, for Islam denounces it. 
He also contrasts Islam with capitalism in an endeavour to 
underline the Independence of Islamic socialism of Eastern 
and western extremes. 
Slbal's major concern in writing his book, as stated 
in its introduction, is to refute the misconception of some 
people that Islam is alien to socialism because it has 
asserted (The right of) private ownership and legitimised 
Cii) 
the institution of inheritance, and of big landlordism, 
giving the rich absolute freedom in disposing of their 
wealth. 
> 
In Sibal's view the socialism of Islam is composed 
of four elements: 
1)• Natural right for all citizens (muwatln-Sic) 
2), Laws for guaranteeing these rights and regulating 
them. 
3)« Laws of mutual social responsibility (at-takaful 
al-i.1timal). 
A). 'Support* or sanctions (muayyidat) for ensuring 
the implementation of the former three sets of 
laws. 
Of these, the first and the thrid elements are partt -
» 
cularly relevent to Sibil's purpose and therefore claim 
his greater attention. The right of ownership conspicuously 
among the natural rights of individuals, repeatedly comes 
up for discussion in the various chapters of the book, and 
is studied in some detail. The author's overwhelming 
concern for this right is shared by nearly all those 
Egyptian exponents of socialism, whether Islam or secular 
who try to establish the compatibility of socialism with 
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I s lam. This has been i n response to the a t t i t u d e of the 
majority of the orthodox de t r ac to r s who, in c a s t i g a t i n g 
socia l ism, ident i fy i t , next to m a t e r i a l i s t i c heresay, with 
t h e expropria t ion of i nd iv idua l s . 
Under the heading ' t he o r ig ins of ownership ' , Sibal 
opens h i s d iscuss ion by saying tha t i n Islam the r ea l 
owner of th ings i s God (The Qur*an 2:284) , This fundamental 
be l i e f , says the author , has two bene f i t s : f i r s t l y , i t 
d i spe l s vani ty and arrogance from the hear t of the proper ty-
owning mortals; Secondly, i t ob l iges him to abide by the 
Shari'ah ru l e s of ownership. But God, though being the 
o r i g i n a l and ul t imate owner, has l i b e r a l l y and f ree ly put 
a l l h i s worldly possessions a t the d isposal of human beings 
(The Qur'an 22 :62) . Sibal der ives two conclusions from 
t h i s Qur'anic s tatement: F i r s t , there i s nothing in the 
mate r ia l world which cannot be possessed by Man endowed 
with determination, i n t e l l i g e n c e and e f f o r t ; Second, a l l 
groups of people are equally e n t i t l e d to make use of the 
good things of the e a r t h . Once a person has taken possession 
of a thing through honest means, he i s recognised by Islam 
as i t s r i g h t f u l owner. And no means i s more honest in 
a t t a i n i n g ownership than work. Consequently ownership based 
on begging, i n j u s t i c e , decei t and harm i s forbidden. But 
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possession of a thing is not an end in itself. Just as 
its origin should be honest work, its aim should also 
be honest and useful, both individually and socially. In 
Islam individual ownership is a socially Justified. 
The most interesting and important part in Sibai's 
discussion on ownership is his Justification of the national-
isation (Ta'mlm) of certain categories of property. He 
recognises multiple rules and institutions in Islam which 
make nationalisation an essential feature of its socialism. 
Foremost among these is a prophetic tradition reported by 
Ahmad and Abu Dawud to the effect that people own three 
things in common: water, grass, and fire; another tradition 
* 
mentions salt too. Sibal says that since these things 
were the basic necessities of desert life at the time of 
the Prophet(s) their enumeration should on no account be 
regarded as exhaustive or exclusive. Thus, in a modern 
context, 'water* can be taken to stand for the entire 
installations of water supply, 'fire* for electricity, and 
•grass' and 'salt' for all the indispensable food require-
ments of contemporary life. In a word, the Prophet's saying 
should be interpreted as warranting the communisation of 
any resource and material whicb, if allowed to remain in 
private hands, might lead to monopolised exploitation of 
public need. This tradition, together with its interpre-
G;^ 
tation, as suggested by Sibai, figures prominently in the 
apologetics of the Egyptian socialists at the time against 
orthodox attacks. On the institutional side, the writer 
mentions vaqf and hlbah. According to the fuqaha, he says 
vagf consists of removing the object of an endowment from 
the ^ssession of its owner, so that it ceases to be the 
property of only one person, and its use becomes confined 
to those for whom the endowment is intended, and in his 
view this is a kind of nationalisation. Hlbah is to bestow 
something as a gift upon a particular person or group of 
persona. Sibai concludes that the state can thus interfere 
in numerous ways with the right of ownership not to speak 
of its authority to collect Zakat and other taxes from 
property owners. All this proves that in Islam the right 
of ownership like the rest of the natural rights is subordi-
nate to the collective interests of the (Muslim) community. 
The Radical Version of Islamic Socialism; 
The crises of Nasirism from the mid-sixties onward 
resulted, among other things, in weakening the appeal of 
Arab socialism in Egypt and its Islamic neighbours baffled 
Arab-Muslim masses. The frustrations bred of the Arab 
defeat in the six-day war of 1967 had naturally created a 
fresh hankering among the millitant youth in the Arab countries 
ca 
as well as elsewhere in the Muslim world, for a more 
vigorous p o l i t i c a l doc t r ine . This was the background 
to the appearance of a new var ian t of Islamic socia l i sm. 
I t d i f fered from the model presented by Sibai and h is 
Egyptian or Syrian imi ta to r s by v i r t ue not only of i t s 
independence of the p o l i t i c a l exigencies of officialdom, 
but a lso of an innovation h i the r to unthinkable in an 
Is lamic context i . e . i t s attempt to reconc i le Marxism 
with Islam. This was, as mentioned before, undoubtedly 
t he r e s u l t of the growing popular i ty and influence of the 
Soviet Union and other countr ies of the s o c i a l i s t camp 
i n the t h i rd world as a whole, a process which had s t a r t e d 
wi th the death of S t a l i n i n 1953» and had momentous impl i -
ca t ions at both t h e o r e t i c a l and p r a c t i c a l l e v e l s . A by-
product of the campaign of d e - s t a l i n i s a t i o n was to r ehab i -
l i t a t e the independent roads to ' social ism* and the t h i r d 
wor ld i s t ideologies i n g e n e r a l . . . The blossoming out of 
an assortment of Marxist or Marxian schools of thought, 
revis ionism, the new l e f t , and the motley streams a r i s ing 
from the c r i t i q u e of Marxism Leninism by Sa r t r e , Lefebure 
and o the rs meant that i n the p o s t - S t a l i n era such a synthes is 
belonged no longer to the realm of i n t e l l e c t u a l day-dreaming. 
According to Hamid *Enayat, the most forceful r ep re -
s en t a t i ve of r a d i c a l Islamic Marxism i n the Muslim count r ies 
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outside Egypt, has been perhaps Sazman«l Mu.lahldlri'-l Khalq 
of Iran (The organisation of the Fighters of the people 
of Iran), a gurrllla organisation created in the early 
seventies in Iran, The members and ideologies of this 
organization employ the notion of Sunnat Allah (the tradition 
or path of God) interchangeably with the idea of the law 
of evolution as one of the substantial and basic laws of 
the world of creation. Any phenomenon, they aver, which 
is Incapable of adjusting itself to this Sunnah is doomed 
to vanish, for instance, the capitalistic system and the 
world of imperialism, being no longer in harmoney with 
the vital and historical realities of (human) society, 
nurture in their side their own enemy and antithesis, namely 
the working and tolling class, which adopts a novel and 
progressive posture. The contradiction between the means 
of production and relations of production intensifies daily 
with the Increase in production, and the advancement of 
technology, placing the capitalistic system under the pressure 
of the toiling class. At the end, with the revolution of 
the oppressed masses, the gigantic power of capitalism 
will be destroyed, and the working class will inherit the 
power and the means of production and above all will become 
God's successors on the earth. 
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In his book ^Ilal-e Glraylsh Be Maddlgarl (The 
reasons of turning towards Marxism) Mutahhari describes 
their main traits as follows: 
Ttiey believe that the will of God is revolutionary 
and His mode of thinking is based on the wish for the 
victory of exploited lower classes over the exploiters and 
priveleged classes. Therefore,in order to realise His 
will He (God) formed a great party, i.e. Islam, consisting 
of all revolutionary and progressive human beings, against 
which the party of exploiters struggle. They divided all 
human beings in two groups; oppressed the (mustadifIn) and 
the oppressors (mustakbirln). They include all the Prophets 
in the former class. They presented the Qur*an as a text 
book of the philosophy of revolution. Any one who subscribes 
to this revolutionary interpretation is entitled to be a 
member of this party. They believe God is absolute and 
the law of evolution is universal, and the world through 
its revolutionary movement moves towards its absolute end, 
that is establishment of a Just and equitable social 
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order. 
According to lis^ d^ Enayat, most of the adherents 
of this view ha¥e been profoundly inspired by the idealism 
of ^All Shari*atl (1933-77), the most popular mentor of 
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Islamic radicalism in modem Iran, As a teacher, orator 
and theorist, Shari'ati has exercised an influence on the 
Iranian youth as well as Muslim youth elsewhere, which is 
rarely matched by any other contemporary Muslim thinker 
anywhere in the Muslim world, not only in the development 
of the conceptual foundations of Islamic socialism as 
expounded by the educated youth, but also in the dissemina-
tion of the characteristics of militant Islam. His writings 
may be open to criticism by the scholastic criteria of 
traditional religionists, and they do indeed fall outside 
the domain of strictly religious literature because of 
their Inclusion of allent terms or concepts, as well as 
reinterpretation of orthodox doctrines in Islamic literature. 
His heavily west-oriented sociological understanding of 
Islam is also bound to be bitterly resented by mystical 
perception of Islam, and especially Shi^ism, It is true 
that Shari*'atl perceives religion* in the form of Idealism, 
an idealism which constantly calls for struggle. The 
ubiquitous motto in his writings is the saying attributed 
to the third Imagi, Husayan ibn *^ Ali: 'life is verily faith 
(^ aqldah)and fight (Jihfd) • or its variations. All facts 
of Islamic culture (mythology, history, theology and even 
some elements of Jurisprudence) are subordinated in his 
teachings to the compelling necessity ofthis fusion between 
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•theory* and *paraxls', which is but one manifestation 
of the principle of Tawhid (oneness of Gtod). He is the 
first Iranian writer on religion to have turned this 
hitherto theological doctrine into a 'world-view* (.jahan 
binl). a term coined originally by Iranian Marxists in 
the early forties as an equivalent for a secular, political 
system of beliefs, or Weltanschauung since in classical 
Persian this term is more suggestive of a mind which is 
preoccixpied with the material world (.jahan) rather than 
spirit or soul (Jan), In this sense, tawhid means some-
thing much more than the 'oneness of God', which is of 
course, accepted by all monotheists. But says Sharlati: 
What I have in mind (when I use this 
term) is a world-view. So what I 
Intend by "The world-view of Tawhid" 
is perceiving the entire universe as a 
tinity, instead of dividing it into 
this world and the thereafter, the 
physical and metaphysical, substance 
and meaning, matter and spirit. It 
means perceiving the whole of exist-
ence as a single form, a single 
living and conscious organism, possessing 
one will, intelligence, feeling and 
aim... There are many people who 
believe in tawhid. but only as a 
"religious-philosophical" theory, i.e. 
Ciod is one, not more than one that 
is all! But I imderstand tawhid as a 
world-view, Just as I seek shfiic 
(polytheism) also from the same 
standpoint, that is, a world-view 
that regards the universe as an 
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incoherent combination, full of 
division, contradiction and incon-
giniity, possessing conflicting and 
independent poles, diverging move-
ments, and desparate and disconnected 
essences, desires, calculations, 
criteria, aims and wills. Tawhld 
sees the world as an empire; shirk 
as a feudal system. ^ 
According to Enayat, Sharl'atI uses the term dialectic 
freely. Contrary to some of his 'Arab counterparts, he 
does not deem it necessary even to find an Islamic (persian 
or Arabic) equivalent for the term (such as Jadal> or 
Jidall. or .lidallwah which are of medieval origin). 
For him, the two crucial applications of the principle of 
dialectic are the philosophy of history and sociology. Using 
the story of Abel and Cain as a metaphorical framework, 
he depicts history as a conflict between two opposing forces 
represented by these two characters. The Qur'an refers to 
the story in a most laconic manner without mentioning Abel 
and Cain. It is only in the commentaries that their names 
appear. This enables Shariati to interpret the story in 
terms which have never figured in classical exegeses without 
appearing to advance any heterodox position. The story has 
an obvious moral import, and has always been treated as such 
by religious commentators, Muslim or otherwise, who have 
seen in it nothing other than a condemnation of greed and 
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murder, especially fratricide, ShariatI too takes cognisance 
of this moral dimension. Laying stress on the contradiction 
between the two types—Abel, 'the man of faith, peaceable 
and self-sacrificing• and Cain, 'the voluptuous, the 
transgressor and the fratricide'. But Sharl^ ati does not 
rest content with the moral aspect of the story; he tries 
to duel into its deeper meaning by means of what he calls 
•physiological analysis, and on the basis of a scientific 
and sociological examination of their environment, their 
occupation and their class. The outcome of this examination 
is that the real cause of the conflict between Abel and 
Cain lies In their contradictory types of work, infrastruc-
tures of production and economic system in one word, in 
their differing class status. Abel being a pastoralist, 
representing the age of common ownership of the means of 
production, and Cain being a landowner, representing the 
age of agriculture and the establishment of the system of 
private ownership. His reasoning in support of this claim 
consists mainly of eliminating most of the conceivable 
factora of the diverging characters of the two brothers. 
Their difference, he says, could not be explained in terms 
of their family background or environment, because they 
both had the same father and mother, belonged to the same 
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race, and were brought up in identical circumstances. 
Educational and cultural factors also could not be held 
responsible either, because social life at that primitive 
stage had not yet developed to the extent that difference 
on this score could be of much consequence. So there 
remains, in Shariati's examination, only the economic 
life and class status to account for the cleavage. It 
is noteworthy that his analysis makes no reference to 
a factor that in a typically religious explanation would 
nonnally rank as the most decisive, theinnate nature 
(fitrat) of every individual, in the sense of a pattern 
ft 
» of behaviour which, either through the Divine will or 
human initiative, or a combination of both, is preordained 
to lead to perdition or salvation. The same viewpoint is 
given sharper focus in his study of the 'dialectic of 
sociology* and developing stages of history. He refers ID 
Marx*s classification of history into five stages: primitive 
communism, slavery and serfdom, feudalism, capitalism, 
and the 'truth of the proletariat. But he criticises it 
on the ground that Marxists confuse the criteria of the 
tools of production. Sharilatl finds the first four ages 
to share basically the same infrastructure, that is, private 
ownership of the tools and the e resources of production; 
only the last stage is characterised by common ownership of 
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both . Throughout h i s t o r y , then, only two i n f r a s t r u c t u r e s 
have ex i s ted , and there cannot be more thah two. 
S h a r l ^ a t i ' s Cr i t ique of Marx's Idea of Humanity: 
Shar i^a t i i s of the view tha t the philosophy of human 
l i f e has no place i n e i t h e r of the two es tabl i shed worlds 
of western l ibe ra l i sm and Eastern communism, for in both 
what has been sac r i f i ced i s the f ree growth of the e s s e n t i a l 
nature of man ( f i t i ^ ^ t ) . According to Shari*^atl Marx t r a n s -
» 
fers humanity from the realm of nature to that of history. 
History, according to Marx is, "the continuation of the 
movement of material nature". Man in the context of history 
is ultimately returned to the much amicable nature in which 
the naturalists believe, that is a material entity. Thus, all 
the values that Marx bestows upon him in the context of 
society he takes back f ]?om him through his philosophy of 
Q 
dialectical materialism. 
Shari*atl makes a distinction between two Marxes: 
Marx as a philosopher of humanist and Marx as a sociologist 
or social ideologue. He says: 
When he (Marx) speaks of the capitalist 
system and bourgeois psychology as appra-
ising human existential values in terms 
of money, drawing humanity into moral 
depravity, and building a corinapt society, 
he bases his thought on moral values. 
When he shows off the edifice of his thought 
however, and discusses dialectical material-
ism, he struggles mightily to prove himself 
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loyal to realism and to grant only 
that fits the material and biological 
rationale of the natural sciences. 
And he follows the rest of the material-
ists, including the most hardened 
realliBts, in reducing human values to 
something with no foundation... Here 
Chandel's very telling remark comes 
to mind: Warx the philosopher crushes 
all the substantives values of man under 
the wheels of the blind Juggernaut of 
dialectical materialism; but Marx the 
politician and leader, with the must fervid 
fervid and electrifying praise of these 
values, mubilize people for power and 
victoryJf9 
Shat'l^ atl says that Marx refers repeatedly and 
with pride to a piece of scientific legerdemain that he 
has brought into play for the sake of preserving human 
dignity, which is this: dialectics does not conceive 
of man as do other forms of naturalism and materialism, 
that is, as a fixed material entity in a clockwork 
universe, but rather presents him as a being in a state 
of evolution, moving forward with the historical dialectics. 
By this stratagem, Marx transfers humanity from the realm 
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of nature to that of history.' 
Marx strives, in imitation of Feuerbach and the other 
new humanists, to free humanity from the life treated as an 
economic entity and from intellectual and political self-
alienation, tries to restore its unity by banishing divisive 
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s p e c i a l i z a t i o n , and he wishes, as Sha r l ^a t l puts i t , to 
" re tu rn humanity to i t s human va lues , innate powers, and 
se l f -mastery" , and to achieve self-awareness and become 
f ree of a l l compulsion. In f a i l i n g to perceive in h i s 
cosmology any fac tor o ther then matter and i t s unseeing 
unconscious c o n f l i c t , he necessa r i ly plunges the humanity 
he has exal ted i n h i s ideology in to the p i t of Insensate 
ma t t e r , and in the f i n a l ana lys i s , ranks i t among na tu ra l 
o b j e c t s . Shar l^a t l concludes as follows: 
In f a c t , Marx suffers from the same 
con t rad ic t ion tha t a l l m a t e r i a l i s t 
th inkers do who attempt to r i s e to 
the defence of humanism. Having main-
ta ined tha t there i s only one p r inc ip l e 
of ex i s tence , i . e . mat ter , they s t ruggle 
In vain as humanists to accept a second 
p r i n c i p l e t h a t i s humanity. Therefore, 
from a c e r t a i n s tandpoint , when they f i r s t 
speak of un i ty i n r e l a t i o n to being, and 
then Introduce the concept of humanism 
they are faced with dualism, since one 
may not profess materialism while a t 
the same time e x t r i c a t i n g humanity from 
the world of mater ia l thihgs* and bestowing 
a primacy and independence upon i t . ' ' 1 
At the end of h i s book Marxism and Other Western 
F a l l a c i e s . Shar l^a t l s e t s out to compare the a t t i t u d e 
of Islam as an Ideology towards man in con t ras t with 
Marxism, for he i s of the view tha t Marxism among a l l the 
new ideologies is unique in that it struggles to base 
every aspect of human life, material and spiritual, 
philosophical and practical, individual and social, upon 
its peculiar matetialistic world-view. It is for this 
reason that the system afflicts every diamension of human 
life with the calamity of materialism. Islam, alone amohg 
all the historical religions, has this conqjrehensiveness. 
It does not confine itself to merely ordering the relations 
between man and God, or to the purification of the soul 
(as do Christianity and Buddhism). It presents itself as an 
idealogy comprehending the various aspects of human life. 
In his view these two schools stand before men as two 
radically opposed world-views. Man has to accept either 
of the two, and reject the other. Sharl'ati says: 
Neither of the two is susceptible to 
division. In the first place, all the 
elements and dimensions of each of them 
have coalesced along the line of its 
distinctive world outlook, diametri-
cally opposed to the other, to add any 
element or dimension to either, or to 
take one away, could only result in the 
collapse of the whole structure. Secondly, 
an ideology is an interrelated whole with 
a single spirit and essence, and a 
unique raison detre. To try to resolve 
it into its constituent elements would be 
like killing it and then dissecting 
the corpse.'2 
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According to Sharl'atI the opposing ways in which 
Islam and Marxism approach humanity may be summed up.in 
several pairs of examples: 
(l). Marxism, because it is founded on an absolutely 
materialistic world-view, is incapable of raising humanity 
in its essence, attribute, or evolutionary state beyond 
the narrow confines of materiality. It necessarily ranks 
it along with all other beings in the confines of an uncon-
. scious and purposeless nature, 
Islam, in holding the world-view of Tawhld. is able 
to Justify man as a divine essence, grant him transcendental 
attributes, extend his evolution to the infinite, and thus 
situate humanity in a living, meaningful, and infinite 
universe whose dimensions extend- far beyond what even the 
sciences can represent. 
(2). Mancism, in accepting only the conception of 
matter of classical physics, is forced through materialistic 
analysis to retract all it has said about the essential 
glory and noble primacy of humanity. Thus the glorious 
being envisioned by Marx thephilosopher and humanist, the 
creator of God, is suddenly reduced to a piece of merchan-
dise, a product of the tools employed in craft, agriculture, 
(t) 
or industry. 
Islam, in explaining the world of matter and the 
primordial nature of man as two signs of one exalted 
Being and Absolute consciousness, is able simultaneously 
to accept the existence of a reciprocal impact of man 
upon environment and environment upon man, and also, in 
so far as man acts as a cause in the chain of causality, 
to uphold the human station without reference to natural 
and social determinations. It guards humanity from slipping 
into the pit of materialist, historicist, or socialogist 
fanaticism, so that the primacy of man will is not trans-
formed into a primacy of matter or of tools, 
(3)» Marxism, remaining fiercely loyal to materialism, 
relinquishes its right to speak of values or to make Judge-
ment on the basis of them. 
Islam, maintaining a belief in an absolute source of 
values beyond the emprical realm, can Justify them logically, 
(4). Marxism, because it considers man to be the 
product of his social environment, which in turn is an 
aggregate of shifting structures and circumstances, is 
unable to base itself on a constant principle such as the 
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human essence or human reality. Having denied both God 
and the primordial nature of man, it has relinquished the 
authentic basis for the human values that makes up the 
body of morals. Conseuqently, as Lenin puts it, "All 
talk of moral principle is a lie". 
Islam maintains the existence of constant principles 
in nature upon which science is based; it asserts that 
constant principles exist in our primordial nature (fitrat) 
« 
and form the basis of morals. According to Islam, human 
values are Just as authentic and demonstrable as natural 
laws* Contrary to Marxism, which tries to equate those 
values with social customs and to bury them in the depths 
of an economic and social materialism, Islam is totally 
committed to freeing them from the mutable yet coercive 
conditions and exigencies of material life by routing them 
in the primordial nature (fitrat) of man and showing them 
to be reflections of the Absolute shining upon the human 
conscience. 
(5). Marxism, by annexing "dialectical" to "materialism" 
in order to arrive at an explanation of historical and social 
change, has arrived at a materialistic determinism in which 
man is deprived of his prim^ i£;_^ iaiure and becomes a plaything 
of the blind process of contradictions. Consequently, it 
denies whatever it has claimed by way of humanism and 
completely deprives humanity of all freedom and responsi-
bility. 
Isl"5m, accepting this element of contradiction in 
the human constitution, does not deny freedom (of choice) 
or its consequence, i.e. responsibility, but sees them as 
issuing from precisely this contradiction. It defines man 
as a being in contradiction, having the dual essence of 
clay and Divide spirit, and as a will that can choose 
either one over the other. His human responsibility urges 
him to place his earthly half at the service of his divine 
half for the sake of its growth, and thus to achieve exis-
tential clarity and purity of spirit. In this way he may 
transmute his existential dichotomy to tawhJd and assume 
divine characteristics. 
(6). Marxism has "overturned" the Hegelian dialectic, 
changing it from the one based on idealism to one based 
on realism. But this has ruined the dialectics of Heracli-
tus, since Heraclitus, although he envisions everything in 
perpetual movement and change, maintains two constant 
principles alongside this change: One, fire and the other 
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logos. This shows that the true outlook of dialectics 
(as opposed to the one popularized by Marx) has been a 
mystical one from the start. Substantiating this fact 
are western philosophies from that of Heraclitus in 
ancient Greece to that of Hegel in the nineteenth century, 
as well as the world-views of all the great Eastern 
religions. Zoroastrianism, the Taoism of Lao Tzu, Manich-
eanism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and the Abrahamic religions 
(Judaism, Christianity and Islam). All these explain the 
world according to the principle of contradiction and 
change (i.e. generation and decay). 
Heractitus exemplifies a typically mystical world-
view in his use of fire to symbolize the sacred and eternal 
substance and logos to symbolize the constant order and 
harmony of a universe in total transformation. Marxism, 
by denying these two constant principles in dialectics, has 
denied any constant aspect or eternal order in the universe 
or in humanity. Thus its humanism is expressed not as a 
flow, but as a succession of waves. 
(7). In the words of Berth, "Marxism is the philosophy 
of the producers". 
In the language of the Qur'an, Islam is the philosophy 
of guidance. 
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(8)• Marxism supposes that man has created Gtod. Man 
whom It has thus raised to the Empyrean finds there no 
throne to occupy; the tether of an overturned and defective 
dialectics inevitably drags him immediately to the ground 
where he is handed over to the tools of production and 
the mode of production and condemned to suffer a historical 
determinism* 
Islam regards man as having a non-material nature. 
Maintaining that God has created man, it renders him indepen-
dent of natural and material determinations. In speaking 
of man*s fateful rebellion in paradise, it presents him as 
a will Independent from that of his creator. Thus freeing 
him fi^m the ties of Mvine predestination. In this way, 
by presenting man as an aware being possessed of a will 
and freed from the captivity of heaven and earth alike, it 
arrives at true humanism. Then it has accorded to man the 
unique trust that all the world had balked at but he accepted 
it caused all the angels (symbolizing all the forces of 
the universe) to prostrate themselves at his feet. Finally, 
Isl'Sffl looks upon man as God's viceregent in the world who 
has sent him into this world, so that like some nature-god, 
he may subjugate the world and build his own destiny through 
self*awareness, amid contradictions and suffering. Thus 
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he may r e t u r n to God as a self-aware being. 
We see how f a r such a phi losophy 's approach to 
hiunanity and humanism i s from tha t of the "philosophy of 
the piH)ducers". 
A great contemporary student of Islam, Iqb§l , has 
had the l a s t word on t h i s po in t , "Islam and communism both 
t a l k about man and summon man to themselves; but communism 
has taken pains to draw man from Ck>d to dus t , while Islam, 
on the con t ra ry , i s s t r i v i n g to r a i s e him up from the dust 
to God." ' ' ' 
Hamld'Eriayat • s ana lys is of Shar l*a t i*s philosophy 
Ind i ca t e s t h a t Shar l^a t l i s an Islamic-Marxist be l iev ing 
i n the po l a r i za t i on of socie ty and i t s d i a l e c t i c a l move-
ment. But Shari*^ati 's a t t i t u d e towards Marxism con t rad ic t s 
such a claim. Nevertheless Enayat i s r i gh t i n h i s a s se s s -
ment of S h a r l ' a t i ' s i d e a s . The main problem i s t h a t 
S h a r l ^ a t i also suffers from the same con t rad ic t ion as Marx 
does , tha t i s , Shar l*a t i i s of the view that Marxian ideas 
of humanity as a philosopher are d i f f e r en t from those of 
Marx as a soc io log is t or ideologue. The same dilemma 
i s also found i n S h a r l a t l ' s a t t i t u d e towards humanity. 
FJ2 
That Is why 'Enayat projects his ideology as a Marxian 
approach towards the social changes and philosophy of 
h is tory . But a profound insight into Shari*at l ' s c r i t i c a l 
a t t i tude towards Marxism in contemporary prespective shows 
that he i s a severe c r i t i c of Marxism. So we can conclude 
tha t Shari*litl*s approach to humanity as a socialogist i s 
different from that of Sharl*atl as a philosopher. 
» • » 
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CHAPTER - II 
RECENT TRENDS IN SOCIAL THOUGHT 
(a). Democracy and Liberty From J.S.Mill and B.Russell— 
The Islamic Respective: 
It Is very surprising that there are In the vrorld 
today two completely different political and social systems 
and both of them call themselves "democratic" with a sense 
of pride and each of them considers their own system the 
only democratic system In the world. As the author of 
Modern Western Political Thought says, a few decades ago 
Signer Mussolini, the dictator of Italy hailed his corporate 
state as the realization of true democracy. Even Geobbles 
called the Third Reich "The most ennobled form of modern 
democratic state". The fact Is that democracy the world 
over has become a good word and everybody Is keen to 
1 
associate himself or herself with this holy name. Even 
some Muslim thinkers have been trying to prove that Islamic 
system Is a democratic system so as to enhance the credibi-
lity of Islam. Hamid 'Enayat, a contemporary Muslim thinker 
has discussed this Issue In his book Modern Islamic Political 
2 
Thought but has himself fallen into the same trap. Some 
thinkers believe that democracy is not merely a form of 
Government, but it is a form of state as well as a society. 
8.^  
A democratic society is one in which the spirit of equality 
and fraternity prevails. The meaning of democracy has also 
its economic aspect: by economic democracy we me an that 
industry is entirely democratized. In other words it means 
democratic socialism. So we can say that democracy is a 
form of Government, a form of state and a form of society 
and something more—it is a social ideal and a political 
method, John Dewey holds that "The idea of democracy is a 
wider and fuller idea than can be exemplified in the state." 
There is still debate over the meaning of democracy as a 
political system. Hamid*Enayat believes that we cannot 
adopt a single definition as our reference point: 
"...no form of government, whatever its 
ideological underpinning or its social 
and economic configuration, can be 
entitled to the epithet democratic, as 
the term is generally understood in our 
times, without being predicated on a 
number of principles which would be 
either implicit in the attitudes and 
social values of its subjects, or expli-
citly formalised in its laws. The most 
important of these principles are a 
recognition of the worth of every human 
being, irrespective of any of his or 
her qualities, the acceptance of the 
necessity of law, that is a set of defi-
nite or national norms, to regulate all 
social relationships. The quality of all 
citizens before the law, regardless of 
their racial, ethnic and class distinc-
tions, the Justifiablity of state 
(- ("• \r, 
decision on the basis of popular 
consent, and a high degree of tolerance 
of unconvenitional and unorthodox 
opinions",^ 
But democracy is not safe yet in the world. It 
faces challenges both from within and from without. One 
of the major obstacles of democracy today is the large size 
of the state. But this difficulty has been overcome to 
some extent by the development of means of communication etc. 
Another difficulty of democracy is the emergence of parties. 
Parties have become part and parcel of democracy. Baker, E. 
in his book Reflection on Government writes that it is 
perhaps the exaltation of party and of the disciplines and 
is perhaps the exaltation of party and of the disciplines 
and loyalists of party, which has been greatest of internal 
5 
difficulties of democracy,"^ There are some people who doubt 
the soundness of the very principle of democracy, that is, 
the majority rule. The contemporary Iranian Muslim Philoso-
pher Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabatabai, also expresses the 
same idea in his multi volume commentary on the Qur'an 
Al~Mlz§n« After arguing that no other great religion, or 
even worldly ideology can rival Islam in its concern for 
social problems, he takes issue with those westernized 
intellectuals in the Muslim countries who claim that the 
() i 
social norms of Islam are no longer applicable to the 
conditions of the modem world, in which it is the will 
of majority which is expected to determine the nature 
of social laws and relations. He rejects this claim by-
recalling that in history usually the reverse has been 
the case. At their inception, all great religions conflicted 
with rather than pandered to the wishes of the majority. 
Mawdudi's criticism and fear of democracy echo a similar 
line of thinking. Democracy, he believed is the kind of 
government in which the majority rules whether its views 
be right or wrong, and in which a minority may hope to 
have a voice in affairs only by transforming itself into 
the majority. No guarantees of fundamental rights or 
other safeguards that might be built into a democratic 
constitution could truly protect a minority into democratic 
polity. Democracy, when reduced to its bare bones, means 
only the tyrany of the majority. Since the muslims were 
clearly a minority in idea and likely always to remain so, 
the creation of democratic institutions in the country was 
nothing less than a deadly poison for them, one that would 
destroy their culture, take away their identity, and finally 
7 
force them even to give up their religion. 
Earlier Iqbal, in his Reconstruction ot Religious 
Thought in Islam and many of his Urdu and Persian verses 
88 
had criticized the western type of democracy in which the 
weight of people is ignored and only their number is taken 
into account. This urdu couplet comprises this point: 
In a Persian poem he asserts that treating horses and 
donkies as equals is what democracy means: 
His critique of democracy is, to some extent, similar 
to and influenced by Neitzsche's attack on democracy. How-
ever, he believes that true democracy was for the first 
time in the history of mankind was practised by Muslims in 
the early period of Islam, when a Shura (consultative committe 
existed and helped the Prophet (s) and the Rightly Guided 
Caliphs (Khulafa'-i Rashidah)« Iqbal considers the function 
of legislative assembly similar to Shura. But he expressed 
his reservations with regard to Muslims' role in such elected 
assemblies and parlimaments in countries where they form 
a minority only.^ Thus his attitude is ambivalent towards 
democracy. Adoption of Parliamentry democracy by the 
Islamic Republic of Iran Is an indication that democratic 
system of a state is not totally incompatible with Islam. 
Democracy in social and economic spheres is also accepted 
by Iran and some other Muslim countries. Consequently 
XX 
may be said that TabatabVl's and Mawdudi's fears have been 
d i spe l l ed to a great context . Nevertheless the fa te of 
a Muslim minority in countr ies inhabited and ruled mostly 
by non-Muslims remain in quest ion, where by sheer force of 
majority non-Muslims can impose t he i r t r a d i t i o n s , r i t u a l s , 
laws e t c . upon a Muslim minori ty . 
J .S .Mi l l was also very anxious to safeguard minor i t i es 
agains t the tyranny of the major i ty . Mill was of the view 
t h a t the growth of the s t a t e tended to reduce ind iv idua ls 
to a cannon type and to swamp them in the tyranny of 
c o l l e c t i v i s m . According to J .S .Mi l l soc ia l progress depended 
upon giving to each ind iv idua l the f u l l e s t opportunity for 
f ree development. Accordingly he favoured unhampered freedom 
of d i scuss ion . He believed that t r u t h would survive in the 
s t rugg le of i d e a s . Arguments put forward by Milton, Sydney 
and Humbolt rested upon the u t i l i t a t i a n point of view. 
Mil l argued that ind iv idua ls and assoc ia t ions should be l e f t 
unmolested unless t h e i r act ions se r ious ly in te r fe red with 
t he i n t e r e s t s and r i g h t s of o t h e r s . He la id s t r e s s upon the 
value of o r i g i n a l i t y and the soc ia l benef i t s r e su l t i ng from 
a va r i e ty of ideas and a c t i o n s . He even opposed s t a t e 
education on the ground tha t i t i s a contr ivance for moulding 
people to be exact ly l i k e one another . J .S .Mi l l does not 
pretend that actions should be as free as opinions. In 
his book On Liberty« he says: 
Acts of whatever kind, which without 
Justifiable cause, do harm to others 
may be, and in the more important 
cases absolutely require to be cont-
rolled by the unfavourable sentiments, 
and when needful by the active inter-
ference of mankind. The liberty of the 
individual must be thus far limited; 
he must not make himself a nuisance to 
other people.9 
So freedom of acts according to Mill is conditional. 
Now the question which arises is, what is the limit of 
the authority of society over the individual ? or what is 
the sovereignty of the individual over himself? J.S,Mill 
replys: 
Each will receive its proper share, if 
each has that which more particularly 
concerns it. To individuality should 
belong the part of life in which it is 
chiefly the individual that is interested; 
to society, the part which chiefly 
Interests society.10 
But J.S.Mill has not made clear as to how one can 
distinguish that part of individuality which concerns 
society with the other part of his individuality that is 
self-regarding. J.S.Mill offers two maxims to assist the 
Judgement in holding the balance between them and to 
ni 
clear any doubt. The maxims are: 
First, that the individual is not 
accountable to society for his actions 
in so far as these concern the interests 
of no person but himself. Advice, inst-
ruction, persuation, and avoidance by 
other people if thought necessary by them 
for their own good, are the only measures 
by which society can Justifiably express 
its dislike or disapprobation of his 
conduct. 
Secondly, that for such actions as are 
prejudicial to the interests of others, 
the individual is accountable, and may 
be subjected either to social or to 
legal punishment, if society is of opinion 
that the one or the other is requisite for 
its protection.'''' 
R.B.Mccoallum, Professor of Oxford University, in 
his introduction to Mill's book On Liberty criticized 
Mill's idea of self-regarding acts and act regarding others, 
which is a matter of endless dispute. In this regard he 
says: 
Mill's attempts to distinguish between 
self-regarding acts and other-rdgarding 
acts have been assailed again and again, 
and it is not difficult to discredit any 
particular example. The principle on 
which he acts are particularly open to 
attack by moral philosophers. They are 
probably more acceptable and natural to 
a Judge on the bench, who is constantly 
reminding Juries of what they may consider 
to be relevant to the charge against the 
prisoner and what is merely a matter of 
private conduct and Judgement, But the 
y2 
essential question to the political 
theorist is not vvhat particular acts 
may be regarded as within the compe-
tence of public authority to correct 
and punish, but whether there is to 
be any limit made at all. The battle 
on this question is not where any 
particular lineis to bedrawn, but 
whether the drawing of any line is 
permissible. On the one Aide stands 
the individualist school from Locke 
to Mill: On the other side is the 
school which derives from Rousseau 
with his absolute ascendancy of the 
general will if and when such a will 
can exist and be recognized. Fr*om this 
school came the Hegelians, neoHegelians, 
Marxists, and others, who make the 
individual subservient to the collective 
good of the state.12 
Islam has also endeavoured to strike a balance between 
individuality and collectivity. Though the difference 
between socially-regarded and self-regarded acts is not 
discussed in some detail by any contemporary Muslim thinker, 
in classical Islamic works on state, society and morality 
this distinction is made, and, moreover, other aspects 
have been also discussed regarding acts, both individual 
and social. 
RUSSELL; 
Freedom for Russell i s the g rea te s t of a l l goods. 
He opposed both communism and fascism because they are 
incompatible with l i b e r t y . He advocates democracy and i s 
of the view tha t social ism and democracy are reconci lable 
\]:\ 
He finds Guild socialism a way out. According to Russell 
it is the best way hitherto proposed to secure liberty 
without the constant use of violence which is to be 
feared under a purely Anarchist regime. For Russell 
freedom signifies capacity for creative action. Russell 
holds that it is the individual in whom all that is good 
must be realized and the free growth of the individual 
must be the supreme end of a political system which is to 
refashion the world. According to Russell the state as 
it is built today is not a suitable instrument for the 
organisation of freedom, because its motive is power, 
accordingly it is the embodiment of the possessive impulse 
of human nature. In his book Power Russell writes: 
The fundamental concept in social science 
is power, in the same sense in which 
Energy is the fundamental concept in 
physics. Like energy, power has many forms, 
such as wealth, armaments, civil authority, 
influence or opinion. No one of them can 
be regarded as subordinate to any other 
• and there is no one form from which the 
others are derivative. The attempt to treat 
one form of power, say wealth, in isolation, 
can only be partially successful, Just as 
the study of one form of energy will be 
defective at certain points, unless other 
forms are taken into account wealth may 
result from military power or from influence 
owed opinion, just as either of these may 
result from wealth. The laws of social 
dynamics are laws which can only be stated 
in terms of power, not in terms of this or 
that form of power.'I ^  
[]'\ 
According to Russell power is the embodiment of the 
possessive impulse of human nature. Wars arise primarily 
out of the life of impulse, out of impulse of aggression 
and the impulse of resistence to aggression. Impulses play 
a more vital role in shaping human life than conscious 
reason. In the view of Russell there are two kinds of 
impulses, possessive and creative. The possessive impulses 
help an individual to possess more and more things. Since 
the stock of worldly goods is limited, one can add to his 
possessions more and more only at the cost of others, so 
the desire and effort to acquire more goods leads to 
conflicts and lust for power and this ultimate leads to war. 
The state and property are the two institutions which are 
the great embodiments of possessive impulses. 
The creative itapulses are of a different nature. 
They are concerned with spiritual things such as knowledge 
and art. They are the things in which there can be no 
exclusive ownership and these things are shared by all. 
Creative In^ jxilses never lead to war and they always help 
to make life better. 
According to Russell reason is the wise servant of 
the impulse, that is, as the knowledge and intelligence 
of an individual grow, his impulse comes to be more and 
more controlled by reason. This idea of Russell has been 
subjected to criticism. In his book Reconstruction of 
Religious Thought in Islam Iqbal wrote that intellect 
alone could not save mankind from the dangers posed by 
the materialistic west. He says, "Experience shows that 
truth revealed through pure reason is incapable of bring-
ing that fire of living conviction which personal revela-
tion alone can bring. This is the reason why pure thought 
has so little influenced man while religion has always 
15 
elevated individuals and transformed whole societies. 
Iqbal may agree with Russell's view that in democracy the 
creative impulses of man should find all opportunities of 
being translated into action. In Iqbal's philosophy freedom 
is equated with creativity — a point on which he comes 
closer to contemporary existentialists. But in Islamic 
society and state all impulses, acts and creative attainments 
are to be subjected to Divine guidance. In Iqbal*s philoso-
phy Individuality is to be retired and perfected through 
constant action in accordance with the dictates of revelation. 
Revelation does not curtail freedom and suppress individuality 
rather it provides opportunities to strengthen them. Iqbal 
has dealt with these ideas in his two Persian mathnaurs 
(long poems), Asrar-i KhudI and Rumuz-i Blkhudi. Iqbal's 
ideas on these issues provide proper Islamic perspective 
Ibr evaluating the western concepts of democracy and liberty. 
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( b ) . Open Society and i t s Enemies: Karl PoTPper 
Both Marcuse as a neo-marxist and Karl Popper as 
a neo - l i be ra l represent ing two d i f f e ren t cur ren t s of thought 
discussed the i ssues r e l a t i n g to modern socie ty and p o l i c i e s 
with a view to bring about soc ia l change. Marcuse who 
represen t s new-left be l ieves in a q u a l i t a t i v e change, that 
i s revolut ion in a l l dimensions of human l i f e against the 
oppresive i n d u s t r i a l socie ty while Karl Popper i s opposed 
to any r evo lu t ion , fo r , any revolu t ion i n i t s wake brings 
some kind of d i c t a t o r s h i p . He c i t e s the French Revolution 
and the Russian Revolution as a consequence of which very 
soon Napolean and S t a l i n appeared on the scene and under-
mined the goals of Revolution, According to Popper present 
democracy i n the west, p a r t i c u l a r l y American soc ie ty , i s 
c lose to the i dea l open soc ie ty and any change in i t , should 
t ake p lace only thixDugh c r i t i c i sm and piecemeal reform. 
He does not give any c l e a r model of an idea l socie ty of 
the fu tu re . Only he proposed the i n s t i t u t i o n s by means of 
which one can grapple with au thor i t a r i an i sm. He says: 
" the attempt to make heaven on ear th invar iab ly produces 
h e l l " . ' ' He proposes to adopt a c r i t i c a l ra t ional ism as 
opposed to i r r a t i o n a l i s m . The former a t t i t u d e emphasises 
the use of argument and experience as the appropriate 
devices for t h i s purpose. Popper says: 
r8 
I.may be wrong and you may be right 
and by an effort we may get nearer to 
the truth, is, as mentioned closely, 
akin to the scientific attitudes. It 
is bound up with the idea that every 
body is liable to make mistake, which 
may be found by himself with the assis-
tance of the criticism of others. It, 
therefore, suggests the idea that nobody 
should be his own judge, and it suggests 
the idea of impartiality. (This is closely 
related to the idea of scientific object-
ivity).'^ 
Further he says: 
Ultimately in this way rationalism is 
sinked up with the recognition of the 
necessity of social institutions to 
project freedom of criticism freedom of 
thought and thus the freedom of men. 
And it establishes something like a 
moral obligation towards the support of 
these institutions. This is why rationalism 
is closely linked up with the political 
demand for practical social engineering-
piecemeal engineering of course in the 
humanitarian sense with the demand for the 
rationalization of society.5 
In his article, Karl Popper's Open Society; A Personal 
Appreciation, Edward Boyle sums up Karl Popper's attitude 
towards social philosophy in the following manner. (1) One 
unifying principle, which runs through the whole of Popper's 
works, is the crucial importance of learning from our own 
mistakes, whether we are involved in science, in social 
science or in government. The criterion of the scientific 
status of a theory is also its falsifiability, or refutability, 
:^ n 
or testability. Every genuine test of a theory is an 
attempt to falsify it, or to refute It,^ He is insistent 
that science itself cannot be regarded as merely "a body 
of facts; the scientific theory or hypothesis we wish to 
test and on whose testability, indeed, its scientific 
status depends, will be determined by our interests as well 
as by the facts themselves, so that the theory could even 
be described as "the crystallization of a point of view". 
The real distinction between what Popper calls the "gene-
ralising science (like physics or biology) and the 
"historical" sciences is not that the latter can find room 
for the element of a personal view point, whereas the former 
cannot. In this respect the differences between them 
are ultimately a matter of degree, but rather in that the 
generalising sciences are ultimately interested in "universal 
law or hypothesis", whereas the historical sciences are 
interested in "specific events" and in their interpretation 
as a means of elucidating the most urgent human problems 
of the day, (2). In Popper's view, the task of the theore-
tical social science is not to prophesy, but to trace the 
unintended repurcussions of international social actions 
and refute the philosophical point of view which he calls 
l i . O 
"historicism". The metaphysics of history impedes the 
application of the piecemeal methods of science to the 
7 R 
problems of social reform,' History has no meaning , 
but we can impose (our own) ends upon it," Popper argued 
against Marx who believed that socialism was bound to 
come whatever may happen. In this way Popper said "I had 
grasped the heart of the Marxian argument, which he aimed 
at exposing, 
(3)« Popper projects himself as a moral philosopher 
In the great tradition of Hume in his insistence that there 
is no logical argument from "is" to "ought", that is we 
cannot derive ethical norms or decisions from facts. This 
"critical dualism of fact and decision", as Popper calls 
it, is one of the key doctrines of The Open Society and 
the arguments in its favour are set out fully in chapter-V 
of the book entitled "Nature and Convention", In Open 
Society and Its Enemies, Popper says : 
It is impossible to derive a sentence 
stating a norm or a decision or, say, a 
proposal for a policy from a sentence 
stating a fact; this is only another 
way of saying that it is impossible 
to derive norms or decisions or proposals 
from facts."10 
Popper refers to Marx's ethics as "normal positivism" 
or "moral futurism" which holds "might is right" or coming 
J ; l 
might (socialism) i s r ight" . Popper says th i s i s the 
consequence of Marx's sociological theories . 
(4) . This insistence on "The autonomy of ethics" has 
been the deriving force behind Popper's passionate belief 
In the r ight of Individuals to end his cr i t ic ism of ru lers 
and the ins t i tu t iona l frame work of soc ie t ies . I t also has 
been the reason for his notorious and most eloquent opposi-
t ion to Pla to ' s doctrine that " just ice" i s a synonym for 
"that which i s in the in teres t of the best stat€?i 
(5) . Finally, i t i s Popper's opposition to P la to ' s 
programme which has led him to elaborate important d is t inc t ion 
between "Utopia" and "piecemeal" social engineering — no 
doubt the best known and the most widely discussed aspect 
of Popper's work. 
The main theme of The Open Society and i t s Enemies 
i s to expose and c r i t i c i s e Marx's social theory. Part icular ly 
in his book Poverty of Historicism, he t r i e s to c r i t i c i s e 
the h i s to r i c i s t i c approach of left-wing c i rc les who believe 
that "History is with us", that i s , socialism is bound to 
come whatever may happen, and i t i s a h i s to r ica l necessity, 
for "Scientific soc ia l i s t " is a sc ient i f ic proof that social-
ism will be coming. Popper says that " i t was in 1919 and 
10-9 
in the early 1920s that I began to disbelieve in all this: 
"I discovered for myself that all this "social science" 
12 
was spurious, and possibly most damaging". Popper criti-
cises the later writings of Marx and Engels from The Manifesto 
onwards and overlooked the early works of Marx and Engels, 
This is why in reply to his critic, Acto, Popper says that 
"I plead guilty of having idealized the picture of Marxism 
1^ 
and I accept Action's criticism", -'^  Popper overlooked 
repressive measures taken in advanced industrial societies, 
particularly the American, and unlike Marcuse defended that 
society and disbelieved in any revolution and qualitative 
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( c ) . New Left; Marcuse; 
Marcuse's WOTK i s f requently presented 
as f a l l i n g into three d i s t i n c t s tages : (1) h i s ea r ly 'Heideggerian Marxist* 
stage from 1928 to 1933; (2) h is o r tho -
dox ' c r i t i c a l theory ' stage from 1933 
to 19^1* which adhered to the vers ion 
of Hegelian Marxism developed by the 
I n s t i t u t e for Social Research in e x i l e ; 
and (3) h is post-Second V/orld War w r i t -
ings , i n which h i s work took on a d i s -
t i n c t l y 'Marcusean' c a s t . 1 
After the second world war Marxist i n t e l l e c t u a l s 
s t r e s sed the humanist element in Marxist philosophy. So 
Luckacs, Korsch and Marcuse and Kojeve put forward new 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of Marxism. In France Sar t re f e l t Marxism 
had to be ex t r ica ted form with t h i s view dogmatic and 
mechanistic approach of the o f f i c i a l exponents of the philoso-
phy he developed a revolut ionary marxism which combined 
ex i s t en t i a l i sm and Marxism, Philosophers of the Frankfurt 
lor) 
school (Jurgeo Habermos, Horkheimer and Adorma) renewed 
Marxism, reinterpreted the dialectic which had been 
debased ih the Soviet theory of dialectical materialism. 
Herbert Marcuse, the co-founder of the Frankfurt 
school, was the theoritian of the new-left.- He believed 
that oppression in the industrial society exists no longer 
in an economic way but in a spiritual and intellectual 
form, Marcuse is responsible for pointing out that man 
In totalitarian system was reduced to one dimentional being. 
His criticism of advance industrial societies, both western 
and Soviet society and his defence of Radical change won 
for his world-wide acclaim and he was considered "father 
of the new left". The author of Herbert Marcuse and the 
crisis of marxism. Douglus kellner, holds that Marcuse's 
critique of contemporary society was radical in the sense 
that it penetrated to the roots of current alienation of 
man and his revolt against the existing system of production-
3 
consumption oriented social control. 
7 In his book Soviet Marxism, Marcuse articulated his 
views on the political phonemenon of communism in the 
Soviet Union and its ideological doctrine and its departure 
from classical marxism. In this regard Marcuse says: 
lOG 
The fundamental difference between 
western and Soviet Society is paralleled 
by a strong trend towards assimilation. 
Both systems show the common features of 
late industrial civilization — untrali-
zation and regimentation supersede individual 
enterprise and autonomy; competition is 
organized and 'rationalized'. There is 
Joint role of economic and political 
bureaucracies; the people are co-ordinated 
through the mass media of communication, 
entertainment industry, education.^ 
In Marcuse's view, the rationality of soviet industrial 
system demands submission to the machine process, surrender 
of individual initiative to efficiency and performance within 
the established pattern. Hence the soviet organization of 
labour and society is aimed at domination of the working 
class and serves to subjugate the labourers to the machine 
apparatus rather than aiming at their liberation and the 
5 
development of their potentialities. 
Marcuse traced the root of the oppersion in technolo-
gical apparatus which is totalitarian in nature, that is, 
not only it determines the socially needed occupations, 
skills, and attitudes but also individual needs and aspira-
tions. Even it succeeds to reconcile all opposing forces 
by means of brute oppression and thus strangling the factors 
that caused social change. In this regard Marcuse says: 
J 07 
Technical progress extends to a whole 
system of domination and co-ordination, 
creats a form of life which appears to 
reconcile the forces opposing the system 
and to defeat or refute all protest in the 
name of the historical prospects of freedom 
from toil and domination.^ 
Marcuse's Theory of Contemporary Advanced Society; 
In his famous book One Dimensional Man, he articulates 
the crisis of Marxism in an era which seemed to refute the 
marxian theory of history and socialist revolution, Marcuse 
challenges some of the basic postulates of Marx's theory 
while using Marxian categories and method of analysis and 
critique. The result is a reconstruction of Marxian Theory 
which questions such central features of Marxism as the 
theory of capitalist crisis and the revolutionary role of 
7 
the working class in making possible socialist revolution. 
The historical context of One Dimensional Man is 
related to the crisis of social change during that period. 
In that period there was hardly any attempt made to question 
Marxian orthodoxy. During the 1950 in the U.S.A. conformist 
society theory proclaiming the end of ideology was invoque, 
and there were but a few honorable thinkers, like C.Wright 
Mill, Erich Fixjm, Pavl Baran and Pavl Swcexy and some 
critical Journalists like I.F.Stone and Fred Cook, who either 
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used Marxism in a creative way or sharply criticized 
American society. 
In fact One Dimensional Man is a study of advanced 
industrial society. In this book Marcuse compares the 
formative stage of the theory of industrial society and 
its present situation and proves that the basis of the 
critique has been altered the very idea of qualitative 
change. The capitalist development has altered the structure 
and function of the two classes of society in such a way 
that they no longer appear to be agents of historical trans-
formation. In the absence of demonstrable agents of social 
change the theory and practice, thought and action have lost 
their meaning. In his book One Dimensional Man Marcuse, 
defining the actual contradiction in nineteenth century 
European society^proclaims: 
"The category Society" itself expressed 
the acute conflict between the social 
and political sphere-society as antago-
nistic to the state. Similarly, "Individual" 
"Class", "Private", "Family" denoted spheres 
and forces not yet integrated with the estab-
lished conditions-spheres of tension and 
contradiction. With the growing integration 
of industrial society these categories are 
losing their critical connotation, and tend 
to become descriptive, deceptive or operation 
terms.^ 
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According to Marcuse technology is serving now as 
a new form of control which is more effective. Thus the 
traditional notion of neutrality of technology can no 
longer be maintained. In this regard Marcuse says: 
In the medium of technology culture, 
politics and the economy merge into 
an omnipresent system which swallows up 
or repulses all alternatives. The pro-
ductivity and growth potential of this 
system stabilize the society and contain 
technical progress within the framework 
of domination. Technological rationality 
has become political rationality.9 
In industrial society freedom of thought and speech 
which served to promote critical ideas has lost their former 
content. Independence of thought and the right to political 
opposition are being deprived of their basic critical 
function in a society. Marcuse says: 
Contemporary industrial civilization 
demonstrates that it has reached the 
stage at which the free society can 
no longer be adequately defined in 
the traditional terms of economic, 
political and intellectual liberties, 
not because these liberations have 
become insignificant, but because 
they are too significant to be con-
fined within the traditional forms. 
New modes of realization are needed 
corresponding to the new capabilities 
of society. Such new modes can be 
indicated only in negative terms because 
they would amount to the negation of the 
prevailing modes. The economic freedom 
no 
would mean freedom from the economy 
from being controlled by economic 
forces and relationship; freedom 
from the daily struggle for existence, 
from earning a living. Political free-
dom would mean liberation of the indi-
vidual from politics over which they 
have no affective control* Similarly, 
intellectual freedom would mean the 
restoration of individual thought, now 
absorbed by mass communication and 
indoctrination, abolition of "public 
opinion" together with its makers. 
The unrealistic souhd of these proposi-
tions if indicative, not of their Utopian 
character, but of the strength of the 
forcer which prevent their realization. 
The most effective and enduring form of 
warfare against liberation is the implant-
ing of material and intellectual needs 
that perpetuate obsolete forms of the 
struggle for existence,^^ 
In advanced industrial society even the character of 
human needs has always been pre-conditioned that is, such 
needs are determined by external powers over which the 
individual has no control, Marcuse distinguishes the true 
and false needs. According to him "False" are those which 
are superimposed upon the individual by particular social 
interests. In jthis repression the needs which perpetuate 
toil, aggressiveness, misery and injustice, their satisfac-
tion might be most gratifying to the individual, but his 
happiness is not a condition which has to be maintained 
and protected if it serves to arrest the development of 
11 
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the ability (his ovm and others) to recognizing the disease 
of the whole and grasp the chances of curing the disease. 
The result then is euphoria in unhappiness« Most of the 
prevailing needs to relax, to have, to behave and consume in 
accordance with the advertisements, to love and hate what 
others love and hate, belong to this category of false needs. 
Marcuse says that the distinguishing features of the advanced 
industrial society consist of its effective and suffocation of 
those needs which demand liberation — liberation also from 
that which is tolerable and rewarding and comfortable, while 
it sustains and absolves the destructive power and repre-
ssive function of the affluent society. Further he says: 
Under the rule of a repressive whole 
liberty can be made into a powerful 
instrument of domination. The range 
of choice open to the individual is not 
the decisive factor in determining the 
degree of human freedom, but what can be 
chosen and what is chosen by the indi-
vidual, the criterion for free choice 
can never be an absolute one, but 
neither is it entirely relative. Free 
election of mosters does not abolish the 
masters or the slaves, free choice 
among a wide variety of goods and 
services does not signify freedom if 
these goods are services sustain social 
control over a life of toil and fear 
that is If they sustain alienation. 
And the spontaneous reproduction does not 
establish autonomy it only testifies to 
efficiency of the controls,12 
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Technological reality has ruled out any possibility 
of negative thinking. Mass production and mass distri-
bution claim the entire life of the individual. The result 
Is an immediate identification of the individual with his 
society. In this process man loses his inner dimension 
and becomes one-dimensional man and militates against any 
qualitative change of society, Marcuse says that even 
philosophers and scientists also are not immune of this 
behaviour. Practical reason is also identified with theo-
retical reason. In One Dimensional Man, he says: 
I have suggested that the concept of 
alienation seems to become questionable 
when the individuals identify themselves 
with the existence which is imposed upon 
them and have in it their own develop-
ment and satisfaction. This identification 
is not illusion but reality. However, this 
constitutes a more progressive stage of 
alienation. The taller has become entirely 
objective; the subject which is alienated 
is swallowed up by its alienated existence. 
There is only one dimension and it is every 
where and in all forms the achievements 
of progress defy ideological indictment as 
well as Justification; before their tribunal, 
the "false consciousness" of their rationality 
becomes the true consciousness. -^  
Now, what is the way out ? Marcuse proposes to 
develope the absolute need which is the effective cause of 
qualitative change, to develop absolute refusal and effective 
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denial , that i s , demand for the end of the domination of 
technical apparatus and demand for a quali tat ive change, 
that means revolution i s the only remedy to change the 
indus t r ia l society and save mankind. He expl ic i t ly renounces 
here advocacy of any reformism or piecemeal change: 
Such change would pre-suppose that the 
labouring classes are alienated from 
th i s universe in their very existence. 
That their consciousness i s that of the 
to ta l impossibility to continue to 
exist in th is universe. So that the 
need for qual i ta t ive change i s a matter 
of l i f e and death. Thus the negation 
exists prior to the change i t s e l f . The 
notion that the l ibera t ion h i s to r ica l 
forces develop within the established ^, 
society i s a comstone of Marxian theory. 
According to Douglas Kellner, some of Marcuse's 
c r i t i c s see concepts l ike the great refusal as ineradicably 
Heideggerian elements in his thought. But in his view 
his emphasis on individual revolt and self-transformation 
const i tu tes a v i t a l component of his revolutionary theory 
which maintains that there can be no meaningful talk about 
social change unless the individuals themselves are l iberated 
from ' cap i t a l i s t needs" for thoroughgoing social change.''^ 
In his Eros and Civi l izat ion Marcuse turned to 
Freud to produce a theory that would explain why revolutionary 
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consciousness had failed, because he was aware of the 
absence in Marxism of emphasis on individual liberation 
and the psychological dimension of man. Hence Marcuse 
reconstructs Freudian and Marxian theories in order to 
develop a critical theory of contemporary society and man. 
Nevertheless, in his view Marx and Freud remain the represen-
tatives of two extreme types of reductionism. 
According to some critics, what Marcuse claims is to 
transcend existing society and civilization, carry out 
a global revolution, creat a qualitative change or great 
refusal, but he could not work out any alternative model 
of socialism except in general terms. As Leszk Kolakowski 
points out he conceived revolution without the working class 
hatred of modern technology as such because Marx had glorified 
technical progress. 
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(d). Existentialist Marxism of Sartre: 
The dialogue between existentialism and Marxism was 
Initiated in France after the war due to the particular 
situation. Following this philosophers resolved to change 
the world rather than interpret it in a country like France 
that was the birth place of the enlightenment. This alter-
native seems the most reasonable reaction in the post-war 
west. And marxism on account of having well-established 
doctrinal structure and its power of political organisation 
in whole as a theory of social change was relevant to exist-
entialism. In fact, Kierkegaaixl's protest against Hegelian 
attempt to merge human subjectivity into an impersonal 
historical being also coincided with Marx's stance in its 
opposition to Hegelian approach. 
According to Leszek Kolakowski existentialism as 
expounded by both Heidegger and Sartre had one essential 
feature in common with Marxist revisionism, namely its 
emphasis on the opposition between irreducible human 
subjectivity and thing like forms of existence, at the 
same time, it pointed out that human being had a constant 
tendency to flee from subjective, i.e. free and independent 
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existence, into a rarefield state. 
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But there was some shortcomings and lack of change in 
Marxism which existentialism solves. There was a crying 
need to make a revolution within the current marxism in 
order to find room for creativity. So, Sartre resorted to 
existentialism in order to instal dialectic on its real 
foundation, that is human existence, as against Engels' 
and Hegelian approaches to the notion of dialectic. Similarly 
Herbert Marcuse resorted to Fruedianism in order to recons-
truct Marxism and create a revolutionary theory. 
According to Sartre responsibility of this shortcoming 
lies not with Marx but with Marxist thinkers who run from 
economlsm of Engels to the voluntaristic idealism of Stalin. 
So the only way out is to return to the authentic Marxism. 
In this regard one nay refer to the book Sartre & Marxism 
by Pietro Chiodi who says: 
Sartre was by new convinced that without 
the communists there was nothing to be 
done but that the communists themselves 
would not be able to do anything so long 
as they remained entranched in a Marxism 
which had lost its vocation of universal 
humanism only existentialism could restore 
Marxism to that vocation; and meanwhile 
existentialism found a reason for its conti-
nuing presence in the decline of Marxism.2 
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Sar t re resolved to use ex i s t en t i a l i sm as a means 
to ascend from the Marxism of today towards an authent ic 
Marxism as e x i s t e n t i a l i s t rea l i sm. According to the 
author of Exis tent ia l i sm and Marxism ex i s t en t i a l i sm tended 
to play a bridging ro l e between the young Hegel and the 
young Marx. 
Exis tent ia l i sm has been able to take recourse in 
Marxism and to maintain i t s e l f because i t reaffirmed the 
r e a l i t y of man as Kierkegaard asser ted h i s own r e a l i t y 
4 
agains t t ha t of Hegel. Sa r t re considers tha t ex i s t en t i a l i sm 
w i l l be absorbed in to when Marxism has i n s t a l l e d the e x i s -
t e n t i a l i s t anthropology at i t s foundation. What Sar t re 
accepts of communism i s i t s demand tha t l imi ted bourgeois 
humanism be replaced by a universa l humanism and tha t the 
only way of achieving t h i s i s by removing the means of 
production from the hand of a s ingle c l a s s and placing them 
a t the disposal of the e n t i r e society.-^ 
Sar t re re^Jects d i a l e c t i c a l materialism and advocates 
h i s t o r i c a l mater ial ism, for the foundation of h i s t o r i c a l 
material ism i s the mode of existence which i s charac te r i sed 
by man's being Paraxis-Pro.iect and by h i s being at s t ake . 
P rax i s -Pro jec t also expresses the h i s t o r i c a l nature of man 
as Sar t re dec la res : 
l\i 
1£ there is to be any such thing as 
dialectical materialism, it must be 
a historical materialism that is to 
say materialism from within," 
Materialism for Sartre is the project as the structure 
of human reality and the foundation of history which is 
conditioned in an exhaustive way by the relationship of 
scarcity. The author of Sartre & Marxism. Pictre Chiodi, 
observes: 
Economic conditioning expres the 
regressive dimension to the project 
which found individual and collective 
and history; but what gives history 
its character as truly human and 
historical is a progressive impulse in 
a direction which is not already implicit 
in the state of things to which it opposes 
itself as a form of response,7 
The question as to whether or not the historical 
dislectic extends to include nature is related to the use 
of the term 'dialectic*, Sartre regarded dialectic as 
connected with the mode of being of man as conditioned 
existence and rejects Engels' views on dialectic that are 
rooted in nature and do not fall into the Hegelian mistake 
of reducing historical reality to rational knowledge. 
According to the author of Sartre & Marxism, the fundamental 
object of the critique of Dialectical Reason is tracing 
w:^ 
the original unity of d i a l ec t i c i ty , whether i t be of 
knowledge or of the r ea l , not to Hegel's knowledge or 
Engels' nature, but to the structure of existence as 
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Praxis-Project governed by need. In this regard Sartre 
observes: 
Engels criticises Hegel for imposing 
the laws of thought on matter, but he 
does not precisely the same himself, 
in that he expects the sciences to 
verify a dialectical reason which he 
discovered in the social world. But in 
the historical and social world, as we 
shall see there really is a dialectical 
reason; by transferring it into the 
natural world, and forcibly inscribing 
it there, Engels* stripped it of its 
rationality." 
In the critique, Sartre's main objective is to free 
the dialectics from the Hegelian dogmatism and Engels' 
idealism and to restore the dialectics to its critical 
foundation that is dialectical reason. Sartre observes: 
...If there is such a thing as a 
dialectical reason, it is revealed 
and established in and through human 
Praxis, to men in a given society at 
a particular moment of its development. 
On the basis of this discovery. The 
limits and scope of dialectical certainity 
have to be established. The dialectic 
will be an effective method as long as it 
remains necessary as the laws of intelli-
gibility and as the rational structure 
of being a materialist dialectic will be 
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meaningless if it cannot establish, 
within human history the privacy of 
material conditions as things are 
discovered by the Praxis of parti-
cular man and as they impose them-
selves on it^ 'IO 
Leszek Kolakewski is of the view that The Critique 
of Dialectical Reason does not appear to contain any 
new interpretation of Marxism as regards the historical 
character of perception and knowledge and the negation 
of the dialectics of nature, Sartre follows in Luckac's 
footsteps. 
CRITIQUEt 
According to the sociologist George Gurvitch Sartre 
in his critique made an attempt to librate his philosophy 
from the past dogmatic dialectic (Hegel, Engels etc.) but 
he failed to do so, for he himself also remained within 
the confines of the dogmatic dialectic of existentialism 
as Hegel confined dialectic in his spiritualistic idealism 
and Engels in his materialistic philosophy. The key point 
in The Critique of Dialectical Reason is to base and restore 
the dialectic to its critical foundation taking as the 
point of departure the existentialist concept of the project. 
According to Sartre, man's existence is the real base of 
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d ia l ec t i c , Man through nature and society f inal ly returns 
to his ownself and gets freedom. Here the f i r s t analogy 
between Hegelian at t i tude and that of Sartre i s related 
to existence. For instance according to Hegel i t i s the 
absolute idea or Gk)d who moves from within and reveals 
i t s e l f in nature and man and ultimately Joins to his origin 
or self, Gurvitch after elaborating th i s point says that 
even here the sol idi ty of Sar t re ' s d ia lec t ica l philosophy i s 
less than that of Hegel's for the ab i l i ty of Ck)d in creation 
of world and society is more than that of man's existence. 
Thus i t may be said that Sartre failed to purify the dia-
l ec t i ca l dogmatism. Pietro Chiodi, the author of Sartre 
and Marxism says: 
The meeting between Existentialism and 
Marxism which Sartre undertakes to effect 
takes the form of a Critique of Dialectical 
Reason — a c r i t i c a l re-examination of that 
dogmatic d ia lec t ica l reason common to both 
Hegel's s p i r i t u a l i s t i c idealism and to the 
mater ia l is t ic idealism of pseudo-Marxism of 
a Marxist by the ex i s t en t i a l i s t problematic; 
that is to say, by means of a vindication 
of the f in i t e nature of the prot^Lgonist of 
the d i a l ec t i c . The human being. 
G. Gurvitch says that all philosophers including 
Sartre founded dialectic in their philosophies on some 
kind of apriori knowledge that is why he believes that 
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dialectic should be liberated from the yoke of any philoso-
phy. In order to do so he believes dialectic should be 
reconsiled with empiricism. According to Sartre the attitude 
of Gurvitch is a neo-positivistic, which rejects every form 
of apriori knowledge. In his book The Critique of dialectical 
Reason Sartre says: 
Gurvitch calls his hyper-empiricism 
dialectical but this hardly matters 
since all he means is that his object 
(social fact) present itself td 
investigation as dialectical. His 
dialectic is thus Itself an empirical 
on conclusion. This means that reci-
procities of conditioning or as Gurvitch 
quite correctly puts it, reciprocities 
of perspectives etc., is based on 
investigations and is confined by present 
ones. Generalizing this attitude, one 
might, I think speak of a neo-positivism 
which discover in a given region of 
anthropology now a dialectical field, 
now a field of analytical determinism 
and now, if occasion demands, other 
types of rationality.'12 
*** 
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CHAPTER - III i'^ '^  
MUTAHHARJ'S SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 
( a ) . Mutahharl 's View on Indiv idual : 
The conception of man and notions about h i s nature 
and ro l e in society c o n s t i t u t e s the substratum of soc ia l 
philosophy. Mutahharl as a soc ia l philosopher has expressed 
h i s views in many of h i s books p a r t i c u l a r l y in F i t r a t (nature) 
Insan wa' Iman (Man and F a i t h ) , Insan Par Qur'an (Man in view 
of the Qur'an) and Jamiah wa T'arlkh (History and Socie ty) , 
He made an attempt to c la r i fy Islamic a t t i t u d e towards the 
contemporary phi losophical and psychological conceptions 
regarding man. He also contrasted i t with Marxist and 
E x i s t e n t i a l i s t approaches to indiv idual man. 
In h i s book Society and History and h i s work on 
economics Bar - ras l mabani-e i q t i s a d - e IslamI (A study of 
« 
t he fundamentals of Islamic Economics), Mutahharl 's stand 
seems to be Incl ined towards co l lec t iv i sm r a t h e r than i n d i v i -
dualism for he bel ieves tha t man i s soc ia l by na tu re . But 
Mutahharl 's approach i s d i f fe ren t with the two opposi te 
approaches to the methodology of soc ia l science which i s 
ca l led methodological individualism and methodological 
co l l ec t iv i sm. Mutahharl opposed both marxist and e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
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as well as atomistic approach to man. The latter is Hobbes 
approach according to which it is denied that man has a 
fixed particular nature (fltrat). Mutahharl controverted 
and rejected all the three approaches. 
In his book Insan dar Quran, Mutahharl says that man 
is an entity which is self-conscious and also conscious of 
the world or nature around him. Regarding the priority of 
one of the two types of consciousness, that is, self-conscious 
and world-consciousness, over the other, Mutahharl believes 
that arbitration over this matter is not an easy task. 
However, it is possible to claim that one of the main diff er-
ences between the Eastern way of thinking and the Western one 
Issues from the radically different answers to this question. 
To be more precise, the East gives precedence to self-
consciousness while the West considers world-consciousness as 
prior to the former. This is why the modern West upholds 
scientific approach to reality, whereas the East adopts a 
spiritual attitude in which self-realization occupies the 
central place, 
Mutahharl holds that science is an instrument to 
cognize the world, that is nature, but faith is instrumental 
for self-consciousness "self realization". In this regard 
he says: 
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Science gives us enlightenment and 
power: faith gives us love, hope 
and order. Science makes instruments; 
faith constructs purpose. Science 
gives speed; faith gives direction. 
Science is power; faith is benevolence. 
Science shows what is: faith inspires 
insight into what must be done. Science 
is the outer revolution; faith is the 
inner revolution. Science makes the 
universe the human universe: faith makes 
the psyche the psyche of humanity. 
Science expands man's being horizontally; 
faith conveys him upward. Science shapes 
nature; faith shapes man. Both science 
and faith empower man, but science gives 
a power of discrimination, and faith 
gives a power of integration. Both 
science and faith are beauty, but 
science is the beauty of the reason and 
faith is the beauty of the spirit. 
Science is the beauty of thought, and 
faith is the beauty of feeling. Both 
science and faith give man security, 
but science gives outward security, and 
faith gives inward security. Science 
gives security against the onslaught of 
illness, flood, earthquakes, storms; 
faith, againfit worry, loneliness, feeling 
of helplessness, feeling of futility. 
Science brings the world into greater 
harmony with man and faith brings man 
into greater harmony with himself.1 
Mu^ahharl holds that the idea of the opposition of 
science and faith becomes widespread and divides the last 
fifteen hundred years of European history into the age 
of faith and the age of reason. But the history of Islamic 
civilization is divisible into the age of flowering, or 
the age of science and faith, and the age of decline, in 
which science and faith together have declined. Islam is 
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an unique religion, whose fundamental book, The Qur'an 
has bridged the cleavage between nature and man, and thus 
between the knowledge of the world and the knowledge of 
man's self. The Qur'an does not see any opposition between 
the two, one being complementary to the other, and therefore 
science and faith go hand in hand. Due to this view 
Islam encouraged scientific research, introducing its two 
basic principles, that is observation and experimentation, 
which resulted in the unprecedented flourishing of sciences 
In the golden age of Islam, When Muslims ignored science, 
this society stagnated and their progress was halted, Mutahhari 
is justified in holding the view that self-conscious-
ness provides a safe launching pad for making flights in the 
seemingly infinite space and time. The western mode 
of thought in the course of time, gradually ignored the 
importance of self-consciousness, and as a result developed 
natural sciences only with a view to attain greater material 
benefits. It is this Western attitude that popularised 
the notion of the opposition between two types of conscious-
ness, that is the consciousness of the world and in conscious-
ness of self. He advises: 
"We muslims must eschew this wrong 
conception that has inflicted 
irreparable injuries on science and 
on faith, indeed on humanity: we must 
not take the opposition between p 
science and faith for granted." 
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C r i t i c s of the Western philosophy are of the view 
tha t one of the main reasons of the s e l f - a l i e n a t i o n in 
the West i s the fac t tha t the West merely developed man's 
knowledge of na tu re , which not only brought in i t s wake 
man's a l i ena t ion frota himself but also resu l ted in his a l i e -
nat ion from na tu re . The g rea te r knowledge of nature was 
a t ta ined the grea te r was man's a l i ena t i on from his ownself. 
With reference to Mahatama Gandhi's book My Religion Mutahharl 
says that Gandhi more than anyone e l se rea l ized t h i s matter 
and elaborated i t in h i s book. According to Mutahhari there 
are many kinds of consciousness such as : (1) Consciousness 
with respect to na tu re . (2) Phi losophical consciousness. 
(3) Class-based consciousness. (4) Nation-based consciousness. 
(5) Human-based consciousness. 
Regarding the consciousness with respect to pr imordial 
na ture ( f i t r a t ) . Mutahharl holds tha t man i s se l f -conscious 
tha t i s he knows the "self" i n t r i n s i c a l l y . Infac t the essence 
of man i s consciousness. I t i s not such that f i r s t " I " came 
to exis tence and l a t e r on acquired knowledge of one ' s "self". 
He says tha t the very emergence of consciousness, tha t i s 
the uni ty of subject and ob jec t . Here we may see some obvious 
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agreements between Islamic view and the existentialist 
view of man and his consciousness. In this respect one 
may refer to Sartre's notion of consciousness who says 
that consciousness enters the world with man and that man sepa-
rated from consciousness which is basically self-consciousness, 
is not man and is reduced to the status of an object only. 
Dr. Mahdi Hairl Yazdi in his doctoral thesis Knowledge by 
Presence elaborated this issue at some length: 
"If" "I" truly say "I know something", 
does this asertion presupos.e that I 
as the knowing subject am already 
acquainted with myself which is, in this 
case, the knowing 'I'? If it does, what 
can the meaning of this acquaintance be 
except the very being of myself? In the 
light of this fundamental Introvertive 
question and by means of laws and princi-
ples of logic-we feel quite justified to 
arrive at the very foundation of human 
intellect where the word knowing does 
not mean any kind other than being. In 
this ontological state of human consciousness 
the constitutive dualism of the subject-
object relationship is overcome and con-
verged into a unitary simplex of the 
reality of the self. From this unitary 
simplex we are able to derive the sense of 
self-object consciousness which in the 
language of the illuminative philosophy 
is called "knowledge by presence". The 
prime example of this knowledge is what 
shows itself to us performatlvely and 
directly without mediation of any linguistic 
symbolism. It shows itself to us through 
all our self-Judgement e.g. I think, I speak 
etc. The acting subject of these Judgements 
is the performative "I" as distinct from the 
metaphysical I,or self which is problematic 
in philosophy.* 
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I t may be pointed out here tha t I am using the terms 
knowledge by presence and knowledge by correspondence, fu l ly 
r e a l i z i n g that these are not co r rec t t r a n s l a t i o n s of the 
terms *ilm al~hudurl and *ilm al« 'husull . Just because I want 
to remain fa i th fu l to H a ' i r i ' s t r a n s l a t o r , Kooper, Similar ly 
in quoting from the book by H a r i r i , I have reproduced in 
verbatim Keeper 's English t r a n s l a t i o n of H a ' i r i ' s t ex t though 
a t many places the t r a n s l a t i o n i s inadequate or r a the r i n -
c o r r e c t . 
According to H a ' i r i Muslim philosophers hoSid tha t 
there are two kinds of knowledge (1) knowledge by presence 
o r a p r i o r i knowledge (I lm-ul-hudurl) and (2) knowledge by 
correspondence or acqu i s i t ion ( I lm-u l -husu l l ) tha t i s 
apos t e r io r i knowledge. H a ' i r i says t ha t knowledge by presence 
i s the kind of knowledge tha t has a l l i t s r e l a t i o n s wi th in 
the framework of i t s e l f , so that the whole anatomy of the 
notion can hold t rue without any impl icat ion of an external 
ob jec t ive reference ca l l i ng for an ex t e r i o r r e l a t i o n , t ha t 
i s the r e l a t i o n of knowing i s in tha t form of knowledge a 
s e l f -ob j ec t r e l a t i o n without the i n t rus ion of a connection 
with an external ob jec t . 
In the knowledge by presence the object ive object and 
t h e subject ive object are one and the same. Knowledge by 
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correspondence on the other hand is that type of knowledge 
which enjoys both a subjective object and a separ^ e object 
which includes a correspondence relationship between one 
of these objects and the others. As a matter of fact a 
combination of the outer and inner objects along with the 
maximum degree of correspondence between them makes up the 
essentiality of this species of knowledge since "correspon-
dence" is indeed a dyadic relation by nature. It logically 
follows that whenever this relation holds there must be a 
conjunction between one object A and the other B. The 
relation holds true if either of the conjuncts is false. 
If there were no external object there could be no represent-
ation of it. As a result, there could be no possibility 
of correspondence relation between them. Consequently, 
there could be no possibility of that kind of knowledge at 
all. As described above, the external object plays a major 
role in the essentiality of knowledge by correspondence, 
but it has no constitutive part in knowledge by presence. 
Accoi^ing to Mutahharl man before acquainting with 
the things around himself, or in other words acquiring know-
ledge by correspondence is aware of his "self" or has 
knowledge by presence. He observes that when psychologists 
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set out to study the consciousness they study consciousness 
which is acquired through knowledge by correspondence not 
knowledge by presence. But philosophers mostly deal with 
knowledge by presence. This knowledge is free from uncer-
tainty. Uncertainty emerges only in knowledge by correspon-
dence. In the case of knowledge by presence knowing, 
knower,and known are united, so there is no room left for 
any doubt. 
According to Mutahhari the main error of Descartes 
in his "Cogito ergo sum" lay in the fact that he doubts the 
existence of "I" which is indubitable and later on tries 
to demonstrate that I exist due to the inevitable existence 
of the thinking of "I". 
Man apart from his natural (fitrat) consciousness 
has also consciousness of mankind. According to this doctrine 
all htunan beings are similar in nature and they enjoy the 
same consciousness, joy and suffering. Hence they have equal 
rights. Unlike the Marxists who believe in class-based 
consciousness, Mutahhari maintains that all men irrespective 
of their class, race or religion share the same consciousness. 
Mutahhari is of the view that August Comte's doctrine of 
humanism emerged from the view that man has a consciousness 
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of mankind also. Even the universal declaration of human 
rights is based on this idea of man, Mutahharl says that 
if one develops this kind of consciousness he shares with 
others' i^oya, pleasures and sufferings. This kind of 
consciousness is different from and better than other kinds 
of consciousness, which underly for example, in the idealogies 
of nationalism and Marxism that divide men into groups and 
classes and thus society is fragmented a Comte's doctrine 
transcends all such boundaries and considers all men equal. 
But this doctrine inspite of being more sound and logical 
failed to bear practical fruits because it was not practised 
faithfully. Human rights are being violated every day and 
this violation increasing day by day. Why it is so ? In 
his book Man in the Qur'an. Mutahhari says that the failure 
of its implementation is rooted in the West's approach to 
the reality of man. The existence of man is different from 
the rest of beings. In the case of non-human beings their 
essence and existence are identical and there is no possibility 
of change and development for them. But man determines his 
essence and shapes and perfects his identity through striving 
by his own will and wish. Man does not remain the same being 
that he was when created but man becomes what he chooses to be. 
Here again we find a parallalism between existentialist 
concept of man and Mutahhari's interpretation of the Islamic 
isry 
concept of man, Ibn *Arabl has said in one of his verses: 
'God gave man what his potentialities asked from God at 
the time of creation*. It means that there is no determinism 
in the case of man, whereas all other beings are fully deter-
mined. This view ensures freedom and creativity of man.-^  
Man is the sum total of educational and environmental 
factors and his will and choice determine what he is. In 
other words everything except man has been created as it is 
•actually', but man is created with potentiality which he 
brings into. Man unlike other beings possesses a physical 
body and a personality. So far as physical body is concerned, 
man shares this aspect with other beings. But with respect 
to the personality he is different from others. 
Mutahhari holds that the doctrine of nature (fitrat) 
in Islamic sense unlike Cartesian or Kantian doctrines 
does not claim that man from the beginning of his creation 
possesses certain apriori knowledge. He does not agree 
with existentialism and Marxism also that man trom the 
beginning is merely passive in acquisition of knowledge and 
he receives impressions through sense perception from outside 
which determi-ne his personality. According to the doctrine 
of nature (fitrat), man at the time of his creation had 
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ap t i tude for apprehending things p o t e n t i a l l y . In o the r 
words the re i s an inherent power within man which pushed 
him towards c e r t a i n things and goa l s , but i t i s ac tua l i sed 
through h i s endeavour with the help of ex te rna l f a c t o r s . 
I f external f ac to r s are congenial then the human values and 
t r u e knowledge may be ac tua l i zed . But i f due to the 
negative e f fec ts of society man i s driven away from h i s 
r ea l nature and f a i l s to regain h is essence, he i s a l i ena ted 
from what i s ca l led man, that i s a l ienated from his o r i g i n . 
Ex i s t en t i a l i sm and Marxism also deal with the problem of 
a l i e n a t i o n but In a d i f fe ren t way. In t h i s book The World 
View of Tavhld Mutahhari says: 
The Qur'Sn in maintaining t h a t man has a 
primordial nature and in accounting t h i s 
nature a basic e x i s t e n t i a l dimension of 
man tha t in turn gives r i s e to a range 
of thoughts and d e s i r e s , regards the 
Prophet ' s summons to Tawfald as an answer 
to these innate needsT I t poses no 
o ther i n f r a s t r u c t u r e for Tawhld than the 
universa l primordial nature of man, does 
not present c l a s s condit ions as determin-
ing of an i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , and if there 
were no such thing as a pr imordial na tu re , 
everyone's thoughts and i nc l i na t i ons would 
necessa r i ly point where h is c l a s s back-
ground d i c t a t e d . In t h i s case , no choice 
or e l ec t ion would e x i s t ; there would be 
ne i the r pharaohs deserving of blame nor 
ant i-pharaohs deserving of p ra i se because 
man i s deserving of p ra i se or blame when 
he can be o ther than what he i s , as the 
black in h i s blackness or the white in 
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his whiteness, he deserves neither. 
But we know that man is not condemned 
to thought based on class: He can 
rise up against his own class, interests, 
Just as Moses did after having grown up 
amid the luxurious of a pharaoh. This 
in itself shows that the idea of infra-
structure and superstructure, besides 
negating the humanity of man, is nothing 
more than a superstition," 
Again in his book Man and Faith Mutahhari holds that 
according to Islam, in the course of his developments inde-
pendent of the influences of historical and social factors, 
man possesed a special existential dimension that distinguished 
him from the animals and bestowed upon him his individuality^ 
According to this view, man has a kind of species — conscious-
ness and species-conscience that are shared by all human 
beings, and this primordial conscience has given him a 
species-individuation, that may be called the inner call 
that moves him towards transcendence. All his endeavour is 
directed and controlled by this primordial conscience. 
•** 
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(b). Mutahharl's Approach to Society: 
In his book Society and History Mutahhari writes that 
Islam is neither a theory of society nor a philosophy of 
history. In the Islamic scripture no social or historical 
theme is dealt with in the « usual languages of sociology 
or history. Likewise, no other issue, such as morals, 
Jurisprudence or philosophy, is addressed in conventional 
language couched in current terminology, or elaborated 
according to customary classificatory schemes. Nonetheless 
many of the questions these sciences deal with can be fully 
deduced and derived from the Qur'an. 
The first question in Sociology is: Is man social by 
nature ? Mutahhari replies in affirmative. In his book 
Society and History, he analyses three theories in this 
regard. According to the first theory, man's social life 
is similar to the partnership of a man and woman in married 
life in which each of the partners was created as a part 
of a whole, and by nature, yearns to be united with the 
whole. According to the second theory, social life is 
like an alliance such as a pact between the countries which 
are singly unable to defend themselves against a common 
enemy and are forced to work out an agreement of co-operation 
and collaboration. According to the third theory, social 
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life is similar to the partnership of two capitalists which 
gives rise to a commercial, agricultural or industrial 
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company aiming at the attainment of greater profits. 
Mutahharl advocates the first theory according to 
which the main factor of socializing is inherent in man's 
own nature itself. He is of the view that sociability is 
a general and universal objective which man. naturally 
aspires to attain. Mutahharl supports his view by the 
Qur'an which holds that sociability is inherent in the 
very nature aad creation of man. In the surat al-Hujarat 
the Qur'an says: 
0 mankind! We have created you male and female 
and have made you nations and tribes, that you 
may know one another. Certainly, the noblest of 
you, in the sight of Allah, is the most God-
fearing among you.. ,(49:13;< 
The second question in sociology is whether society 
has an essential and independent existence ? Again Mutahharl 
cites four theories and presents his own view as well. 
According to the first theory society is constituted of 
individuals and priority is given to the individual because 
the individual has an objective existence which is not enjoyed 
by society, custom, or social laws. According to the second 
theory society is not a natural compound but an artificial 
or unnatural compound whose components do not lose their 
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identity but Just surrender their independence to the 
whole. The third theory believes in the essentiality 
and absoluteness of social reality. According to this 
theory whatever exists is the collective spirit, the 
collective consciousness, the collective sensibility, 
the collective will, and the collective 'self*. Individual 
consciousness is nothing but a manifestation of the 
collective consciousness. 
The fourth is Mutahharl's own view, according to 
which society is a real compound like the natural compounds. 
But the synthesis here is of minds and souls and of wills 
and wishes. The synthesis at a higher level, that is 
cultural and not physical. He says that individuals enter 
into social life with their gifts acquired from nature and 
their inborn abilities, and spiritually merge into one 
another to attain a new spiritual identity, which is termed 
the 'social spirit'. Mutahhari supports his view by quoting 
some verses of the Qiir'an in this regard. He observes: 
This theory recognizes the independent 
existence of individuals; because, accord-
ing to it, the existence of conqponents of 
society (individuals) is not merged into 
the existence of society. It,also, does 
not accept any unified existence for 
society like that of chemical compounds. 
At the same time, it recognizes the object-
ive ireality of society, because it considers 
the synthesis of individuals similar to a 
chemical synthesis with regard to their 
spiritual and intellectual makeup.^ 
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According to Mutahhari the verses of the Holy Qur'an 
confirm the fourth view. He says tha t the Qur'an does not 
d iscuss human problems i n current phi losophical and s c i e n t i -
f i c terminology. I t s language and approach i s d i f f e r e n t . 
Never theless , the Qur'an views the problems concerning 
soc ie ty in such a way that i t supports the fourth view. 
The Qur'an puts forward the idea of a common h i s t o r y , a 
common des t iny , a common record of deeds, a common conscious-
ness , understanding, s e n s i b i l i t y and a common conduct for 
the Ummahs ( s o c i e t i e s ) . I t i s obvious tha t i f the e n t i t y 
referred to as 'Ummah' did not have an object ive ex i s t ence , 
i t would be meaningless to t a lk of f a t e , understanding, 
conscience, obedience, and disobedience with reference to 
i t . I t may be said tha t the Qur'an e x p l i c i t l y r e fe r s to 
a c e r t a i n kind of l i f e which i s the co l l e c t i ve and soc ia l 
ex i s t ence . Here co l l e c t i ve l i f e i s not mentioned jus t a 
metaphor or an a l l egory . I t i s a r e a l i t y ; l ikewise c o l l e c t i v e 
death i s also a r e a l i t y . 
Mu^tahharl quotes the following verses of the Qur'an 
to support h i s view: 
And every ummah (soc ie ty) hath i t s term, 
and when i t s term cometh, they cannot 
p u l l i t off an hour nor yet advance ( i t ) . 
(7 : 34) 
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Every ummah (society) shall be summoned to 
its record. (45 : 28;. 
...unto every nation have We made their 
deeds seem fair...(6 :108) 
...And every nation purposed to seize their 
messenger and argued falsely, (thinking) 
thereby to refute the Truth. Then I seized, 
and how (awful) was My punishment.(40:15).5 
Regarding society and the existence of social laws 
Mutahharl holds that following the foregoing views we shall 
have to accept; firstly, that society itself has a compara-' 
tively more permanent existence independent of the existence 
of individuals although this collective life has no separate 
existence and is distributed and dispersed among its indivi-
dual members, and incarnates itself in their existence. It 
has discoverable laws and traditions, more permanent and 
stable than those of the individuals that are its components. 
Secondly, we shall have to accept also that the components 
of society, which are human individuals, contrary to the 
mechanistic point of view, lose their independent identity 
although in a relative fashion to produce an organically 
composite structure. But at the same time the relative 
independence of the individual is preserved because individual 
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l i f e , indiv idual na ture , and indiv idual achievements are 
not disolved t o t a l l y in the c o l l e c t i v e ex i s tence . According 
to t h i s point of view, man ac tua l ly l i v e s with two separa te 
ex is tences , two souls , and two "se lves" on the one hand, 
the re are the l i f e , soul , and se l f of the human being, 
which are the off-shoots of h i s e s s e n t i a l na ture ; on the 
o t h e r , there are the co l l e c t i ve l i f e , sou l , and self which 
a re the products of soc ia l l i f e and pervade the ind iv idua l 
s e l f . On t h i s b a s i s , b io log ica l laws, psychological laws, 
and soc ia l laws together , govern human beings . But according 
to the fourth theory, only a s ingle t3rpe of laws govern man, 
and these are the soc ia l laws a lone. 
Mutahharl found the main support of t h i s idea i n the 
h i s to ry of Muslim philosophy as expounded i n Ibn-Khaldun's 
philosophy, according to whom there are c e r t a i n laws govern-
ing the socie ty tha t are independent of the laws governirg 
the i nd iv idua l . In the West also Montesque and Max Weber 
worked out t h i s idea . 
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The Holy Qur'an explains that nations and societies 
qua nations and societies (not Just individuals living in 
societies) have common laws and principles that govern 
their rise and fall in accordance with certain historical 
processes. The concept of a common fate and collective 
destiny about the tribe of BanI Israil the Quran says: 
And We decreed for the Children of Israel 
in the scriptures: You varily will work 
corruption in the earth twice, and you will 
become great tyrants. So when the time for 
the first of the two came We roused against 
you slaves of Ours of great might who ravaged 
lyour) country, and it was a threat performed. 
(After you had regretted your sins and became 
pious again) Then we gave once your turn against 
them, and We aided you with wealth and child-
ren and made you more in soldiery, (saying) 
•If ye do good, ye do good for your own souls, 
and if ye do evil, it is for them. (i.e. Our 
laws and customs are fixed and constant, 
it is by this covenant that people are bes-
towed with power, might, honour and constancy 
or subjected to humiliation and abjectness). 
So when the time for the second (of the Judge-
ment) came, because of your acts of tyranny 
and depotism. We aroused against you others 
(of Our slaves) to ravage you, and to enter 
the temple even as they entered it the first 
time, and to lay waste all that they conquered 
with an utter wasting. It may be that your 
Lord will have mercy on you (if ye mend your 
ways), but if you repeat (the crime) We shall 
repeat (the punishment), and We have appointed 
hell a dungeon for the disbelievers.° 
(17 : 4-8) 
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If we accept that there are the laws which govern 
the society, there will be no place left for the idea 
of the freedom and choice of the individual. Mutahhari 
refers to Emlle Durkhelm, the famous French sociologist 
who emphasized the importance of society to the extent 
of saying that social matters, (in fact all the human 
matters, as against the biological and animal urges and 
needs of man. like eating and sleeping) are the products 
of social life and, not the products of individual thought 
and will« These have three characteristics: they are 
external, compulsive, and general; they are considered to 
be external, because they are alien to individual existence; 
and are Imposed from without upon the individual by society, 
Mu'fahharl choses a middle position ( ) 
between absolute individualism and collectivism that lies 
between the extremes of absolute freedom and absolute 
determinism. He believes that Durkheiminian determinism 
arises due to his failure to recognize the essential nature 
of the htiman being. Mutahhari refers to the Quranic view 
point in this regard. 
0 believers 1 You have charge of your 
own souls* He who goes astray cannoty 
ln;jure you if you are rightly guided. 
(5:105) 
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Although the Holy Quran attributes character, 
personality, reality, power, life, death, consciousness, 
obedience, and disobedience to society, it also explicitly 
recognizes the possibility of violation of social laws by 
an individual. The Our'an in this matter relies on what 
is termed as Fi^rat Allah i.e. the devine nature. In 
Surah al-Nisa* some verses refer to a group of people who 
called themselves must ad 'a fun (the oppressed and the 
weak) in the society of Makkah and took refuge in their 
weakness and being oppressed as an excuse for shirking 
their natural responsibilities. In fact, they considered 
themselves helpless as against the social compulsions and 
pressures. The Our'an says that their excuse cannot be 
condoned on any ground, because at least they were free 
to migrate from the Makkah society to another one better 
suited for the fulfilment of their aspirations. 
Regarding the homogeniety or heterogeneity of the 
societies as to whether all human societies are subject 
to one and the same rule or there must be multiple types 
of rules that govern various types of societies. 
Mutahhari is of the view, that if we assume that 
there is homogeniety in the society, then we can conclude 
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that a single ideology may suffice to explain all societies 
and their mutual differences may be explained away as the 
differences among members of the same species. On the other 
hand if we assume that societies are different in nature, one 
theory can not be able of solving problems of different 
societies. Mutahhari again appeals to the theory of nature 
(fitrat) in order to Justify his argument. As we have dls-
cussed, his position in an early chapter, he is of the view 
that man, who constitutes a single species, not a set. of 
species, is social by his primordial and organic nature that 
is man's sociality, his emergence as society, or his coming 
to have a collective spirit aries from an essential innate 
quality* In order to have a social existence the human 
species has to arrive at the stage of perfection appropriate 
to it, which it does have the capacity to reach, it has social 
aptitude that serves as the basis of the collective spirit. 
The collective spirit itself amounts to a means to bring 
the human species to its ultimate perfection. Therefore, 
this specific nature of man determines his collective spirit, 
which in its turn serves the human primordial nature (fitrat). 
So long as man remains, the human primordial nature (fitrat) 
will continue its activity. Therefore, the collective spirit 
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rests on the individual spirit, the primordial human nature 
of man. Because man is a single species, human societies 
too, have a single essence, nature and identity, 
Nutahharl criticises Durkheimian approach to the notion 
of society. Nevertheless Durkheim also believes in collect-
ive spirit but does not explain that what is the source of 
collective spirit. According to Mutahharl the source of 
collective spirit is nature (fitrat). 
Aa a matter of fact there are varieties of societies 
in respect of the form and colour. Here the question which 
may arise is about the future of societies, Mutahharl holds 
that "according to the theory of the substantive reality of 
the primordial nature, the theory that man's social existence, 
his social life and the collective spirit of society consti-
tute a means that the specific primordial nature of man 
has adopted to attain its ultimate perfection. Societies, 
civilizations and cultures are moving towards unification, 
uniformity and fusion and the future of human societies is 
the same, that is a world society in which all human potential 
values will be actualized and man will attain his real per-
fection, happiness, and finally genuine humanity. 
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<Allamah Tabatabai also shares the view of Mutahhari. 
• • • 
In his tafsir al-Mlzane. he writes: 
Islam annulled the principle of national 
division as having an effective role in 
the primitive tribal life that is based 
on genetic relationship and the other is 
variation in geographic locate. These 
are the basic factors in the division of 
the human species into nations and tribes 
and the divergencies of language and 
colour. At the next stage, these two 
factors lead each people to take possession 
of a land, superimpose the name of a nation 
upon it, and rise to its defence. While 
this trend is something that nature has 
impelled man to, something exists in it 
that is contrary to what the primordial 
human nature (fitrat) demands, that the 
huunan species lives as a "whole" and a 
"unity". Natural law is based on the 
ingathering of the dispressed and the uni-. 
fication of the multiple; by this means 
nature attains its ends. And this is an 
observable phenomenon in the state of 
nature, seen in how primal matter emerges 
first as the elements.•• Then as plants, 
then as animals and then as man, while the 
national tribal divisions gather the indivi-
duals of nation or tribe into a unity, or 
confer on them a unity, they array them 
against other unities in such a manner that 
the individual of a people look upon one 
another as brothers but set other human 
beings apart and regard them as "objects" 
that is, as instruments, fit only to be 
exploited... This is the reason Islam has 
annulled national tribal division (which 
fragment humanity) and has based human 
society upon belief (the discovery of the 
truth that is the same for all and spherence 
to it), not upon race, nationality, or 
motherland. Even in connection with 
marriage and inheriteace, it has made shared 
belief the criterion.^ 
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(c). Mutahharl's View on Freedom; 
It is presumed that the idea of freedom is considered 
to be the basis of capitalism that it guarantees free 
enterprise and freedom of having property etc. As the author 
of Iqtisaduria (Our Economics) holds that the cornerstone 
of this system is the freedom of man in the economic sphere 
in its various activities, such as ownership, production, 
investment and consumption. 
According to Mutahhari, freedom is a requisite of 
life and evolution, and one of the greatest needs of living 
creatures,whether they are plants, animals or human beings. 
The difference in their freedom lies in the differences of 
their nature. The human being needs freedom beyond that of 
plants and animals. Every living thing must have freedom 
to grow and perfection. Nothing can remain stationary. 
Inanimates do not grow up so they have no need of freedom. 
But living creatures need three things for their growth 
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and evolution: nurturing^ security, and freedom. 
In the Holy Qur'an one of the explicit purposes of 
the Prophet's mission is to offer mankind social liberty 
and deliver them from their all kinds of enslavement.^ 
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Mutahharl holds that there are two kinds of freedom, 
(1) Social freedom and (2) Spiritual or intellectual freedom. 
He says: 
The >rorld of today considers social 
freedom as being sacred and the uni-
versal declaration of human rights 
is declared for this purpose hut 
inspite of this, wars, bloodshed 
and misfortune prevail in the world, 
Mutahhari says that there is another 
kind of liberty which is spiritual 
freedom, the difference between the 
Prophet's school and other human schools 
is that the Prophelfs have come to offer 
spiritual freedom t'o mankind as well 
as social freedom, the former having a 
greater value then anything else. Both 
social liberty and spiritual freedom 
are sacred and the former liberty is 
not possible without the latter. The 
trouble with modern human society is 
that it tries to safeguard social liberty 
without seeking spiritual freedom,*• 
About spiritual freedom, Mutahharl in his book 
Spiritual Sayings says: 
The human being is a complex being with 
various powers and instincts, with strength 
appetites, anger, greed, ambition and 
love of excess. On the other hand, he has 
been granted reason, mental and moral 
conscience. Internally and spiritually 
the human being may feel himself free or 
enslaved. He may be a slave of his 
greed, lust, anger and love of excess or 
he may be free of all these vices.5 
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As regards the Western concept of human freedom and 
Its differences with Islamic approach to this problem, 
Mu'Jahharl Is of the view that there are certain fundamental 
differences. For example regarding the derivation of the 
concept of freedom and human right they (the V/ests) are of the 
view that man was born free and, as such, Is entitled to 
retain his freedom. When asked why the same is not true 
with a sheep, they offered different answers. Mutahharl 
says that to the Western mind individual freedom is derived 
from and rooted in the human inclinations and desires. 
Consequently the vote of majority will be the sole criticism. 
If the majority approves of homosexuality all should respect 
It and consider it legitimate. 
Mutahharl holds that the kind of democracy and indivi-
dual freedom envisaged in Islam is basically opposed to 
that evolved in the West. Islamic democracy is based on 
Integrity of human freedom and Individual rights. It does 
not add upto any perversion of human sensibility into utter 
sensuality. On the other hand, Islam does not favour ascetic 
life. It does not advocate undue repression of human 
concupiscence. Instead, Islam helps individuals to organise 
and manage their lives in a physiologically, Intellectually, 
or spiritually and sociologically harmonlus manner, its 
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followers are able to regulate their animal urges and 
instincts in a more human manner. 
According to Nu-^ ahharl» Islam seeks to enhance human 
endeavour towards self improvement and humanization in 
terms of cultivating the higher aspect of human nature, 
instincts and feelings peculiar to human beings. Islam 
tries to ensure genuine freedom for one to act and interact 
like a real human being, without in any way subjecting 
7 
oneself to one's Carnal dictates. 
Regarding freedom in capitalism Mohammed Baqir Sadr 
in his book Our Economics says: 
As for the course of economic life 
of the capitalist society the absolute 
capitalist freedom therein is but a 
weapon in the hands of the powerful 
making way for them and paving the 
way of wealth on the sktdls of others. 
Because so long as the people possess 
different amounts of mental and physical 
talents and natural opportunities, they 
must adopt different ways to benefit 
from the complete economic freedom provided 
to them by the capitalist doctrine. They 
must also differ in the degree in which 
they benefit therefrom. This inevitable 
difference between the strong and the weak 
people leads to the freedom becoming 
legal expression of the right of the 
strong in everything, while meaning nothing 
in respect of others. Since the capitalist 
freedom does not recognize control, of 
whatever kind it may be, the secondary 
people would lose every assurance for 
their existence and respect in the struggle 
I I 
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of life and would remain at the mercy 
of strong competitors who know no 
bounds for their freedoms in respect 
of spiritual and moral values and who 
take into account nothing but their 
own interests.° 
As a result of the capitalistic notion and practicing 
freedom, human dignity was debased so much that man himself 
became a commodity subject to the laws of supply and demand 
and human life became dependent on these laws and conse-
quently his value was determined by the Iron law of saleability 
Shahld Sadr distinguishes between two forms of freedom i.e. 
natural and social freedom. He says: 
Bie natural freedom is that which is 
bestowed by nature itself while the 
social freedom is that which is granted 
by a social system and which the society 
guarantees to its members. Each of these 
two freedoms has a characteristic of its 
own.9 
According to him, natural freedom is an essential 
element in the man's constitution and it constitutes a 
basic phenomenon which is common to all living beings in 
different degrees in accordance with their vitality. That 
is why man has the largest share of freedom among all the 
10 living beings. But social freedom is the freedom which 
is given to an individual by the society, because this is 
the freedom which relates to the social existence and is 
determined by all the interests of all the members of the 
society. This freedom is deliniated by the ideology and 
social system a society chooses for it. 
If we were able to clearly distinguish between the 
natural and social freedom, we could realise the extent 
of fully involved in ascribing the attributes of natural 
freedom to social freedom and would have been able to 
refrain from believing that the freedom provided by the 
capitalist*doctrine forms the essential constitutent of 
humanity and is essential to prevent human entity. This 
assertion is based on ignoring the distinction between the 
natural freedom which is an essential constituent of the 
human existence and the social freedom, which is determined 
by social needs and constraints necessary for building a soci-
ety conceived by its architects facts and vested interests 
11 in accordance with the values they prefer. 
Sadr further divided social freedom into two kinds, 
one, essential (dhatl) social freedom, and the other, formal 
(surl) social freedom. By the former Shahld Sadr means that 
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freedom or right which one gets from a society to do certain 
things and the society provides to the individual all the 
means and conditions needed for attaining that thing, Fcr 
instance if the society assures you to have access to a 
particular commodity, it is made available in abundance 
in the market and no one is permitted to monopolise the sale 
and purchase of that commodity. This is essential (dhatl) 
social freedom, which may be considered real freedom. But 
it becomes formal (Surl) • When this tjrpe of freedom remains 
on paper only and the social circumstances prevent individuals 
from exercising it. Real freedom means ensuring for all 
equal opportunities by providing all members of society 
similar facilities to compete with others. If some are 
privileged and others denied of certain privileges, freedom 
accorded to them is in practice denied to a class or a group 
of people and this is against the very spirit of freedom. 
Thus a society that is based on formal freedom fails to 
ensure essential freedom. In this case you are free to 
purchase the commodity because socially all the conditions 
are favourable to do so. This may not be confused with 
essential freedom, for in this case it is not necessary that 
you have the required purchasing power, as it is not ensured 
by the society. Therefore, this freedom is not a real one. 
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Shahid Sadr says that the Capitalist doctrine is based 
upon the assumption that the formal freedom embodies the 
1 
meaning of freedom entirely. Shahid Sadr concludes that 
capitalist view of freedom is negative in the sense that 
it does not ensure the actual conditions conducive to its 
exercise on the other hand socialist society adopted the 
opposite attitude for it claimed that under the dictator-
ship of the prolitariat, which enjoys soverignity in the 
system, in place of formal freedom essential freedom is 
answered for the masses. In this system, too, real freedom 
is derived to people. This criticism of socialist society^ 
though the problem is approached from a different view, 
is akin to Popper's critique of socialist society. However, 
in the view of Biqir Sadr, both the socialist and capitalist, 
believe in one type of freedom and deny the other type. 
Therefore, name of them really ensures social freedom to 
man that is comprised of the essential as well as formal 
freedom. 
We shall give here a rather long extract from Shahid 
Sadr's book lotlsaduna.for Mutahhari has not discussed in 
any one his numerous writings the issue of democracy and 
social freedom in detail. Nevertheless what one may gather 
from his stray opinions it may be assumed with some Justi-
fication that as he shares Baqlr Sadr's views on many issues 
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and is in total agreement with his general and socio-
political outlook, he should have endorsed Shahld Sadr's 
stand on social freedom in the context of capitalism and 
socialism on one hand, and Islam on the other. Sadr's 
comments are as follows: 
This contradiction between two poles 
of the formal and the essential freedom 
or between the essence and form (of 
freedom) that exists does not disappear 
(in any of the two systems) both the 
forms of freedom. Consequently it pro-
vided to the society the intrinsic 
freedom by ensuring a reasonable degree 
of guarantee to all the individuals of 
the society, an honourable life and the 
necessary requirements thereof, not 
recognizing freedom within the limits 
of this assurance. At the same time it 
did not let this assurance be a justi-
fication for doing away with the formal 
freedom and wasting its own personal and 
objective value but opened the way and 
granted td everyone, outside the bounds 
of the assurance, such freedoms as were 
consonent with his understanding about 
the existence and life. Thus man is 
guaranteed to a degree and within special 
bounds, and is freed outside these bounds. 
In this way the formal and interinsic 
freedom have been blended together in the 
Islamic planning. There has never been 
any consideration, outside the shadow of 
Islam, over this splendid blending of 
the two as how to materialize it, except 
during the last century when efforts 
were started to establish the principle of 
assurance and to bring about agreement 
between it and the freedom, after the 
experiment of capitalist freedom failed 
bitterly.''3 
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CHAPTER - IV 
MUTAHHARI IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 
(a). Mutahharl's Idea of Social Justice: A Comparison 
with Western Social Thinkers: 
Justice comprises the whole of virtue and complete 
conformity with the approved pattern of moral conduct. For 
purposes of rational analysis the classical philosophers, 
following Aristotle preferred to restrict the term's refer-
ence to a particular virtue, distinguishing for example, 
between Justice and equity or between justice and charity. 
In the Republic justice regulates and equilibrates 
the other virtues. Its functions are to achieve harmony 
and to maintain equilibrium. Justice results frx)m each 
element in society in doing the appropriate task. In 
moving away from Plato's dualism, which would serve to exalt 
justice and denigrate positive law, Aristotle treated justice 
as immanent in the working of law and thus gave it a 
markedly more effective function. Since immanent justice 
necessarily evokes difficult antitheses and tensions, it 
is to Aristotle's enduring credit that unlike most of his 
successors, he candidly left the unresolvable unresolved. 
Kant and his disciple have elucidated the concept of justice 
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only tangentially after giving a baldly positivistic 
definition of "Just" and "Unjust" in the Metaphysics of 
Morals» Hume concerned mainly with the coherence and 
consistency of morals and was content to enlist Justice 
in its service by submitting that "Public Utility is the 
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sole origin of Justice". 
Unlike Saint Simon and various other socialist 
theoritlclans and unlike many of their own disciples Marx 
and Engels allowed no place for "Justice" in their analysis 
of economic relations. Like Bentham, they rediculed the 
term, regarding it as a mere mask for capitalist exploita-
2 
tlon and hypocrisy. 
Socialists attribute the injustices in society to 
the rampant individualism which is responsible for existing 
social injustice and the degradation of the masses of the 
people. So they concluded that the failure of individualism 
compels the adaption of the only alternative system, socialism, 
Even the author of Socialism holds the view that "Socialism 
has come into the world because of injustice^.-^ But social-
Ism also by denying the existence of individual failed to 
establish equal opportunities of Justice and maintenance of 
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equal rights and freedom. Therefore, socialism gave 
birth to a new class in socialist countries. In his book 
The Open Society and its Enemies (II)» * Karl Popper also 
predicted the emergence of a new class in socialist count-
ries* 
The author of Democracy versus Socialism elaborated 
the essential ethical differences between these two social 
systems as follows: 
Socialism, denying the existence of 
Individual natural rights, seeks to 
reconstruct society in a direction 
opposite to its past evolution; to 
make the individual absolutely sub-
servient to the state; to deprive 
him of his equal right with all 
others of exercising his industrial 
faculties as he will and to conqpel 
him to exercise them in such manner, 
time, and place as he is directed; to 
annul his right to benefit by his 
own beneficial acts; and to allot him 
a reward bearing no reference to the 
service rendered by him. Individualism 
affirming the existence of equal, natural 
individual rights, seeks the further 
evolution of society in the direction 
of its past evolution until society 
shall have become fully subservient to 
the welfare of the individuals composing 
it; seeking to attain such general 
welfare through the removal of the 
remaining infractions of the natural 
and equal rights of all individuals. 
The freedom of each e to exercise all 
his faculties as he wills provided 
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he infringes not the equal freedom 
of any other; the right of each to 
the fullest opportunities for the 
exercise of his faculties» limited 
only by the equal rights of all 
others; and the unlimited right 
of each to benefit by his own bene-
ficial acts, reward being proportioned 
to service rendered.5 
But private ownership and monopolies in capitalism 
deprive the majority of the people of the beneficial result 
of their acts and reduce their reward to below the value 
of the services which they render. Individualism also failed 
to procure freedom and j^ustice for the majority of the 
people. 
Mutahharl in his two books namely *Adl-»e Ilahl (Divine 
Justice) and Barrasl i.imall Mahanl-vi Iqtisad-e Islaml 
(A Brief Study of the Foundations of Islamic Economics) has 
shed light on the issue of Justice and social Justice. In 
the first chapter of Divine Justice, he discussed in detail 
the notion of Justice from the stand point of two schools 
of thought in Kalam that is Asharaites and Mutazilites. In 
A Brief Study of the Foundation of Islamic Economics, he 
tries to explain the concept of social Justice from Islamic 
point of view. According to Mutahharl, denial or approval 
of the principle of Justice played an important role in the 
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development of social philosophy in Muslim world. Regarding 
the importance of the issue of social justice, Mutahharl 
says: 
Firstly, I would begin with discussing 
the issue of justice in order to explain 
the effect of justice upon the principle 
of social justice; Secondly, the denial 
of the principle of justice and its 
negative effect more or less in our 
thought was the main course of decline 
of social justice in Islam which could 
have been developed and based on scienti-
fic and rational grounds and could have 
become a guiding principle in jurispru-
dence. Consequently a kind of jurispru-
dence emerged which is now inconsistent 
with the rest of the principles of Islam 
and has no secure basis for social philoso-
phy. If there would have remained freedom 
of thought (in Islamic world) and the 
traditionalists (^ shab-e Sunnah)would not 
have had dominance over the champions of 
justice (Ahl-e *Adl), and if Shi'ahs also 
had not been trapped Bi in the bit fall . 
of Akhbarlgarl then we could have had a 
codified social philosophy and our juris-
prudence also could have been based upon 
it and we had not .been plunged into 
contradictions and dead ends." 
In his book Ashnal ba Ulum-e Isiami (An Introduction 
to the Islamic Sciences), Mu-jfahhari holds that it is indeed 
evident that none of the Islamic sects denied justice as 
one of the Devine attributes. No one has ever claimed that 
God is unjust. The difference between the Mutazilites 
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and their opponents is about the interpretation of Justice. 
The Ash'arites interpret it in such a way that it amounts 
in the view of the Mutazilites, to almost a denial of the 
Attributes of Justice. However, the Ash'arites themselves 
are not at all willing to be considered the opponents of 
Justice. 
The Mutazilites believe that some acts are essentially 
"Just" and some intrinsically "Unjust". For instance, 
rewarding the obedient and punishing the sinners is Justice; 
and Gk>d Just has to reward the obedient and punish the 
sinner, and it is impossible for Him to act otherwise. Reward-
ing the sinners and punishing the obedient is essentially 
and intrinsically unjust, and it is impossible for God to 
do such a thing. Similarly, compelling His creatures-to 
commit sin, or creating them without having power of doing 
good, creating at the same time the sinful acts and then 
punishing sinners on account of their sins, which were beyond 
their powers is nothing but injustice, an ugly thing for 
God to do; it is unjustifiable and unGkDdly.' 
But the Asharites believe that no act is intrinsically 
or essentially Just or unjust. Justice is essentially what-
ever God does. If supposedly God were to punish the obedient 
and reward the sinners, it would be equally Just, Similarly 
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if God creates His creatures without any will, power or 
freedom of action, then if He causes them to commit sins 
and punishes them for that it is not essential injustice. 
If we suppose that God acts in this manner, it is justice. 
Hence according to the Asha'irah Justice is determined by-
Divine will and Acts only. 
In his book The Philosophy of the Kalam. H.A.Wolfson 
also holds that since their (Mutazilites) assertion free 
will was supported by them on the ground of their particular 
conceptions of Divine Justice, and their denial of the 
separate existence of Divine Attributes was supported by 
them on the ground of their particular conception of Divine 
unity, the Mutazilites came to be called "The Partisans of 
Justice and Unity" (Ashab al-'adl wa Tawhld).^ 
In the Shlah faith the principle of Divine Justice 
is considered one of the five essential doctrines of their 
faith. According to this principle Justice is an attribute 
of God, identical to His Essence, It is God who is the Maker 
of the law of Justice. In this case if God fallows His own 
law, it does not in any sense mean curtailment of His power. 
On the basis of this principle of faith they say that it 
is according to Divine Justice that man should be free and 
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capable of act ing according to his w i l l , otherwise man 
may not be responsible for h i s a c t s , and consequently he 
may not be rewarded or punished, Hiey say fur ther tha t 
i f God does not reward the v i r tuous and does not punish 
the vic ious He would be unjus t , which i s impossible . 
In the Shi*ah f a i t h , human freedom i s a l o g i c a l 
c o r o l l a r y of Divine J u s t i c e , The Shi' ah l i k e some of the 
Ashari tes and a l l f fu taz i l i t e s , hold that man's ac t ion 
a re of two types : re f lex ive tha t i s unvoluntary, and wiUed 
or chosen. There i s no dispute as regard the re f l ex ive 
a c t s , for they are i n s t i n c t i v e and man has no cont ro l over 
them but the ac ts which are chosen by man to perform are 
voluntary a c t s : In these cases man can act i n two ways, 
for he may choose between r i gh t and wrong, good and e v i l . 
We have seen that Mutaz i l i t es bel ieve i n t o t a l fireedom of 
man with regard to voluntary a c t s . This freedom i s ca l led 
qadar or tafwid, The term tafwld means ' de l ega t ion ' o r 
' a u t h o r i z a t i o n ' . According to some M u t a z i l i t e s , God 
has delegated power to man for performing good 
o r ev i l a c t s . This means t ha t power i s 
always with man. On the o ther hand Abu-Hasan 
al-Ash*arl*s d i s c i p l i n e , Abu Bakr al-B2iqallanl, a l a t e r 
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M u t a z l l l t e s , bel ieve t h a t power being a Divine At t r ibu te 
so l e ly belongs to God, suid He i s the Creator of a l l kinds 
of a c t s . I t i s only God who bestows power upon man to 
choose between good and e v i l , r i gh t and wrong a c t s . Man 
possesses t h i s l imi ted power only. This doc t r ine i s ca l l ed 
the doct r ine of ' acqu is i t ion* or Kasb» In t h i s way, the 
Mutaz i l i t e s and the Asharites take two extreme p o s i t i o n s , 
while the Shl^ah, according to the teaching of the Imams 
of the Prophet ' s Family (Ahl a l -Bav t ) . take an intermediate 
p o s i t i o n . The saying of the Imam J a ' f a r al-Sadiq(A) i s : 
Neither determinism nor freedom or 
delegated power, but an intermediate 
^ position,9 
In Usui a l -Kaf l . i n Kitab al^Tawhld, there i s a 
chapter e n t i t l e d (al- . labr wa al~qadar wa a l " aror bavn a l 
'amrayn) the Persian t r a n s l a t o r and commentator, Sayyid 
Jawad Mustafawl, defined qadar as synonymous with another 
'Arabic word Tafwid. After explaining the doct r ine of 
determinism and human free w i l l , he wr i t e s : 
The doc t r ine of freedom or amr bayn a l -
amrayn (an in termediate pos i t i on ; forms 
the content of a l l the Tradi t ions narra ted 
i n t h i s chapter and a l l the Tradi t ions 
reaching us through the Imams of the 
Prophet ' s Family IAhl a l -Bavt : In a l l 
these Tradi t ions Jabr and tafwid (or qadar) 
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have been r e j ec t ed , and by refu t ing 
them an Intermediate pos i t i on ( 'amr 
bavn a l - amarvn) i s pos i t ed , t ha t 
IS ne i the r man i s as he lp less in h i s 
ac ts as the too l s i n the hands of a 
worker, not having any power not to 
do any thing o r defend himself, nor 
i s man fu l l y capable of performing 
h i s ac ts independently, as i f God 
has no power over h i s a c t s . In 
r e a l i t y a l l h is ac t s are r e l a t e d , on 
the one hand to Gtod, and on the o ther 
to h i s ownself.10 
Regarding the na tu ra l r i gh t Mutahharl holds tha t 
Islam bel ieves in na tu ra l r i g h t s and universa l j u s t i c e 
( inheren t i n the very laws of n a t u r e ) . Without having an 
end or purpose in mind, tha t i s t e l e o l o g i c a l world-view, 
11 the na tu ra l laws can not be j u s t i f i e d . 
He says tha t the un ive r se ' s working according to 
na tu ra l laws ind ica t e s tha t i t s working i s purposive, and 
t h a t the goal towards attainment of which i t i s moving, 
i s dest ined by i t s c r ea to r , Allah. 
Hence, Mutahharl concludes, the basic di f ference 
between Divine logic and profane or non-divine logic i s 
t h a t the former i s based on the be l ie f tha t every one who 
i s born in t h i s world has a r i g h t over the world. All 
human beings are ch i ld ren of the universe , and a chi ld 
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has rights over his parents, and in return he will have 
to pay lor it in future (i.e. will fulfill his obligations 
towards the world)• 
In support of his view he quotes the following 
Qur'anic verses: 
He it is Who created for you all that 
is in the earth.(1:29).^3 
And the earth. He has set it for living 
creatures; (55:10)1** 
And certainly We have established you in 
the earth and made in it means of liveli-
hood for you; little it is that you give 
thanks. (7:10)15 
And surely We have honoured the children 
of Adam, and We car: 
and the sea.(17:70) 
rry them in the land 
'•7n^ 1o 
These verses elaborate natural rights bestowed upon 
man, emphasizing that natural rights are essentially of 
Divine origin, that is conferred upon man by God Himself. 
This view is poles apart from the Marxist view that holds 
that man ,earns right after he has fulfilled his obligations. 
Islam, on the contrary, first accords right and then obliges 
man to do his duty towards the world and the society. This 
controverts the basic principle of The Communist Manifesto: 
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To everyone according to h is work. "The o r i g i n a l Marxist 
p r i nc ip l e tha t was modified was ' t o every one according to 
h i s needs'** which was r a the r compatible with the Islamic 
idea of na tura l r i g h t s . 
Now the question which a r i s e s i s whether human r i g h t 
i s p r i o r to ^Justice or v ice -versa , in other words >*iether 
r igh t i s determined on the bas is of Jus t i ce or v i ce -ve r sa . 
Mu-^ahharl holds the view that Ju s t i ce i s the foundation 
and bas is of r i g h t . I t i s to be noted tha t Mutahhari 
excluded the notion of freedom and equal i ty from the category 
of r i g h t s , because he bel ieves t h a t r i g h t s are derived from 
freedom and equa l i ty , so the d e f i n i t i o n of r i g h t does not 
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cover them and i s not appl icable to them. Here one may 
f ind an amazing s i m i l a r i t y between Mutahhari view of freedom 
and the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t notion of freedom, which, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
i n Sartr«*s philosophy i s considered as an on to log ica l c a t e -
gory, the ground and essence of human ex i s t ence . 
Regarding the r e l a t i o n of r e l i g i o n and Jus t i ce 
Mutahhari maintains tha t t h i s i s a c r u c i a l issue on which 
advocates of d i f fe ren t schools of Kalam have di f ferences 
of views. Mutaz i l i t es bel ieve t h a t Jus t i ce i s r e l i g i o n , 
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that is, religion is constituted on the basis of Justice. 
That is why Mutazilites are popularly known as "^Adllwah" 
(the partisons of Justice). But the Asharites believe 
that what religion says is Justice, Mutahharl sides with 
Mutazilites and holds the view that Justice is the criterion 
of religion, or in other words Justice is religion. Mutahharl 
says in one of his stray writings, included in the introduc-
tion to Barrasi-i iJmSll Mahanl-vi Igtisadre Islaml : 
The principle of Justice is the cri-
terion of Islam, that is one has to 
evaluate all things in the light of 
this criterion. Justice belongs to 
the causes (or reasons) of religions 
laws and not one of the effects (or 
products) of the laws. What the 
faith prescribes is not Just, but .„ 
what Justice demands is the faith. 
According to this view Justice provides ground for 
the faith, and is therefore, prior to faith. This view by 
implication indicates that ^adl (Justice) is the criterion 
of good and evil, which means that all good and evil are 
determined rationally. 
Now the question is what is Just law ? To answer 
this question Mutahharl says: first it should be clear as 
to what is Justice and how social law and order should be 
laid down to pave the way for social Justice ? Nevertheless 
17.^  
justice and injustice beyond the context of society are 
meaningless. At the same time they are not confined to 
man, i.e. it covers animals and plants as well. So animals 
also have rights in this universe, therefore, justice apart 
from its social context, covers non-human beings also.^ 
Coming to the notion of social justice, in his book 
A Brief Study of The Foundation of Islamic Economics. 
Mutahharl is of the view that there is no contradiction 
between social justice and individual justice. That "is 
social justice does not hamper individual justice. Mutahharl 
holds that people should respect justice as possessing for 
it is a Divine attribute whereas injustice being opposite 
to it should be punishable. 
Ensuring human rights is obligatory upon all men, for 
being natural rights they are permanent and eternally uni-
versal. No expediency can take them away. For instance the 
right to life, right to freedom and right to equality cannot 
be abrogated, Mutahharl holds that even the interests of 
the society one cannot be deprived of his natural right. 
But at the same time he concedes that when the social interest 
as a whole is in danger. Some of these rights can be taken 
1 (^ 
away. For Instance if the society feels threatened one 
can be deprived of his natural right to life, but this 
is permissible In • very extra-ordinary circumstances. 
VTlth reference to the^Declaration of human rights", 
he says that human rights are being violated covertly or 
avertly in our times inspite of the technological and 
scientific development of human society. He concludes 
that only faith can guarantee natural rights and establish 
Justice. Faith in morals, faith in law and faith in 
Justice. Mutahhari says that we cannot deny the role of 
science but science has its own scope and limitations. 
That is, it can be a good instrument or can serve as a 
light, but it is not an end in Itself those who consider 
reason as sufficient for establishing the rule of Justice, 
expect too much from it. Science and reason are instrumental 
In moving man forward, but the moving force behind them 
Is faith, of which they are means. 
In his book Insan wa Iman (Man and Faith), Mutahhari 
writes that relation between science and faith has generated 
much interest among both religious and non-religious thinkers. 
'Allamah Muhammad Iqbal writes on this issue: 
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Hiunanity needs three things today a 
spiritual interpretation of the uni-
verse, spiritual emancipation of the 
individual, and basic principles of 
a universal import directing the 
evolution of human society on a 
spiritual basis. Modern Europe has, 
no doubt built idealistic system on 
these lines, but experience shows 
that truth revealed through pure 
reason is incapable of bring that 
fire of living conviction which per-
sonal revelation alone can bring. 
This is the reason why pure thought 
has so little influenced man while 
religion has always elevated indivi-
duals, and transformed whole societies. 
The idealism of Europe never became a 
living factor in her life and the 
result is a perverted ego seeking itself 
through mutually Intolerent democracies 
whose sole function is to exploit the 
poor in the interest of the rich.20 
As compared to Mill, Russell, Marcuse, Popper and 
Sartre, it may be Justifiably said that Mutahhari has 
constructed his idea of Justice on a securer grounds then 
that sujested by those western thinkers. This ground 
provided by Mutahhari's conception of nature (fitrat) and 
the natural rights which are ensured by nature for all 
living beings. He gives priority to natural rights and is 
not prepared to accept that these rights may be taken away by 
any society except in extraordinary circumstances. In his 
view natural rights are of Divine origin. This theistic view 
of Mutahhari is also logically superior to etheistic view 
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of contemporary western philosophers* It is because of 
his unahakeable faith In Islam* He believes that It Is 
only Islam as against capitalism and socialism fully 
ensures Ban*s natural rights and guarantees social 
justice for all men* 
««« 
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(b)« Ethical Philosophy of Mutahharl and Tabatabal Compg'ed 
with Contemporary Western Thinkers: 
The great philosophers from Plato, Aristotle to those 
of our day consider their primary task to analyse what a 
desirable mode of conducting one's life might be. So they 
have developed certain moral standards. But during the 
last ten decades philosophers like G.E.Moore and others 
developed a new approach to the analysis of ethical problems. 
That is logical investigations about the statements of ethics 
which is called meta-ethlcs or logic of ethics. In his book 
A Modern Introduction to Ethics Milton K. Munitz says: 
The chief interest of such logical 
investigation has been focused on 
question such as following given a 
characteristic ethical statement 
(one containing the use of the 
words "good" "right". Their multi-
tudes variants and opposites viz. 
"bad" "wrong" etc.) how shall we 
constrive the way in which such 
statement are used ? How if at all do 
they differ from other types of 
statement, e.g. The factual ones of 
ordinary discourses or of the science? 
What kind of evidence^ that is, what 
kinds of considerations or statement 
of what does the agreement or dis-
agreement on ethical matters consist? 
How, if at all is possible to overcome 
disagreement in ethics?'' 
}H'^ 
The common assumption tha t under l ies almost a l l 
t r a d i t i o n a l wr i t ing was the knowledge of what i s good and 
e v i l , contemporary e th i ca l philosophers c l a s s i f i e d every 
theoty about value in to n a t u r a l i s t i c and n o n - n a t u r a l i s t i c . 
This d iv i s ion in e t h i c s made by G.E.Moore in h i s Pr incipla 
Ethica ( 1903 ) • But every one now r e f e r s to Hume's • 
t r e a t i s e as he says : 
In every system of morali ty which I 
have h i t h e r t o met wltlti, I have always 
remarked that the author proceed^ for 
some time in the ordinary way of 
reasoning and e s t ab l i shes the being 
of a God, or makes observat ions 
concerning human a f f a i r s , when a l l of a 
sudden I am surprised to find tha t 
instead of the usual cuirpulations of 
p ropos i t ion , i s , and i s not I meet 
with no porposi t ion tha t i s not 
connected with an ought or an ought 
not .2 
Non-natura l i s t ic theory again i s divided in to two 
main types : " I d e a l i s t i c " and "Rea l i s t i c " theory of va lue . 
While both the types hold value to be a non-natural and 
unanalysable q u a l i t y . Rea l i s t i c theor ies according to 
Osborne hold that value i s a non-natural and pure proper ty 
of na tu ra l and ex i s t i ng s t a t e s of a f f a i r s . I d e a l i s t i c 
t h e o r i e s , on the other hand, acknowledge only one u l t imate 
concept "oughtness", i n terms of which value i s defined. 
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"Oughtness" I s an absolute and under!ved fac tor in the 
s t r u c t u r e of Real i ty by v i r tue of which i t i s said tha t 
some things are "more f i t t i n g " to e x i s t , or "ought" r a t h e r 
" to ex is t " than o t h e r s . 
The debate on the problem of the e t e r n i t y of moral 
values i s as old as philosophy i t s e l f . There has hardly 
been a major th inker of any era of any t r a d i t i o n who has 
not discussed t h i s problem. 
The o r ig in of t h i s subject i n Muslim philosophy can 
be traced to the period of A s h ' a r i t e - M u ' t a z i l i t e cont ro-
v e r s i e s regarding e th i ca l p r e d i c a t e s . Later on scholars 
of ua\^ al^f ioh (Is lamic Jurisprudence) also took up t h i s 
i s sue at the phi losophica l l e v e l . ^Allamah Muhammad Husayn 
Taba^alJal (1902 - 1981), the most o r ig ina l th inker of the 
contemporary Muslim World, inspi red by the scholars of usu l , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y the l a t e Shaykh Muhammad Husayn I s fahan! , 
threw a new l i g h t on t h i s i ssue in a manner unprecedented 
throughout the h i s to ry of Muslim philosophy. The outcome 
of h i s phi losophical contemplation i s the s ix th chapter of 
h i s book Usul-e fa lsafeh wa rawish-e r iya l l sm (The p r i n c i p l e s 
of philosophy and the methods of r ea l i sm) . Murtada Mutahhari 
a pupi l of *Allamah Tabatab"ai, wrote de ta i led explanatory 
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notes on this book, adding his own views in the form of 
critical comments on TabatabM's views. He appears to 
disagree on certain basic points with Tabatabll regarding 
certain moral issues. 
Speculative Wisdom and Practical Wisdom (Hikmat-e Nazarl 
and Hikmat-e ^AmalDt 
The distinction between speculations about the nature 
of reality and discussions about the norms of human conduct 
have always been recognized, the former is called 'speculative 
wisdom* and the latter 'practical wisdom'. 
It is not possible to bring the principles of practical 
wisdom under the study of reality, for speculative wisdom 
addresses things as they are while practical wisdom addresses 
man's actions as they ought to be. 
In the texts of Muslim thinkers too, speculative reason 
and practical reason are regarded as two different types of 
human faculties, but they did not discuss in detail their 
features and differences. However, they did suggest that 
the former faculty is inherent in the self, which by means 
of it attempts to discover the external world, whereas the 
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latter consists of a series of perceptions controlled by 
the self, which is the administrator of the body.^ 
Early Muslim philosophers defined Justice in terms 
of freedom* Since the self fails to attain speculative 
perfection without the proper use of the body, the self 
ought to establish a balance between those two faculties 
in order to utilize the body Justly, The faculty which 
establishes such a balance between the self and body is an 
efficient or active force. In case the balance is attained, 
self is not dominated by body; contrarily body will be 
subordinated to self. They considered Justice to be a kind 
of co-ordination between body and the self in which body 
is controlled by self and self is kept in check by body. 
Although Ibn Sina (980 - 1030), accepted the distinc-
tion between speculative and practical and he dealt with 
these issues in detail, yet there exists some ambiguity 
In his approach to practical reason. Some Muslim philoso-
phers consider practical reason as the self's faculty of 
perception. They say that our reason is capable of two 
kinds of perception. One is the faculty of perception used 
In speculative sciences and the other is the faculty used 
.18G 
In p r a c t i c a l sc iences . But o t h e r s , l i k e Mulla Had! Sabzawarl 
(1833 - 1910), hold tha t the term ' r eason ' i s used for both 
t h e o r e t i c a l and p r a c t i c a l aspects of the percept ive or 
cogni t ive f a c u l t y . But i t can be maintained t h a t i t i s an 
5 
e f f i c i en t facul ty capable only of action.-^ 
^Allamah Tabatabal ' s Eth ica l Views and Mutahharl 's Cr i t ique ; 
*^Allamah Tabatabal maintained t h a t whatever we ascr ibe 
to p r a c t i c a l wisdom i s connected with the world of norms or 
non<-factual i deas , which comprise commands and p roh ib i t ions 
and a l l those notions which are dea l t with in ' i lm a l ' u s u l . 
I n o ther words, i t i s the domain of- the ' o u g h t ' . Regarding 
the concept of 'ought ' he says : 'Nature has i n i t s e l f some 
ends towards which i t moves' . In the domains of i n e r t t h i n g s , 
p l a n t s , animals, and man, a l l a c t i v i t i e s so f a r as they f a l l 
i n the domain of i n s t i n c t , i t i s nature t ha t moves towards 
i t s goal* At the human l e v e l a l so , so f a r as they are 
i n s t i n c t i v e a c t i v i t i e s , i t i s na ture that moves towards i t s 
g o a l . There i s a s e t of ac t s at the human l eve l which 
t akes place by the means of v o l i t i o n and con-
templa t ion . In such a c t s , man has h i s own 
ob jec t ives which are a t ta ined by voluntary a c t s . These ends 
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are also the ends of nature; nature cannot achieve them 
directly, but only through the agency of man's will and 
thought. It is here that a need for "ought" or values 
arises and they come into existence automatically. For 
instance man's nature, like that of plants, needs food, 
but he should acquire it by means of volition and contemp-
lation. Unlike plants, which acquire food directly through 
roots, and animals, which are attracted towards food instinct-
ively, man seeks it by conscious volition and effort. Here 
Tabatabal says that instinct is not defined in precise forms 
so far. Man is unaware that the system of his ideas itself 
is constructed according to the system of nature, and nature 
uses man as its instrument in order to achieve its goals. 
Man innately possesses some systems: the system of nature 
as well as the flsystera of choice and will. The latter is 
subject to the former. The natural end is reflected in the 
for>ta of a need or desire in man's soul (e.g. inclination 
towards food). Tabatabal concludes that at the back of every 
voluntary act there is a hidden command of nature as to 
•what one ought to do' or 'what one ought not to do'. It 
is this very 'ought to' which motivates a person to move 
towards his natural objective. Mutahharl comments that 
Tabatablil has probably reduced all willed acts to ideas or 
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values. Mutahharl also compares this view of Tabatab'al 
with the moral theory of Bertrand Russell. Surprisingly 
*Allimah Tabatabal without having read Russell, developed 
a theory similar to that of his, 40 years ago, probably 
at the same time when Russell was developing his moral 
philosophy. " 
Russell in the A History of Western Philosophy elaborates 
his view in the context of his analysis of Plato's view 
regarding ethics. He says that according to Plato, practical 
wisdom and speculative wisdom are identical. He holds that 
morality means that man should desire the good and the good 
is independent of the self; therefore, good is cognizable, 
such as the objects of the study of mathematics or medicine, 
which are independent of human mind.' Russell points out 
that: 
, Plato is convinced that there is "the 
good" and its nature can be ascertained; 
when people disagree about it, one is 
making an intellectual error, Just as 
much as if the disagreement were a g 
scientific one on some matter of fact. 
Russell himself holds that "good" or "bad" are relative 
terms whose meaning is determined by man's relation to things 
or objects. When we have a goal to achieve, we say "it is 
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good". Hence it is wrong to hold that "good" is an object-
ive quality inherent in the nature of a thing like whiteness 
or roundness. Mutahharl concludes from this discussion 
that "goodness" and "badness" are not concrete and objective 
qualities of objects that can be discovered like other 
natural things. In his view if one treats moral issues like 
the objects of scientific study, it may be asked as to 
whether such norms are mutable or whether there are two 
types of norms, one changeable and the other permanent. On 
this issue, Mutahharl's view is opposed to that of Western 
Philosophers. Incidentally 'Allamah Tabatabal is of the view 
that values are of two kinds: mutable and immutable. He 
has given the example of Justice and cruelty, and said that 
the goodness of Justice and the badness of cruelty are self 
evident. There are, hence, some values which are immutable, 
while there are other values which change with time." 
It is, of course, indispensible that some 'oughts' are 
related to particular individual. For example, if one needs 
a certain kind of education, he might say, "I ought to study 
this subject", while another who does not need that education 
says," I ought to study some other subject". Accordingly, 
individual and particular 'oughts* are relative. 
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An important question in ethics is: Is there any-
universal and absolute 'ought' which is generally shared 
by all human beings ? Mutahharl says that in case there 
Is such an 'ought', as every ought is directed towards 
some goal, we have to ascertain if there is such a common 
goal that may be the basis of the universality of value. 
If we could prove such universality and eternity of values, 
we shall have to accept that they originate in an abstract 
self, and that man is not confined to physical nature only,'^ 
• 
'Allamah Tabatablii holds that animate beings and 
inanimate things are different in terms of their movement 
towards their objectives, i.e. inanimate things move towards 
their ends in one direction alone which is predetermined. 
Nature, in the course of its normal movement, is equipped 
with the means through which it moves towards its goal. 
Animate beings also, in respect of their physical being 
(not as mental and rational beings), in their own world 
move directly towards their end. But as the laws and means 
of nature do not suffice to direct animate beings towards 
their desired goals, they employ their mental and perceptual 
faculties also to achieve their ends. In fact, there 
emerges a kind of harmony between physical nature (which 
is unconscious) end mental processes which enable a being 
l y l 
possess ing consciousness to a t t a i n the end desired by 
na tu re . Consciousness d i r e c t s a being to move towards 
c e r t a i n other ends a l so , which are supposed to be d i f f e r en t 
from the ends of na tu re . Man may Imagine tha t the harmony 
between the movements towards na tu ra l and willed ends I s 
* 
acc iden ta l , but according to Tabatab'al the re I s a kind of 
"pre-es tabl i shed harmony" between the physical and mental 
p rocesses . 
The natural mental make up of man and animals Is such 
that as they perceive and conceive an object there arises a 
desire for It, and they seek pleasure In attaining It. In 
case they fail to do so they feel some pain. For Instance, 
by nature man seeks pleasure and avoids pain. The past 
experience of pleasure In eating some food stirs his appetite 
for it, and he moves in the direction of satisfying it. This 
act is governed by particular mental processes, but at the 
same time it also serves to attain the end of nature too, 
for a body requires food by its own nature. Eating serves 
both the ends; the person takes pleasure in it and at the 
same time nature satisfies its need also. Hence the question 
arises: Are these two acts unconnected with each other and 
accidently occur together? Is it the natural urge to seek 
1^2 
pleasure which requi res c e r t a i n na tu ra l means to serve i t 
o r i s i t the na tu ra l urge which makes a man fee l p leasure 
i n sa t i s fy ing an appe t i t e? In other words, i t may be 
asked, does pleasure-seeking serve the end of nature or 
does nature serve the purpose of a t t a i n i n g pleasure ? I t 
i s d i f f i c u l t to decide which one of the two i s fundamental 
and which one i s secondary. However, Mutahharl holds t h a t 
the re i s some kind of harmony between the na tu ra l and 
conscious ends, and t h i s harmony i s pre-planned and not 
acc iden ta l . Further i n deal ing with t h i s i s s u e , he r e f e r s 
to Ibn S ina ' s view according to which the purposive movement 
i s confined to conscious beings only, Taba"Jab"al says t ha t 
nature I t s e l f pursues c e r t a i n ends, so a l l the beings move 
according to those ends. Hence a l l movements in natiire are 
purposive, tha t i s , governed by some ends, Man's purposive 
a c t i v i t y i s also a pa r t of the general purposive scheme of 
na tu re , Mutahharl does not agree with t h i s gene ra l i za t ion 
made by Tabatab^l, ' '^ 
Tabatab^il says fu r the r tha t one of the values i s tha t 
of 'employment* or ' s e r v i c e a b i l i t y ' ( is t ikhdSm). which i s 
concerned with man's r e l a t i o n to h i s limbs and f a c u l t i e s 
and t h i s r e l a t i o n i s ob jec t ive , r ea l and c r e a t i v e . The 
power of my hands i s under my con t ro l , which i s a na tu ra l 
ivrs 
matter ; tha t i s , t h i s power i s na tu r a l l y and congenial ly 
a t my d i sposa l . All bodily organs of man are owned by man 
and form an i n t e g r a l pa r t of h i s being and are at the service 
of man. He says t h a t a l l ex te rna l objects may be considered 
to be tools for su rv iva l used by man. Not only inanimate 
beings and p l a n t s , e t c . are for man, but even o ther men are 
a lso supposed to be at an i n d i v i d u a l ' s s e rv i ce . In o ther 
words, a l l be ings . Including men, who f a l l in the f i e l d of 
o n e ' s a c t i v i t y , are too l s for a human being, Man thus 
extends h i s l imi ted exis tence to the spheres of o ther beings . 
Mutahharl says that according to Tabatab"ai t h i s human tendency 
o r approach to o ther beings i s i n s t i n c t i v e l y n a t u r a l , which 
i s not confined to non-human beings but includes a man.'s 
a t t i t u d e towards o ther men a l s o . Mutahharl does not agree 
with Tabatab~ai and remarks t ha t the 'Allamah, in t h i s respect 
seems to agree with the e v o l u t i o n i s t s and accept the Darwinian 
p r i n c i p l e of the s t ruggle for ex i s t ence . In Mutahharl 's view, 
Tabatabal has used a more respec tab le term for the Darwinian 
i d e a . In the s t ruggle for exis tence every man uses o thers 
as h i s too ls and makes them h i s employees. 
» 
Perhaps both Tabatabal and Mutahharl were unacquainted 
with Heidegger 's s imi lar not ion . According to Heidegger 's 
e x i s t e n t i a l philosophy, a l l o ther beings f a l l i n g in the f i e ld 
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of human existence are tools or means of extending and 
developing one's existence. The quality of other beings 
as distinguished from human beings is their 'handiness', 
that is how far they are useful for a human being. Had 
MutjUiharl been familiar with this principle in Heidegger's 
philoaophyy he would have claimed that Tab"atab'ai • s view 
had an affinity with that of the existentialists. It is 
to be noted that Tabatabal developed his principle of 
•istikhadam* in the course of about twenty years unaware 
of a similar theory being formulated by a European exist-
entialist. Not only in his major philosophical work Usul-e 
falsafah wa rawish-e rivalism, but also in his scholarly 
exegesis (tafalr) of the Qur'ah, al-Mlzan. he has referred 
to the principle of employment on many occasions in the 
course of dealing with various aspects of human existence. 
Mutahharl seems to be more conservative on this issue-, for 
his dubbing the ^Allamah as a Darwinist, shows his displeasure 
with the basic idea of employment of other human beings by 
individual human beings. Similarly, Mutahharl's rejection 
of TabS'Jab'iil's doctrine of relativism of certain moral 
values reveals his adherence to the Platonic tradition 
as well as the traditional Islamic philosophy. 
1 (^  '^  
Mutahharl i n f e r s the Darwinian p r inc ip l e o f . t h e 
s t ruggle for exis tence from Tabatabld 's philosophy i n 
the context of his view tha t a man has to make adjustments 
with other human beings in the form of f r iendship and co-
operat ion or through o ther means, so t ha t he i s able to 
survive i n the s t ruggle in which every human being t r i e s 
to use o ther men as h is t o o l s . Mutahharl remarks tha t 
though Tabatabal has not said e x p l i c i t l y such a th ing , h i s 
13 p r i n c i p l e of employment leads to such a conception. 
Tabatab'al regards his p r i n c i p l e of employment as the 
c r i t e r i o n of good and e v i l , r i gh t and wrong. Here two 
quest ions a r i s e . One i s whether man has a n a t u r a l i n c l i n a -
t ion towards e v i l , or in o ther words, i s ev i l inherent i n 
h i s nature? Mutahharl answers tha t from Tabatab"al's view-
point evezy individual has a na tu ra l tendency to a t t a i n 
his own desired ends, which makes him t r e a t o thers as if 
they were his employees to serve h i s ends. This tendency 
of not t r e a t i n g other men as equals to one ' s own ends i s , in 
14 Tabatab"al*s view, nothing but e v i l . 
The other quest ion i s r e l a t e d to the poss ib le i d e n t i t y 
of employment and the p r inc ip l e of the s t ruggle for exis tence, 
Mutahharl does not say tha t both are i d e n t i c a l but holds 
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t h a t s ince both of them lead to the same end, tha t i s , an 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s growth (here , in the moral sense) , they may-
be described as having a close a f f i n i t y with each o ther .15 
However, Mu'J:ahharl does not t o t a l l y r e j e c t Tabatabal ' s 
views regarding man and mora l i ty . What he d isagrees with 
i s Tabatab'al 's genera l i za t ion of the p r i n c i p l e of employment. 
Mutahharl, while s t a t i n g h i s own p o s i t i o n , says tha t a 
d i s t i n c t i o n i s to be made between i n c l i n a t i o n (na tu ra l t en -
dency) and vd.ll . Animals act i n s t i n c t i v e l y by na tu ra l 
i n c l i n a t i o n , while human beings act v o l u n t a r i l y . Mutahharl 
makes a fu r the r d i s t i n c t i o n between two types of human ac t s 
by adding the element of wi l l to man's i n s t i n c t i v e a c t s ; man 
can r e f r a in from ea t ing food or c e r t a i n kinds of food 
w i l l i n g l y though he has an i n c l i n a t i o n to eat them. I n s t i n c -
t i v e ac t s are pass ive ly done under the compulsion of na tu re , 
while i n performing these a c t s , man's reason i s suspended. 
Therefore they are determined a c t s . On the cont rary , volun-
t a r y ac t s are done under the guidance of reason . He, the re fore , 
maintains t h a t w i l l i s freedom. Man i s free because he can 
ac t according to h i s w i l l , and h i s ac ts are not determined 
l i k e those of animals. 
Mutahharl makes another s ign i f i can t point regarding 
the wil led a c t s . He says that in h i s na tu ra l or impulsive 
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be described as having a close a f f i n i t y with each o ther .15 
» 
However, Mutahharl does not t o t a l l y r e j e c t Tabatabal ' s 
views regarding man and moral i ty . What he d isagrees with 
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behaviour man i s under the cont ro l of the externa l world, 
while in wi l l ing he withdraws himself from the externa l 
world and i n t e r n a l i z e s his being to make a choice and' a 
r e so lu t ion . In w i l l i ng , man r e - c o l l e c t s h is being together 
while in act ing impulsively h i s being i s s c a t t e r e d . Regarding 
the quest ion as to whether w i l l i s t o t a l l y absent while act ing 
impulsively, or i t i s only weak, Mutahhari says that w i l l i s 
t he r e , but i t i s weak. With the increase i n impulse, w i l l 
weakens p ropor t iona te ly . He c r i t i c i z e s Mulla Sadra, Hadi 
Sabzawari and Ibn Sina for considering des i r e and wi l l as 
one and the same th ing . Though Ibn SIna occas ional ly made 
some d i s t i n c t i o n between the two, h i s c r i t e r i o n of demar-
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ca t ion i s ambiguous. 
Here two other questions a r i s e : How can e t h i c a l i ssues 
be demonstrated ? How can we argue as to "What i s good" 
and "What i s bad"? 'Allamah Tabatabal i s of the view tha t 
these are undemonstrable, for non-factual matters cannot 
be proved e i t h e r by deduction or induct ion. We can only 
expla in them on a l i n g u i s t i c b a s i s , and tha t also would be 
r e l a t i v i s t i c , for d i f fe ren t ind iv idua l s act d i f f e r e n t l y in 
a given s i t u a t i o n . Moral values are not fac tual or objec t ive 
m a t t e r s . We can prove r a t i o n a l l y or empir ica l ly ideas or 
t h e o r i e s concerning object ive r e a l i t y only. On t h i s bas i s 
^^ 6 regards moral values as subject ive and r e l a t i v i s t i c . 
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P r a c t i c a l philosophy i s concerned with good and bad 
and these concepts are infer red from 'ought ' and 'ought n e t s ' 
These terms depend upon loving or des i r ing something or 
o therwise . In the matter of loving or l i k i n g , ind iv idua l s 
d i f f e r from one another . Therefore, moral values which 
depend upon loving or hat ing some objec ts depend upon'the 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s subject ive a t t i t u d e . Hence they are both 
subject ive and r e l a t i v e . Here i t can be pointed out t ha t 
^Allamah Taba-fablil i s close on the one hand to G.E.Moore, 
who regards values as indef inable , and i s c lo se r to Russe l l , 
on the o the r . 
Bertrand Russell i s of those th inkers who ar r ived at 
the same conclusion in his book A History of Western Philosophy. 
He analyzes P l a t o ' s view regarding Jus t i ce in the following 
words: 
There are several po in t s to be noted 
about P l a t o ' s d e f i n i t i o n . F i r s t , i t 
makes i t poss ib le to have i n e q u a l i t i e s 
of power and p r iv i l ege without J u s t i c e . 
The guardians are to have a l l the powers, 
because tney are the wisest members of 
the community; i n j u s t i c e would only 
occur, on I l a t o ' s d e f i n i t i o n , if there 
were men in the other c l a s ses who were 
wiser than some of the guardians . That 
i s why Plato provides for promotion and 
degradation of c i t i z e n , although he 
thinks that the double advantage of b i r t h 
and reducation w i l l , i n most cases , make 
the chi ldren of guardians super ior to the 
chi ldren of o t h e r s . If there were a 
1 c^ . q 
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more exact science of goA/ernment. and 
more c e r t a i n t y of men following i t s 
pe rcep t s , there would be much to be 
said for P l a t o ' s system. No one thinks 
I t unjust to put the best men into a 
footba l l team, although they acquire 
thereby a great superior i ty ,17 
At another place Russell says: 
The difference between Plato and 
Trasymachus is very important, but for 
the historian of philosophy it is one 
to be noted, not decided. Plato thinks 
he can prove that his idea of republic 
is good; a democrat who accepts the 
objectivity of ethics may think that he 
can prove the Republic bad; but anyone 
who agrees with Traymachus will say: 
'There is no question of proving or dis-
approving; the only question is whether 
you like the kind of State that Plato 
desires. If you do, it is good for you; 
if you do not, it is bad for you. If 
many do and many do not, the decision 
cannot be made by reason, but only by 
force, actual or concealed*. This is 
one of the issues in philosophy that 
are still open; on each side there are 
men who command respect. But for a very 
long time the opinion that Slato advocated 
remained almost undisputed." 
There are two points on which Mutahhari disagrees 
with 'Allimah Taba-^abal. 
(1). Mu-fahharl holds that we cannot attribute value-
oriented activity to all animate beings, as *Allamah Tabatabli 
does. Consciousness of value is confined to man, who possesses 
practical reason. 
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( 2 ) . Mutahhari r e j e c t s the p r i nc ip l e of employment 
as put forward by the 'Allamah. His r e j ec t i on of i t i s 
based oh thred arguments,which he elaborated i n "Akhlaq wa 
jividar^ifilH.f» On the bas is of those arguments he proved 
b i s idea of the un ive r sa l i t y and e t e r n i t y of good and e v i l . 
Mutahhfi»rl forwarded three arguments in support of h i s view. 
The F i r s t Argument: 
Man has c e r t a i n motives which serve to f u l f i l h i s 
Indiv idual needs and demands. Human a c t i v i t y i s also stimu-
l a t e d by another kind of motivation which i s ca l l ed by 
Mutahhari spec ies-or iented motives. These are d i f f e ren t 
f3?om ind iv idua l -or ien ted motives which serve the i n t e r e s t s 
of the indiv idual only. They may be connected with one ' s 
mate and of f spr ing . The species or iented motives are general 
and embrace the whole of humanity. These are not confined 
to a p a r t i c u l a r environment, s i t u a t i o n or time per iod . Because 
of these motives, one can place the welfare and happiness 
of h i s fellow beings ahead of h i s own welfare . These motives 
may be described as humanitarian motives, due to which one 
i s pained if he sees another man in pa in . This kind of 
motive may be also defined as gregarious or soc ia l motivat ion. 
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He commensurates with o the r s , he r e jo ices a t t h e i r Joy and 
gr ieves a t t h e i r g r i e f . Mutahharl says tha t if we accept 
the ro l e of these species or iented motives, ^Allamah 
Tabatabiil 's view i s refuted, for he bel ieves that man's 
na tu ra l njejital makeup i s in accordance with h i s na tu ra l 
and b io log ica l ur*ges. Tabatab'&l considers h i s theory of 
employment to be appl icable to a l l human beings as a general 
p r i n c i p l e . According to Mutal-iharl' s view t h i s p r i n c i p l e 
c o n f l i c t s with our accepted c r i t e r i o n of mora l i ty . I t i s 
genera l ly held t ha t egocentr ic or s e l f i s h motives and acts 
a r e morally in fe r io r , or ra ther e v i l , as compared to a l t r u i s t i c 
motives and a c t s . Morality l i b e r a t e s man from the confines 
of h i s s e l f i sh i n t e r e s t s and i s , there fore , un ive r sa l ly 
appl icable to a l l cases , times and s i t u a t i o n s . Thus he 
affirms the p r i n c i p l e of the u n i v e r s a l i t y and e t e r n i t y of 
moral va lues . To the quest ion "Why righteousness i s good"?, 
the reply 1st Because i t f u l f i l s the i n t e r e s t s of al l .20 
Second ArgUi][tent; 
While Mulfahharl based h i s f i r s t argument on the 
dua l i t y of motives, he bases his second argument i n favour 
of the un ive r sa l i t y and e t e r n i t y of morali ty on the dua l i t y 
of human se l f . This view i s s imi la r to tha t of some contemporary 
20^ 
t h inke r s who hold that i t i s impossible to seek a thing 
unless tha t th ing i s linked with one ' s own se l f . Whatever 
seems to be pleasant for the ind iv idua l i s u l t imate ly 
accepted as good for the whole human spec ies . Durkheim 
and some o ther soc io log i s t s argue on t h i s bas i s that man 
has two selves J one i s the indiv idual se l f , while the other 
i s the co l l ec t i ve se l f . Man, from the b io log ica l point of 
view, i s an ind iv idua l , but from the soc ia l point of view 
he i s a soc ia l being and has a soc ia l se l f a l s o . Therefore, 
each man possesses two se lves . Mu^fililiarl, with reference 
to Taba"jjabeii*8 wr i t ings , says that the l a t t e r also confirms 
t h i s theory without being aware of recent soc io log ica l 
t heo r i e s , and accepts t h a t society has a r ea l self which 
i s not r e l a t i v e . The soc io log i s t s also a t t r i b u t e a persona l i ty 
and self to soc ie ty , which i s r e a l , ob jec t ive , and indepen-
dent of Individual s e lves . I t i s not the sura t o t a l of the 
selves of i t s indiv idual members, but something d i f fe ren t 
from i t . Every man i s possessed of a soc ia l self alongwith 
h i s individual se l f . 
Mu|:ahharl here r e fe r s to the mystical doct r ine of a 
universa l se l f . According to the §ufis and other myst ics , 
the re i s ah underlying connection between human se lves , 
of Which man becomes aware when h i s self i s pu r i f i ed . 
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Sharing a universal self and realizing that thrx)ugh it all 
men are related to one another leads man to attain spiritual 
unity with the universal self. 
Sociologists are of the view that society is consti-
tuted of individuals who have a common social or cultural 
self which is real. They saw that sometimes man's acts are 
motivated by individual motives, while on other occasions 
his acts are prompted by social motives. The individual 
and social motives belong to the individual and the social 
self respectively. The former is natural and biological, 
while the latter is collective. It is here that from the 
duality of motives sociologists infer the notion of the 
duality of the self. Arguing from a sociological viewpoint 
Mutahharl concludes that any act which stems from the social 
self is regarded as morally good and is determined by a 
universal and eternal value-system. Contrarily, any act 
that stems from the individual self is devoid of moral good. 
Hence morality cannot be relative, individual and changing. 
It is governed by values which are universally and eternally 
valid,^'' 
Third Argument? 
Mu-^ ahharl begins his third argument with the assertion 
that man does not do anything which is not related to the 
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universe of his self. On this basis he refutes Tabatab"ai*s 
principle of employment, according to which human acts are 
Ifliposed upon him by some other self. In elaboration of 
this argument he takes recourse to the traditional division 
of human existence into two selves, of which one is superior 
(spiritual) and the other is inferior (carnal). Man is also 
an animal, and his inferior self is ruled by animal desires 
and motives. Morality consists in subordinating the animal 
self to the higher self. Whatever is done for the lower 
self is not moral. Moral acts have their origin in the 
higher self. Animal selves are subject to nature, while 
the higher self, which is universally shared by all men, 
is subject to a system of higher values. According to 
Mutahharl the higher self is universal and the values to 
which it is subjected are also universal and eternal. He 
wonders why yaba-J:abai forgot to refer to this concept, though 
he was acquainted with it. He says that had he referred 
to it, he would have accepted that moral acts are those 
which are done for the satisfaction of the higher self. In 
that case he would have rejected the relativistic doctrine 
of morality as well as the principle of employment. 
Furthering his argument, Mutahhari says that he agrees 
» 
with Tabatabal, Russell and others that good and evil. 
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•ought' and 'ought nets', are based upon man's love for 
certain ends and his dislike for other things. He asks, 
••but which self's love or hate is the criterion of good 
find evil?" He answers that if one says that it is the 
lower or ar^ imal self whose liking or disliking for an 
object is the standard of morality, he is wrong, for he 
negates the very spirit of morality. The interests of the 
lower selves may differ from individual to individual, so 
on their basis there cannot be any universal and eternal 
moral value. But, on the other hand, if we believe that 
it is the higher self which is the basis of morality, we 
will, have to concede that its values are universally and 
eternally valid, 
Mutahhari says at the end of his article "Akhlaq wa 
.-^ awidangl": 
I would like to refer to an Islamic 
doctrine which is very significant 
for resolving the issue of morality, 
and is neglected by philosophers. 
That is> man has an innate nobility 
and excellency which may be defined 
as a spiritual faculty or a Divine 
spafk. Every man unconsciously 
experiences it. While doing certain « 
acts he contemplates whether they 
are compatible with his innate nobility 
or not. Whenever he finds an act 
compatible with it, he regards it as 
good andvirtuous; if it is incompatible 
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with it, it is regarded as a vice or 
evil. As animals know what is bene-
ficial or harmful to them instinct-
ively, the human self that has meta-
physical virtues recognizes what is 
good and what is evil, what he ought 
to do and what he ought not... Human 
beings are created alike so far as 
spiritual faculties and virtues are 
also alike, their views are also 
alike. Biologically and philosophi-
cally hien may be different from each 
other and under different conditions 
their physical needs may also differ. 
But so far as the ability to attain 
spiritual sublimation is concerned 
they are alike and necessarily have 
similar likes and dislikes as well 
as similar standards df good and 
evil. All moral virtues, whether 
individual or social, such as patience, 
can be explained from this view.^^ 
Mutahhari concludes that the above quoted principle 
can explain in a much better way the criterion of good 
and evil and social and individual virtues, as compared to 
all other moral theories discussed above. This principle 
also provides the most secure ground for believing in the 
eternity and universality of moral values. Mutahhari's 
tDOral philosophy has little affinity with contemporary 
moral thinkers> who in general accept some kind of relativism. 
His moral philosophy is not utilitarian also. Though he 
does not fexclude human element in determining good and evil 
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he cannot in any way agree with Russe l l , Sar t re o r Popper 's 
views tha t regard a l l moral values as having t h e i r o r ig in 
i n human experience and h i s soc i a l and indiv idual i n t e r e s t s , 
Morality in Islam has Divine source and b a s i s , which i s 
acces s ib l e to the higher self only. Mutahharl 's moral 
philosophy i s i n conformity with the teaching of Islam and 
he has argued in the terms that are compatible 
with contemporary problems facing man. 
* * * 
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(c). Mutahhari*a critique of capitalism and Marxism 
Ecoporoics; 
Harx*t attempt In his Capital Is to find out the 
cause of exploitation. All the three volumes of Capital 
are devoted to a critical elaboration and examination of 
eapitAlisn* Marx discovered the foundation stone of 
capitelism in surplus value. 
To analyse the theory of value, Marx appealed to 
Ricardo as a point of departure. However, Rlcardo main-
tained that relative prices are regulated by embodied 
labour and being Interested only in the quantitative 
determination of relative prices does not make the dis-
tinction between abstract labour and concrete labour or 
between socially necessary labour and individual labour. 
He also does not explain profits through the surplus value 
produced by workers and tries to determine production 
prices of single commodity directly with the amount of 
labour-*tlme embodied in them. Marx rejected this idea 
and maintained that labour power should be considered as 
the determinant of production prices of a single commodity 
and not labour hours. 
As a matter of fact, Marx adopted the theory of value 
of his predecessors. As Engels in preface to Capital sayst 
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Even Adam Smith knew the source of the 
surplus value of the c a p i t a l i s t . . . , 
Ricardo goes considerably further than 
Adam Smith. He bases h i s conception 
of surplus-value as a new theory of 
value contained in embryo i n Adam Smith, 
but generally forgotten when i t comes 
to apply i t . 1 
In the Capital Karl Marx holds that Adam Smith 
does not dist inguish surplus-value as such as a category 
on i t s own, d i s t inc t from the specif ic forms i t assumes 
in profit and rent . This i s the source of much error and 
inadequacy in Smith's enquiry. Theory of surplus i s an 
attempt, as Karl Popper bel ieves to answer the question 
as to how does the cap i ta l i s t make h is Profit."^ He says: 
Marx's value-theory does not suff ice to explain explo i ta-
t i o n . ^ 
In his book BarrasI i>1mali Maharil-yi Igt isad-e Islam! 
(A Brief Study of the Foundations of Islamic Economics) 
Mutahharl t r i e s to analyse the notion of capitalism and 
examines the Marxian att itude towards the issue of capitalism. 
Mutahharl i n i t i a t e s his argument with analysing the very 
meaning of the notion of value and points to the various 
doctrines of value. We refrain from going into de ta i l s 
of these doctrines, but the core meaning of these doctrines 
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is aa follovBs 
(1)# Die value of a "Commodity" is intrinsic and 
real* 
(2)» Ihe value of a connnodity is conventional and 
unreal. 
(3), The value of a commodity is determined by its 
usefulness* 
(4). The origin of the value of a commodity is in 
its scarcity, 
(5), The value of a commodity is equal to the amount 
of labour embodied in it. This theory is 
presented by Adam Smith and Ricardo, later on 
adopted by Karl Marx in the form of surplus 
value. Mutahharl levelled the following 
criticism at this theory; 
i). This theory ignores the effect of demand and 
simply in mazicet on pricing. 
ii). Worker's labour is the creator of value not 
equal to value. 
iii). This theory is not applicable to precious stones 
and valuable things. 
iv). This theory ignores the role of fashion in the 
value of a commodity. 
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v)« This theory does not consider the role of 
natur« in the creation of value like herbs, fruits, fish, 
which are natural goods and valuable to which m€ui*s 
labour does not contribute In any way* 
vl). Tvfo commodities such as wheat and barley need 
the same labour but their values are different. On the 
other hand labour put In them is the same but their values 
are not same* 
vll). According to this theory, value is determined 
on the basis of the amount of labour put in to produce 
that commodity* The share of a oow would be more than 
that of Its owner in production of the value of a commodity 
In a f artB* 
vlll)* Diis theory is an anti-labour theory for accord-
ing to this theory the real value of a worker is equal to 
his fn^^s of subsistence. In this regard Mutahharl says: 
Mar9c*s theory of surplus value Instead 
of showing that the owner is an exploiter 
8eemd to prove that he is not an exploiter, e can call the owner an exploiter only 
when the wage of a worker is determined 
on the basis of the effect of his labour 
and hot on the basis of the means of the 
production of the worker's labour. If we 
determine the wage according to the product 
we can say that the real wage of a worker 
should be enhanced in proportion to the 
increase in production*3 
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Surplus Value: 
Mutahharl in his book Ba^as l l.lmall Mabaiil''yl Iqtlsad-e 
* 
lalaml. (A Brief Study of the Foundations of Islamic Economics) 
says refering to Marxists, that they prove the i l leg i t imacy 
of capitalism on the basis of the following two assumptions: 
First i the value of a commodity i s equal to the amount of the 
worker's labour. 
Second! the iurplus value i s rooted in worker's labourly not 
i n the peans of production* the f i r s t argument i s already 
proved to be unfounded by Mutahharl. Regarding the second 
argument* that i s , the theory of surplus value, Mutahharl 
ra i ses three questions which are as follows: 
( 1 ) . I s surplus value one of the character is t ics of 
the old capitalism or that of the new ? I f i t i s the 
characterist ic of the old capitalism then what i s the chara-
c t e r i s t i c of the new capitalism ? Vilhat dist inguishes old 
capitalism from new capitalism ? 
( 2 ) , I s the value of a commodity constant or variable ? 
( 3 ) . Is the theory of surplus value i s an anti -capi-
g 
talism theory or pro-capitalism theory ? 
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So far as the first question is concerned, Marxists 
claim that surplus value is one of the characteristics of 
modern capitalism. But this idea is refuted by Mutahharl. 
He is of the view that, firstly, surplus value is rooted 
in ^ust and unequal payment of wages; secondly it is also 
preached by the exploitation of consumers, and thirdly it 
is related to the technology on the machinery also. According 
to MuJ:ahharl the third one is the main characteristic of 
the new capitalism. 
To trace the root of new capitalism one should focus 
one's attention upon technology and machinaries which in 
reality belong to the people but are misappropriated by the 
capitalists. So Mutahhari is of the view that surplus value 
is rooted in the very technology and machinery for it is 
the contribution of scientists^ and people's efforts in the 
course of history. In other words it is the embodiment 
of human efforts. Even scientists have no right to monopolize 
7 
a technique in order to exploit others. 
Technplogy-base^ Capitalism: A New Issue in Islamic Juris-
prudence: 
Mu-^ ahharl is of the view that new capitalism or 
technological capitalism is a new issue. By this term he 
means to refer to the role of technology in the growth of 
2ir) 
new exploitative capitalism at international level by 
means of multi-national companies* So it should not be 
confused with the old capitalism, and it is for the 
Islamic scholars to distinguish between these two and 
consider the new capitalism as a new event (Mustahaddithah) 
challenging them. To make this matter clear, Mu^ahharl 
writes that quantitative development or change does not 
change the nature of a phenomenon unless it gives rise 
to some qualitative change. He says that we believe 
that the main characteristic of new capitalism is the 
role of maohinary which made capitalism a subject to be 
studied afresh in Islamic Jurisprudence. He says that 
mechanism should not be considered as merely an expansion 
of means of production, but it is the new technology apart 
from its quantitative change, substituting man by machine. 
That is, the machine became a manifestation of man*s thought 
will, and power. Machines became a manifestation of the 
evolution of society and the embodiment of the civilization 
of man that developed throughout ages for thousands of years. 
Machine is a substitute of man, not merely a tool in the 
hands of man. It is an artificial man. Machine weaves as 
man does. Machine stitches, ploughs cultivates. Machine 
functions as a conscious man funotions. Machine is not 
merely Haeans in the hand of man nor does it act as a developed 
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arm of man under the control of man but it Is higher than 
man himself and performs all the functions of man more 
meticulously with the maximum out put. Man is used as 
means for other men Just like a machine is used to be 
means in the hands of man* A Machine is able to produce 
to the maximum extent, because it has directly taken 
place of man's consciousness* The immense power of metals» 
electricity, steam, atomic energy is in fact the man working 
with metalio and nuclear muscles* Machine is a phenomenon 
representing its inventors, their thought and intellect. 
In other words, it is culmination of the development and 
evolution of human society which is under the control of 
the capitalist* 
A machine is not a fragment of single metal like 
knife* It is not like a piece of wood that has been picked 
up from a forest, which has no connection with society in 
general and man in particular* It is actually the mind of 
certain scientists which functions by means of tools and 
metalic muscles* In other words, it is the mind of the 
society in itself* It is the genius and creativity of man 
that has reached the present stage after a long struggle in 
the course of history* 
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Critique o:f Marx's Views on Capitalism; 
In Mutahharl's view socialism of Marx stands in its 
head. According to socialism of Marx on means of production 
i.e. maohinery, is a constant constituent of capital, and 
labour power is considered to be a variable capital. In his 
book Capital Marx says: 
The means of production on the one hand, 
labour-power on the other, are merely 
the different modes of existence which 
the value of the original capital assumed 
when from being money it was transformed 
into the various factors of the labour-
process. That part of capital, den 
when, which is represented by means of 
production, by the raw material, auxiliary 
material and the Instruments of labour, 
does not, in the prooess of production 
undergo any quantitative alteration of 
value. I, therefore, call it the constant 
part of capital, or, more shortly constant 
capital. 
On the other hand, that part of capital, 
represented by labour-power does in the 
process of production, undergo on alter-
ation of value. It both reproduces the 
equivalent of its own value, and also 
produces according to circumstances. This 
part of capital is continually being 
transformed from a constant into a variable 
magnitude. I, therefore, call it the 
variable part of capital or, shortly, 
variable capital." 
According to MutahharX machine should be treated as 
the Virlable capital, while human labour is the constant 
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capital. Hence Machine Is the source of surplus value 
which is the property of the society and is usurped by 
the capitalist* The real source of the new capitalism 
is machine. He says, nevertheless, the profit of capital-
ist is partly related to the low wage of labour and partly 
to the exploitation of consumers. The real source o-f profit 
is machine which is the product of the development of 
society and it does not belong to an individual, therefore 
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the very source of new capitalism is illegitimate. 
As for the notion of "constant capital" and "variable 
capital", Karl Popper considers this division of capital 
misleading. In his book, The Open Society and Its Enemies, 
he writes that I shall call the two parts 'immobilized 
capital* and 'wage capital*. The capitalist, according 
to Marx, can profit only by exploiting the workers; in 
other words, by using his wage capital. Immobilized capital 
is a kind of a dead weight which he is forced by competition 
to carry on with and even to increase continually. This 
increase is not, however, accompanied by a corresponding 
Increase in his profits; only an extension of the wage 
capital could have this wholesome effect. But the general 
tendency towards an increase in productivity means that the 
material part of capital increases relatively to its 
210 
wage part. Therefore, the totiO. capital increases also 
without a coBipenaating increase in profits. That is to 
say, the rate of profit must fall. Popper holds that 
this argument has been often questioned. But Marx sees 
this relation in the following manner. If the rate of 
profit tends to fall, then the capitalist is faced with 
destruction. All he can do is to attempt to 'take it 
out of the workers', i.e. to increase exploitation. This 
he can do by extending working hours; speeding up work; 
lowering wages; raising the workers* cost of living 
(inflation), exploiting more Women and children. The 
Inner oontradlotion of capitalism, based on the fact 
that competition and profit-making are in conflict, rises 
here to a point of climax. First, these factors force the 
capitalist to accumulate capital and to increase producti-
vity and to reduce the rate of profit. Next, they force 
him to increase exploitation to an Intolerable degree, and 
with it the tension between the classes is lightened. 
Thus compromise is impossible. The contradictions cannot 
be removed. They must be finally dealt with an Inseparable 
part of capitalism. 
According to Popper, increased productivity is the 
very basis of capitcLLlst exploitation; only if the worker 
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can produce much more than he needs for himself and hla 
family only then the c a p i t a l i s t can appropriate surplus 
laMur* Illot^aaed productivity, In Marx's terminology, 
tteahs Inor^ased surplus labour) It means lncz*eased number 
of hours available to the c a p i t a l i s t , and, on top of t h i s 
an increased number of commodities produced per hour* I t 
means a greatly increased prof i t . This i s admitted by 
Maz«« He does not hold that prof i t s are dwindling; he 
only holds that the t o t a l capital Increases much more 
11 quickly than pro f i t s , so that the rate of profit f a l l s , 
Tb sum up th i s discussion I quote from Mutahharl's 
book on Islamic Economics, the two concluding paragraphs 
under the subt i t le "Sharing of the sources of capital i s 
different from sharing in labour" in which he has discussed 
the question of machine l ike land may be considered as the 
coimon property of the people. He says: 
•••ve in our previous dlscource have 
pz*oved that machine i s a phenomenon of 
soc ia l development and i t is product, and 
therefore, i t s product cannot be consi -
dered an indirect product of the capi-
t a l i s t . I t i s rather an indirect product 
of the consciousness or genius of the 
Inventor i s not tl>e sole property of 
any individual . Therefore, machine does 
not belong to ind iv idua l s . • . n i l s does 
not amount to negate the Individual's 
2.^: 
right to property or the very concep-
tion of private property. It rather 
means that it is considered common 
property in case the special circums-
tances demand that such things should 
be regarded as the property of a society. 
In this case these should not be ovmed by 
an individual.'12 
Nutahiiarl has also indicated the scope of Islamic 
socialisms 
Natural wealth is considered in Islam 
the common property of man. But Islam 
does not coomletely negates the right 
of individuals to ovna natural resources. 
Whereas the labour of an individual 
and person is involved. Islam accepts 
the right of individual property in 
such cases. Whei^ ever individual labour 
is not involved, it will be considered 
the common property of society. Any 
how, on the basis of this principle 
Islam despite being the advocate of 
common ownership with i»egard to some 
kinds of capital does not permit common 
ownership of the product of labour of 
the individuals, except in oases where 
it is legitimised by a contract. Hence 
Islam is not a form of socialism like 
various versions of socialism. But frx)m 
another point of view as it holds that 
natural and industrial capital does not 
belong to Individual, it accepts in a way 
the principle of socialism.13 
Thus, Mutahharl maintains that Islamic economics 
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(d)» Mutahharl 's Cr i t ic i sm of Marxist Philosophy: 
In h i s book Naqdl Bar Marxism (A Cr i t ique of Marxism) 
Mutahharl touched upon the very root of metaphysical mate-
r l a l i am and challenged i t . Bas ica l ly the Marxists be l ieve 
tha t r e a l i t y i s temporal and every thing i s i n a s t a t e of 
f lux . Real i ty i s always charmging, now t h i s , now t h a t ; i n 
t h i s sense i t i s f u l l of negat ion, con t rad ic t ions and oppo-
s i t i o n s . The p lan t germinates, blooms, withers away and 
d i e s . Man i s bom, passes through various s tages of youth, 
maturi ty old age and f i n a l l y d i e s . According to Marxists 
t h i s movement proceeds unconsciously i n nature and even In 
h i s t o r y . As for soul , they deny the indepedent exis tence 
of soul and accord a secondary p o s i t i o n to i t and hold 
mat ter to be the substratum of every t h ing . Soul i s a 
by-prodUct of physio logica l prooesses and therefore i s moral. 
I n thft donlAin of morals Marxists be l ieve i n changing values 
and t h e i r r e l a t i v i s m . 
Among the predecessors and teachers of Mutahharl 
'Allimah Jabiitabal e laborated the i ssue of the nature of 
r e a l i t y i n h i s major phi losophica l work Usul-e Falalfah wa 
Rewijih^e Riyjllsm (The P r inc ip l e of Philosophy and the 
Method of Realism), upon which Mutahharl wrote a de t a i l ed 
coBmentary. In t h i s commentary Mutahharl challenged the 
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views of pragmatists and logical positiviats regarding 
the notion of reality, Mutahharl Bays: 
A Critical analysis makes it explicit 
that the position of modern relativists 
is correct, and actually the term relative 
has no meaning... if two persons perceive 
a body as having two different states, 
the body itself should have either one of 
those states or none of two, but may have 
a third state. Of course it is impossible 
for a thing to posses two different states 
at one and same time. In the first case 
perception of one of the two persons is 
absolutely incorrect and that of the 
other is absolutely true. In the other 
case both of those are wrong. In any 
case the notion of relative reality is 
illogical and irrational. 
Regarding the existence of soul, Mutahhari is of 
the view that the fundamental dimension of human existence 
can liot be interpreted in terms of matter or its modes 
alo|ie« In his articel Spirit* Matter and Life Mutahharl 
sayst 
Scientific research has thoroughly 
deflated the materialists hubris. Mo 
longer may someone say as did Descartes 
ind others, give me matter and motion, 
iRQ 1 will construct a universe. The 
warp and wdof of the Universe have too 
many threads for being to be confined to 
matter and the sensible and accidental 
motion of matter. 
So, according to Mutahharl, soul is the fundamental 
reality. The spiritual forces, i.e. the intellectual 
proceabes, faith, belief and emotions are regarded as 
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independent of physical process at both the individual 
level and at the level of society life. Regarding the 
relativity of moral value, Mu-^ahharl disagrees with 
Marxian approach. The detailed account in this regard 
is giveh in a separate section of this dissertation. So 
far $).$ Marxist's positivism is concerned, dialectic is 
their methodology as well as their onthology. Reality, 
that is, becoming, moves through contradictions and 
attains synthesis of opposites at every stage of evolution. 
Mutahharl criticises Marxian approach to the notion of 
dialectic as he says that in Hegel's idealist philosophy 
the notion of inner emovement was a logical necessity and 
not a causal relation. But in Marxism it does not fit. 
Marxists abundoned the logical ground of Hegel's philosophy, 
and Ibgical niecessity was replaced by the notion of causal 
connection. As a consequence they had to take recourse 
in pre^Hegelian philosophy and its conception of causality. 
However, they try to Justify their claim that this connection 
is ihher and therefore, it is necessary. It is according 
to Marxists that there are certain laws governing not only 
natural phenomena but also determine the process of histo-
rical change. In his book DialeQtios of Nature. Engels 
redUoad thuse laws in the main to three laws: 
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1). The law of the transformation of quantity into 
quality and vice-versa. 
2), The law of the interpenetration or unify of opposites. 
3). The law of the negation of negation. 
With reference to the law of contradiction Mutahharl 
flays that ao far as Marxian philosophy is concerned there 
are always two opposing forces indent in every thing; one 
is positive or constructive and the other is negative or 
destructive* Mutahharl rejects this idea and says that this 
principle is Justifiable in Hegelian philosophy because 
of its idealist base but not applicable to the materialist 
Marxist philosophy. Regarding the principle of motion, 
Mutahharl says that both Marxist and Muslim philosophies 
apparantly arrive at the same conclusion, that is, the reality 
is"becoming", in which being and non-being are synthesised. 
This view leads to the conclusion that the physical world 
is In the state of constant motion, Marxist philosophers 
infer from this that the world is independent, self-moving 
and self-developing, that is, developing as a result not 
of any external causes but by virtue of its own nature i.e., 
dialectical laws. But some Muslim philosophers, particularly 
Mulll SadrS, on the other hand, conclude that both the being 
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and gystem of this Universe stem from the supernal. Were 
it not for the governance of the other world, this world 
which is always in flux and motion, would be cut off from 
its past and future. 
Regarding the law of the transformation of quantity 
intG quality and vice-versa, Mu^ahharl relates this law 
to the notion of nature (fitrat)« and denies the possibility 
of transformation of quantity into quality and vice-versa. 
He says that if the quality is taken as an accident of 
substance it should preced by a change of substance itself 
for without change in substance change in accident is not 
possible9 but if the quality is taken as a substance, in 
this case quantitative change in it cannot change its 
quality. 
In the following paragraphs we summerise the points 
of Mu^ahharl's analysis and criticism of Marxist philosophy: 
(1). A philosophical theory of history ought to be 
based upon observation of contemporary events and historic al 
facts, and should be applicable to other times also. Either 
it should be formulated on the basis of historical evidence, 
being in addition applicable to events of the present and 
the future, or it should have been deducted and inferred 
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from apipllpri premises based upon a series of scientific 
philciophical, and logical principles. The theory of 
historioal tnaterialism does not fulfil the conditions of 
any of the above mentioned methods nor the historical 
events of the time of Marx and Engels can be explained on 
Its basis (as EIngels himself has admitted). 
(2). According to the principle of reciprocal 
causation, the cause-effect relationship should not be 
regarded as a one-sided process. If 'A* is the cause of 
change in 'B' in the same way 'B* also in its turn becomes 
the cause of 'A*. According to this principle, there is 
a kind of reciprocal causal relation between all parts of 
nature and €ill parts of society. According to this 
principle, the suggestion of priority of the one over the 
other is meaningless with regard to causal relation between 
two entitles like matter and spirit, or action and thought, 
or economic basis and all other institution?, i.e. structure 
and superstructure. If two things are interrelated and 
dependent upon each other for their existence, and the 
existence of one is conditioned by that of the other, raising 
the question as to which is prior or fundamentals is meaning-
less. Marx, in some of his statements, considers all social 
proQessea based upon economic factors and has not suggested 
the effect of superstructure on the structure and the base. 
(3)* The notion of necessary correspondence between 
superstructure and base as upheld by historical materialism 
Is notHing but a mere Illusion* For example the countries 
of BaHtern Burope, Asia and South America have become 
socialist despite the fact that they have not yet attained 
the stage of giving birth to a socialist state, 
(4)» It should be noted that the means of production 
are pot capable of developing automatically without htunan 
intervention. The means of production develop in the context 
of man's relationship with nature and his curiosity, invent-
iveness, and endeavour. The development in the means of 
production is accompanied by the growth of science and 
technology. But the question arises as to which of them 
comes first! Whether man first invents something, or his 
inventions determine his life. It cannot be denied that the 
second alternative is correct. 
(5). When Marxists hold that dialectical thought is 
only the reflection of the motion through opposltes which 
asserts Itself every where in nature, they ignore the 
difference between primary and secondary Intelliglbles. 
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It is not possible to arrive at the stage of concept-
formation directly through reflection. 
(6), A critical analysis makes it explicit that the 
position of modern relativists is incorrect, and actually 
the term relative reality has no meaning, ",.. if two 
persons perceive a body as having *© two different states 
the body itself should have either one of these states or 
none of two, but may have a third state". Of course it is 
impossible for a thing to possess two different states at 
one and the same time. In the first case perception of 
one of the two persons is absolutely incorrect and that 
of the other is absolutely true. In the other case both of 
them are wrong. In any case the notion of relative reality 
is illogical and irrational, 
(7). Mutahharl refutes the Marxist view that all 
morality is class morality and moral theories have been 
hitherto the product, in the last analysis, of the material 
conditions of society obtaining at the time, and so moral 
values are relative to both time and social conditions. 
(8). According to Marxists, if any change takes 
place in the economic foundation of a society, the trans-
formation of all other social modes is also accompanied. 
But the theory Is based on an "if. The main question, 
however remains unanswered. Supposing that economy is 
the foundation of society, "if" economic infrastructure 
changes, the whole society also changes with it. But 
the question as to when and under what circumstances and 
by means of which factors the infrastructure changes 
followed by changes in the superstructure,is not touched. 
In other words, to say that economy is the basis is not 
sufficient to explain the dynamic and changing character 
of society. Instead of saying that society is the base, 
the advocates of this theory may properly formulate their 
position by stating that economy is the motivating factor 
of history, which is materialistic in essence. According 
to thle view the contradiction between the economic infra-
structure and the social superstructure (or between the 
two tl«rs of the infrastructure, viz, the tool of production 
and the relation of production) is the moving force that 
pushes history forward. There is no doubt that this is 
what the advocates of the above mentioned view mean when 
they say that economy is the moving force of history. What 
they mean to asert is that all change in history originates 
from internal contradittion between the tools of production. 
But here we are only concerned with the proper formulation 
of the theory, not with conjecturing the inner purpose and 
objective of its advocates, 
(9). Historical materialism contradicts itself, for 
according to this view, all thought, all philosophical and 
scientific theories, and all ethical systems represent certain 
material and economic conditions, and are inseparably 
connected with their own specific objective conditions. 
Hence their value and validity are not absolute, but depend 
upon a specific spatio-temporal situation. With the lapse 
of a particular period and changes in the material, economic 
and social conditions, which are necessary and inevitable, 
every idea or thought or ethical system is ultimately bound 
to be replaced by a different idea, thought or theory. 
According to this principle, historical materialism, too 
is subject to this universal law. Because if it is not 
subject to this universal law and is an exception it would 
mean that there are some sclcmtific and philosophical laws 
whichAfe fundamental and ind«pendent of any kind of economic 
basef and if historical materialism is subj«ct to the general 
law, Its value and validity are confined to one period and 
it is applicable to that period alone which has given rise 
to it. It is not relevant to an earlier or later period. 
Thus, in both cases, historical materialism is contradicted 
by itself. 
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CHAPTER « V 
CONCLUDE REMARKS 
Mu-^ahfaarlU Social Philosophy and I t a Relevance to the West 
and Islaaiic World? 
Th» Ideological development in the Middle East Inc ida tes 
thfct a changed view of the world, a new self Image and a more 
•ophls t loa ted view of na t ive h i s t o r y and socie ty has emerged 
o r I s about to emerge. The wr i t ings published throughout the 
Middle East during the past few decades manifest the growing 
tendency to r e j e c t the European images and c l i ches about 
Islam and the Muslim s o c i e t y . 
During the l a s t few decades Muslim scholars i n the 
Middle East s t r i v e to present t h e i r own i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of 
h i s t o r y , socie ty and analys is of man and they challenge Marxian 
approach* On the whole phi losophica l and soc ia l thought i n 
the contemp»orary age in the Middle East has acquired new dlmen-
fllons and has harmonized i t s e l f i n varying degree with the 
t r a d i t i o n a l values and modes of thought p r e v a i l out i n i t s 
own c i v i l i z a t i o n . 
There were few Muslim th inkers l i k e Mu-^ahharl whose ideas 
had a wide Impact on the East , p a r t i c u l a r l y on I r a n . He sought 
to assess cap i ta l i sm and Marxism, the two major Ideologies 
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t h a t had been dominating the world l o r many yea r s . His 
c r i t i c i s m of western democracy issued from h i s be l i e f 
t h a t the West suppressed the ind iv idua l and h i s r i g h t to 
individUftlity c r e a t i v i t y and fi-eedom. The s p i r i t u a l aspect 
t o t a l l y forgbt ten . So according to Mu-^ahharl the r e a l problem 
of the West i s the problem of a l i ena t i on at a l l l e v e l s , 
s o c i a l , n a t u r a l , r e l i g i o u s , p o l i t i c a l leading to s e l f - a l i e n a -
t i o n . Aa we have discussed in e a r l i e r chapters Mutahharl ' s 
concept of a l i ena t ion i s d i f f e ren t with tha t of the ph i lo so -
phers of the West l i k e Marx, Marcuse and J . P . S a r t r e . Only 
Hegel ' s conception of a l i ena t ion may appear to have some 
a f f i n i t y with the concept of Muslim phi losophers , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
' j j£afa, whom Mutahharl regards as the t rue exponents of 
human r e a l i t y . 
According to Mutahharl the West has forgot ten both 
i t s e l f and God, He says tha t the West has debased i t s e l f . 
Hence Westerner has t o t a l l y neglected to look ins ide himself, 
to l i s t e n to h i s inner se l f and conscience, and he has e n t i r e l y 
focused h i s a t t e n t i o n on mater ial and useful t h i n g s . I t 
considers the aim of l i f e i s nothing but to enjoy mater ia l 
t h i n g s . The West denies ind iv idua l se l f and has forsaken 
the human sou l . Most of the misfortunes of human beings 
r e s u l t from these misconceptiohs, and i t may be feared tha t 
the day i s not far-off when t h i s way of thought w i l l be 
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universal, and consequently will destroy humanity. This 
angle of viewing human being Is the outcome of the historical 
reality, that Is as civilization spreads and develops, the 
civilized person slowly degenerates. Mutahharl In this 
regard Is In total agreement with Mahatama Gandhi whom he 
quotes: "Because of this (Technological achievements) west-
erner deserves to receive the title of Lord of the Earth, 
for he Is the master of every worldly possibly and blessing. 
He Is capable of every worldly task, which other nations 
regard as being In the hand of CJod. But the westerner Is 
Incapable of one thing, and that Is reflecting on his own 
selfi and this thing alone Is enough to prove the futility 
of the false glitter of the new civilization".^ 
Mutahharl at the same time took into account the 
modernity and exigencies of the age In his writings and 
was critical of rigidity prevailed among Islamic circles 
and schools and holds the view that if there would have 
remained freedom of thought in Islamic world and tradition-
alist (A. shlib-al-sunnah and Akhb"arlgarl) would not have 
dominance we could have a codified social philosophy and 
our Jurisprudence also could have been based upon it. But 
Mutahharl holds that keeping up with the time is not also 
as simple a matter as some people imagine. With time, 
there is both progress and waywardness resulting in retrogress. 
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One should move forward according to the advance of time, 
but fight against being led astray by the forces of time, 
Mu'^ahharl says that if every thing has to adapt to time 
and its changes, what is the role of the activity, creative-
ness and construetiveness of man's will ? 
Mu^ahharl was well aware with the controversial issue 
of the challenge of science and religion. In this regard 
he holds the view that the idea of incompatibility between 
science and religion arose basically because of two reasons. 
One of them was that the church maintained that certain 
doctrines held by old science and philosophy had religious 
sanctity and therefore should, from the religious point of 
view, be accepted as dogma which when confronted by people 
like Bruno and Galilio were put to test and then were proved 
to be wrong. Besides that, science altogether altered and 
reformed the pattern of thought and life in the West, in 
which religion occupied but a very insignificant place. 
Further Mutahharl says that religious conservatives 
wanted to bring the outward material form of life under 
the rule of religion, Just as they had done with philosophi-
cal matters, giving them a religious tinge. The native 
and the ignorant also thought that this was the case, and 
imagined that religion viewed the material life of people 
as a having a particular form and pattern. And when the 
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material form of life had to be changed according to the 
Judgement of science, science proclaimed that religion had 
been abrogated, Mu^ahharl concludes that the inflexibility 
of the former together with the ignorance of the latter 
brought about the illustory idea that science and religion 
were incompatible. 
Mutahharl wrote many books on various issues. Except 
a few books he did not write on pure philosophical issues 
but his works had a philosophical tone and followed logical 
and rational method to clarify any issue, Mutahhari in 
later stage of his life paid more importance to social 
philosophy. It is perhaps due to emergence of various 
trends of thoughts in Iranian as well as» in general, 
Muslim society. 
In fact Mutahharl*s chief objective in his writings 
was to defend Islam against the onslought of Marxism and 
capitalism. While challenging them he developed his own 
social philosophy, Mutahharl set out to meet three challenges 
in the Muslim society: 
(1), Westernization and disillusionment with Eastern 
modes of social life and a firm belief in the Western forms 
of culture and society. This mode of thought penetrated 
deeply into all spheres of life in the East, particularly 
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in Iran, Even those Intellectuals who were opposed to this 
mode of thinking were compelled to take account of it 
because of its pervasive influence. The Middle Eastern 
cotintries followed a path of westernization maintaining 
the Western models in politics, law and education, 
(2). The second challenge was Marxism. Marxism made 
inroads in Iran covertly and overtly. It covertly appeared 
in the guise of Islam i.e. tinged with Islamic colour and 
bearing the stamp of Islamic terminology for enhancing 
its acceptability, Mutahharl labled this kind of Marxism 
as hypocritical or deceptive form of Marxism, 
It overtly appeared as a scientific philosophy and 
ideology supporting the struggle against all forms of 
exploitation, injustice and inequality by means of which 
it attracted intellectuals infatuated with modern Western 
terfflinology. Adherents of this view attempted to gain 
the tympathy of the oppressed people of Iran. But their 
area of influence remained confined to a negligible minority 
of educated elite. From the very beginning they were destined 
to fiil for they had no direct contact with the masses who 
Were and are deeply religious in their way of life and 
their mode of thinking. In refuting Marxism, Mutahharl 
attacked at the philosophical roots of this school, that 
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i S t d i a l e c t i c a l mater ial ism, p a r t i c u l a r l y In h i s commentary 
on Tab l taba i ' s book Usul-e Falaafah wa Rawlsh-e Rlyallsm 
(The Pr inc ip le of Philosophy and the Method of Realism), 
which i s considered to be a major work i n r e fu t a t i on of 
Marxism. In h i s l a s t book, Society eind His tory . Mutahharl 
challenged the v a l i d i t y of h i s t o r i c a l material ism, and 
expounded the Islamic concept of h i s t o r y , soc ie ty and man. 
( 3 ) , The t h i r d challenge before Mujahharl was domi-
nance of a kind of s tagna t ion , an t i -ph i losoph ica l f ee l ing 
and old-fashioned t e x t s taught at the r e l i g ious c e n t e r s , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Qum and Mashhad, which were two premier 
cen t e r s of Islamic s t u d i e s . Perhapes i t i s due to t h i s 
reason tha t Mutahharl shif ted h i s cen t re of a c t i v i t y from 
Qum to Tehran, for Tehran at tha t time provided him a 
broader scope for educat ional and academic a c t i v i t y . Even 
Western educated scholars such as Mahdl Bazargan and 
Dr. *AlX Sha r l a t l also were not favourable towards philosophy 
and were ins tead advocating soc io log ica l and s c i e n t i f i c 
approaoh to Islafli. Mu-^ahharl was a r igorous c r i t i c of t h i s 
t rend of thought a l s o . All h i s works marked phi losophical 
and r a t i o n a l over tone. He se t out to cure Is lamic thought 
and education of s tagnat ion and sought to make Muslims 
awaken to the r e a l i t y of the time and look at i t from 
Islamic view-point . 
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The basic difference between Mu^ahharl's social 
philosophy and western philosophers like Popper, J.P.Sartre, 
Marcuse and Russell lies in to their different approaches 
to man. Consequently their views on various vital issues 
such as the nature of moral values, social Justice, society, 
philosophy of history radically differ from those of Mu-^ahharl, 
However, there may be some agreement between Mu-fahhari and 
these western philosophers, but the points of agreement are 
not substantial. Mutahharl believes in a particular concept 
of human nature that is of Divine origin, while the Western 
philosophers deny any such human nature. Sartre in his 
Being and ffothingness rejects the concept of a fixed human 
nature• In Marxism philosophy there is no room for any 
Divine element in human nature, Marcuse believes that man 
has bfQOne one-dimentional du9 to the compulsions of the 
prea^nt soqitty. In his view oppression in the industrial 
sociitlen axista no longer in an economic way now exists 
in spiritual and Intellectual form. But he has no clear 
view of the nature of man, while Mutahharl developed his 
social philosophy on the basis of his conception of man. 
Due to this difference his moral philosophy also has little 
affinity with that of contemporary moral thinkers, who in 
general accept acme kind of relativism, Hia moral philosophy 
is in conformity with the teachings of Islam. Mutahharl has 
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conatznacted his idea of Justice on a securer ground than 
that suggested by Western thinkers. Mutahharl's concepts 
of nature (fitrat) and the natural human rights ensure 
freedom for all living beings. In his view natural rights 
also are of Divine Origin. 
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